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Abstract
We introduce a static analysis framework for detecting instances of security breaches in 
infinite mobile and cryptographic systems specified using the languages of the 7r-calculus 
and its cryptographic extension, the spi calculus. The framework is composed from three 
components: First, standard denotational semantics of the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus 
are constructed based on domain theory. The resulting model is sound and adequate with 
respect to transitions in the operational semantics. The standard semantics is then extended 
correctly to non-uniformly capture the property of term substitution, which occurs as a 
result of communications and successful cryptographic operations. Finally, the non-standard 
semantics is abstracted to operate over finite domains so as to ensure the termination of 
the static analysis. The safety of the abstract semantics is proven with respect to the non­
standard semantics. The results of the abstract interpretation are then used to capture 
breaches of the secrecy and authenticity properties in the analysed systems. Two initial 
prototype implementations of the security analysis for the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus 
are also included in the thesis.
The main contributions of this thesis are summarised by the following. In the area of 
denotational semantics, the thesis introduces a domain-theoretic model for the spi calculus 
that is sound and adequate with respect to transitions in the structural operational seman­
tics. In the area of static program analysis, the thesis utilises the denotational approach as 
the basis for the construction of abstract interpretations for infinite systems modelled by 
the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus. This facilitates the use of computationally significant 
mathematical concepts like least fixed points and results in an analysis that is fully compo­
sitional. Also, the thesis demonstrates that the choice of the term-substitution property in 
mobile and cryptographic programs is rich enough to capture breaches of security properties, 
like process secrecy and authenticity. These properties are used to analyse a number of mo­
bile and cryptographic protocols, like the file transfer protocol and the Needham-Schroeder, 
SPLICE/AS, Otway-Rees, Kerberos, Yahalom and Woo Lam authentication protocols.
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1.1 The Problem  of Computer Security
The issue of security in computing systems developed as an independent research discipline 
in the early 1970s, although much of the earlier work had been carried out as part of other 
research areas, particularly in relation to operating systems and databases. Despite the fact 
that many of the early papers in computer security are difficult to obtain nowadays, there are 
some entities that maintain collections of such papers. One example is the comprehensive 
collection provided by NISTs Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC)1.
The early forms of computer security were restricted to the protection of data and pro­
grams running on isolated monolithic mainframe machines or on limited multi-user or multi­
program systems. Such protection mainly consisted of access control and authorization 
mechanisms and relied, to a large extent, on protecting the physical access to these ma­
chines. Later, the introduction and success of computer networking gave a new perspective 
to computer security. Networks meant that users and machines could share information over 
a wide range of distances. The implications soon became clear: data and files could be vul­
nerable to attacks from other users/programs not only within the machines themselves, but 
also over the network. Cryptography was utilised as an effective solution to the protection 
of data and programs from these new threats.
In the last decade or so, the issue of computer security has become even more intricate and 
sophisticated with the advent of wide area distributed systems like the Internet, and dynamic 
mobile technologies. Such advancements not only facilitated the integration of computers 
into every day life activities, but also provided features like transparency, anonymity, and 
'T he  collection is available at: http ://csrc .n is t .gov/publications/history/
1
mobility, all of which opened the gates for new forms of computer and information attacks 
to be launched. In almost every research area related to the modern technologies underlying 
e-commerce, global communications and pervasive computing, the element of security is a 
necessity for the protection of our identities, data and material property.
Nowadays, it is often a common practice to use credit cards to purchase goods and pay 
for services online over the Internet. Taking this practice as an example, the security threats 
posed are several: fraud resulting from compromising the secrecy of credit card information 
by malicious attackers, the integrity of the data transmitted during a payment session, the 
authenticity of the site offering goods or services, anonymity and non-repudiation issues re­
lated to transactions, etc. Cryptographic protocols have been devised to resolve the problems 
of secrecy and authenticity by using secret-key cryptography and public-key infrastructure 
to ensure that communications maintain certain levels of security requirements.
As a second example, consider the downloadable code fragments that often enter the 
address space of computers connected to the Internet. Special treatment of mobile code 
is necessary in order to avoid leaking private information to external sources as well as 
damaging internal data. Therefore, safety measures like bounded sandboxes, which prevent 
applets from accessing local file systems and initiating ad-hoc network connections, have 
been devised.
All these new demands for computer security have prompted the task of designing and 
implementing more robust systems that are inherently secure. An important aspect of this 
task is program analysis, which helps the understanding of the way programs will behave 
and their properties once executed. Broadly speaking, one may divide program analysis 
into two categories: runtime and compile-time analysis. Runtime analysis relies on dynamic 
techniques that gather information about programs during their execution or testing. This 
information is then used to reason about the properties of a program and subsequently 
will affect the way data and control flow in that program. In general, runtime analysis 
has focused on traditional ad-hoc monitoring techniques used in performance monitoring, 
distributed debugging, etc. and has not yet demonstrated much use of formal methods 
techniques (except for a few examples like runtime type checking and program specification 
guidance). On the other hand, compile-time analysis has benefited much from the use of 
formal methods techniques, in particular model checking, theorem proving and abstract 
interpretation. Unlike the runtime analysis, which has a real-time narrow view of a program 
computation, a compile-time analysis is only applicable at the compilation stage and can 
approximate properties about all the possible computations of that program.
The approach to the problem of detecting security threats in computer systems as con­
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tributed by this thesis involves the introduction of an abstract interpretation-based static 
analysis framework for the verification of security-related properties of infinite mobile and 
cryptographic systems whose meaning is defined by a denotational semantics. The frame­
work is general; it can be accommodated to different languages, properties and abstractions. 
However, in our case, we target closed systems specified with the language of the ?r-calculus 
and its cryptographic-extension, the spi calculus, and deal with open systems by modelling 
the intruder within the specification. We capture the name-passing behaviour within mo­
bile systems and the term-passing and term-processing2 behaviours within cryptographic 
protocols through the abstract interpretation of programs. This abstract interpretation is 
non-uniform; the number of copies of each term appearing in the results of the interpretation 
can be adjusted depending on the nature of properties sought. The information obtained 
from the abstract interpretation is then used to further analyse these programs to detect 
the presence of any secrecy or authenticity breaches.
In the rest of this introduction, we describe the basics underlying four main components 
of our static analysis framework. These include mobile systems (and their security-related 
extensions), denotational semantics, static program analysis, and computer security. Each 
of these components constitutes a major area of research that overlaps with the other areas. 
We only give a brief overview of each of these components in a manner that is specific to our 
framework and avoid going into too much detail, referring enthusiastic readers to references 
on each subject involved.
1.2 Mobile Systems
The word mobile in the real world is normally used to describe the state of any object, 
location, condition etc. that is moving with respect to some reference. In the context 
of computing systems, mobility may refer to the movement of communication channels, 
code, or whole computing environments. For example, HTML links can be created, sent to 
other entities and destroyed later. References to objects in object-oriented programming are 
created and passed around as capabilities of communication. In Java, applet code embedded 
in Web pages can be downloaded and executed dynamically at runtime by the host machine. 
The movement of “intelligent” mobile agents constitutes a form of code and state mobility. 
Finally, the emerging component-based technologies and pervasive/ubiquitous computing 
are interesting examples of mobile computing environments.
2Term processing is the term we use to refer to the cryptographic operations performed by processes on 
terms in the spi calculus.
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From a process algebraic point of view, there are two widely accepted definitions of 
mobility [96]:
1. Link-based mobility.
The concept of link-based mobility states that the movement of a process among 
other processes can in fact be described as the proliferation, change and extinction 
of the communication channels linking that process to the rest. In other words, this 
corresponds to the movement of links in the virtual space of linked processes. The basic 
notion of communication here is that of process interaction, where processes interact 
to exchange links. This induces the behaviour of message passing. The resulting 
mobility is expressively powerful and can be used to encode the higher-order notion 
of process-based mobility, in which whole processes (not just links) can move in the 
virtual space of linked processes. The 7r-calculus [97, 96, 114] is among the most 
authoritative models that embrace the link-based definition of mobility.
2. Location-based mobility.
Unlike the link-based definition of mobility, which describes a virtual movement of 
links, the location-based definition relies on the physical aspect of mobility. According 
to this definition, mobility is the movement of processes in the space of locations. 
For example, the movement of a laptop from one local area network to another is 
viewed as the movement of a computing process (the laptop) from one parent location 
(first LAN) to another (second LAN). The best example of a formalism that adopts the 
concept of location-based mobility is the Mobile Ambients calculus [38], which is mainly 
influenced by Internet programming and the presence of administrative domains that 
divide wide area networks in general.
By and large, the modelling of mobility in computing systems has benefited a good deal 
from the body of theory that was developed earlier for the modelling of static concurrent and 
distributed systems. Formalisms such as Petri nets [107], CSP [75] and CCS [93] provided 
the necessary mature ground for the arrival of the first substantial theory of mobility; the 
7r-calculus. The development of the 7r-calculus was directly inspired by the calculus of [50], 
where label-passing was added to the theory of CCS to model the dynamic configuration 
of networks. In the 7r-calculus, the theory was further simplified by adopting the unique 
notion of a name (hence identifying variables and constants). Names refer to channels 
of communication and can be communicated over other names. The concept of mobility is 
grasped by allowing processes to exchange names of channels, and hence modify the network 
configuration dynamically.
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The 7r-calculus is a highly expressive language that is also capable of encoding statically 
distributed systems and functional programming (A-calculus). The language is characterized 
as being directly executable and has formed the basis for other programming languages like 
Piccola [9], Join [64], Piet [108] and Nomadic Piet [132]. It has also provided the basis for 
many extended models that are concerned with different aspects and properties of mobile 
systems. The extension we are interested in is the spi calculus [5], which extends the language 
of the 7r-calculus by the addition of cryptographic primitives like encryption/decryption and 
digital signing/verification. Reasoning about the different properties of cryptographic pro­
tocols is based on a theory of testing-equivalence. Properties like privacy and authentication 
are defined as equivalences in the presence of intruder processes.
The popularity of the 7r-calculus led to the development of the Mobile Ambients calculus 
that adopts a different approach in the modelling of mobility. Unlike the location-transparent 
7r-calculus, the Mobile Ambients adopts the notion of an ambient as its main idea and it 
is most suitable for the modelling of computing agents that can move from one location to 
another. Ambients are bounded places where computations can take place. The boundary of 
an ambient is significant to its movement, since it determines exactly what entity will move. 
It is also significant from the security perspective as it acts as an access control mechanism 
determining what boundaries can or cannot be crossed. Examples of ambients include a 
virtual address space, a laptop, a Unix file system and a single Java object. Furthermore, 
ambients may be nested within other ambients.
Amongst other formalisms, which adopt definitions of mobility that overlap definitions 
(1) and (2) above and that have been shown to be interesting, is the seal calculus [129]. 
Seals are named locations that are passed around and can have portals opened for remote 
communications occurring with the parent and child seals, while allowing for local commu­
nications to take place directly within the same seal. The seal calculus extends the polyadic 
7r-calculus [95], and in comparison to the Mobile Ambients calculus, it adopts an objective 
movement of locations; movement is initiated by the environment surrounding a seal. The 
Mobile Ambients calculus, on the other hand, adopts subjective mobility allowing ambients 
to initiate the movement.
The seal calculus elegantly models Internet programming. It adheres to a number of 
principles that are reminiscent of Internet-like programming. These include the distinction 
between remote and local communications, locations, restricted connectivity and access 
control. In particular, the modelling of security notions that rely on locations and scoping, 
like the perfect firewall equation, is straightforward.
One of the interesting issues currently debated within the area of mobility formalisms
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and security is whether there is a need for combining location-based mobility languages, like 
the Mobile Ambients and seal calculi, with cryptographic primitives in a similar manner to 
the spi calculus. The analogy between the concepts of a mobile location and a ciphertext 
encrypted with a symmetric key is prevalent. However, it is less obvious when dealing with 
asymmetric-key cryptography and operations like hashing. Nonetheless, the modelling of 
mechanisms, like remote communications (e.g. RPC and RMI), could well benefit from such 
a combination.
In our static analysis framework, we adopt the 7r-calculus as the main specification lan­
guage for mobile systems. We also adopt its security extension, the spi calculus, for the spec­
ification of mobile systems enhanced with cryptography. This decision is motivated by two 
reasons: first, the fact that both languages are more mature than any of the location-based 
languages means that more theory is available. Second, there are very few cryptographic 
extensions of the location-based languages [111], therefore, cryptographic protocols have not 
been studied in light of such models. Nonetheless, extending the current framework to the 
Mobile Ambients calculus and/or the seal calculus should benefit our cause and will provide 
additional understanding of how security mechanisms, in general, behave in mobile systems.
1.3 Denotational Semantics
The denotational (also known as the mathematical) approach to the definition of the se­
mantics of programming languages was initiated by Christopher Strachey and instrumented 
by Dana Scott in the late 1960s and early 1970s [118, 117, 123, 115, 122, 131]. The idea 
suggested by Scott and Strachey was to develop a mathematical framework within which 
the formal semantics of programming languages could be specified without the traditional 
implementation-dependant problems associated with operational semantics and that would 
rely on the rigor that mathematics offers. Indeed, this framework later became an inspiration 
for computer language designers and implementers.
The basis of any denotational model is that syntactic phrases are realisations of abstract 
mathematical objects. For example, in a calculator device, strings of digits are perceived 
as abstract numerical ideas regardless of the format in which those digits are presented on 
the screen. Another example is the functional view that programs stand for mathematical 
functions, and the execution of a program, given some input data, resembles the application 
of a function to its parameters.
In general, for any syntactically correct program, there exists a mathematical object 
known as the denotation of that program that expresses the meaning of the program in a
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clear and non-circular (i.e. needless of further definitions) manner. Based on this, one may 
divide a denotational model into three components:
1. Syntactic domains. These are the collection of entities that constitute the syntactical 
representation of the language constructs and whose meaning is sought. Syntactic 
domains include digits, numerals, expressions, instructions, phrases and programs. 
The syntactic domains we adopt here are abstract [89], as opposed to the concrete 
syntactic domains, which normally introduce unnecessary syntactic sugar useful only 
for the parsing of programs and does not contribute to their meaning. Furthermore, 
the syntactic notation we adopt is a version of the Backus-Naur Form (BNF) [17], 
which describes context-free grammars. Classical readings on the subject of syntax 
include [41, 16].
2 . Semantic domains. These are collections of mathematical objects (denotations) that 
convey the meaning of the syntactical entities. Elements of these objects usually have 
some structure, like complete partial orders (CPOs), lattices or domains, whose algebra 
is determined by domain theory. The semantic elements are usually classified as either 
primitive or complex elements, where the bottom element in these domains often 
denotes the undefined program. Primitive elements constitute the atomic semantic 
elements whereas complex elements are necessary to convey more sophisticated ideas 
that can be decomposed back to the primitive elements. For example, it is common 
in the theory of the 7r-calculus to interpret parallelism in terms of the simpler notions 
of input/output and non-determinism.
3. Semantic functions. These are special functions that map programs, phrases etc. from 
their syntactic domains to their denotations in the semantic domains. Often, there 
are certain requirements that need to be satisfied by semantic functions, for example, 
being monotonic and continuous.
In general, a denotational semantics has to respect the principle of compositionality. Com- 
positionality states that the meaning of a program can be defined in terms of the meanings 
of its subprograms. A discussion on the principle of compositionality in the definition of 
language semantics can be found in [125], Also, the well known Pisa Notes3 on domains 
compiled by Gordon Plotkin are a traditional reading in the subject of domain theory and 
its application to semantics.
One of the main advantages that the denotational semantics approach introduced is that 
the behaviour of any program could be determined directly through the mathematics of
3Notes can be downloaded from http://www.dcs.ed.ac.uk/home/gdp/publications/Domains.ps.gz
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domain theory without the need to execute that program, and consequently, without the 
need to design any language compilers or interpreters. As a result, program verification 
and comparison becomes an easier task compared to other approaches to the definition of 
language semantics.
The fact that the denotational approach relies, to a large degree, on domain theory means 
that several powerful mathematical tools become available for reasoning about program 
semantics. Mainly, concepts like CPOs, continuous functions and least fixed points are 
easier to express and implement. For example, it is often the case that demonstrating the 
termination of a static analysis is dependent on the evaluation of least fixed points.
Finally, the idea of using semantic functions to denote the meaning of programs created 
a close relationship between the theory of denotational semantics and the functional pro­
gramming paradigm. The task of implementing denotational interpreters using functional 
languages becomes fairly straightforward. Any static analysis that, in turn, is based on the 
denotational semantics of the language can also be directly implemented as a higher-level 
abstraction (i.e. semantics-directed). The implementations of fixed points are also standard 
in functional languages.
1.4 Static Program Analysis
Quite often, it is desirable to predict in advance the set of values resulting from programs 
and verify certain properties regarding their runtime behaviour. For this purpose, the area of 
static program analysis offers compile-time computable techniques that can be used to safely 
approximate properties and values of programs without the need to execute them directly 
on computers. The functionality covered by static analysers is wide and ranges from simple 
syntactic verifications that can be used in program transformations to complex runtime 
properties related to issues of security and optimisation. In general, many approaches exist 
for building static analysers. Here, we distinguish four main approaches [102].
1.4.1 Data Flow Analysis
Motivated by the aim of producing smaller and faster programs, the main application area 
of the data flow analysis approach has always been the performance optimisation of pro­
gram code generated by compilers. Other important applications that benefit from data 
flow analysis include program testing, validation, verification, parallelization and vectoriza- 
tion. Classical data flow analyses include reaching definitions, available expressions and live 
variables analyses [102].
A data flow analysis is primarily designed to gather information about the use and 
definition of data in a program as well as the dependencies between the different sets of 
data. To achieve this, a program is often seen as a graph, where nodes represent blocks of 
the program and edges represent flows between those blocks. For example, the following 
program computes the factorial of a number n:
F  d=  [ fa c  :=  l]1; while [n > l ]2 do ([/ac :=  f a c  * n]3; [n := n  — l]4)
This program can be represented by the graph of Figure 1.1, and can also be expressed by 
the function flow  =  {(1 ,2 ), (2,3), (3,4), (4 ,2)}. Sets of equations or constraints are then
Figure 1.1: The flow graph of the factorial program.
constructed that relate the entry and exit information of each program node and among the 
different nodes. The least solution of these equations represents the result of the analysis. 
In the above example of the factorial program, one may construct a reaching definitions 
analysis by defining the following set of equations [102] :
Rout (I) =  (R in (l)\ {(f ac, I)}) U {(/ac, 1)}
R.out{2) =  R in( 2)
I  lout (3) =  (R in(3)\ {(f ac, I)}) U { fa c ,  3}
Rout{ 4) =  (iîïn(4)\{(n, I)}) U {(n , 4)}
R in (2 ) =  Rout( 1) U Rout(4)
R in{ 3) =  Rout( 2)
R in(4) - Rout( 3)
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Where I is any label, I € { 1 , 2 ,3 ,4 }. R out(l) here relates information at the exit point of a 
node, I, in terms of the inputs to that node, and R in(l) relates information about the entry 
point of node, I, in terms of the outputs from that point. The restriction, Rin(l')\{(x, I)}, 
and the union, Rin(l') U {(a;, i')}, refer to the change that occurs in the value of variable 
x at program node I', where the previous value of x was obtained at node I. On the other 
hand, R in(l) reflects the information collected from nodes whose outputs flow into the input 
of node I. Hence, Rout(l') is added to the value of R:in{l) whenever control flow is possible 
from node I1 to node I.
In a reaching definitions analysis, the information collected about a program point rep­
resents the assignments that can reach that point, i.e. assignments not overwritten by the 
time the point is reached. Hence, solving the above equations will result in the least solution 
of Figure 1.2 (the question mark ’? ’ symbol denotes unknown value).
I R,in(l) Rout(l)
1 (n, ? ) ,(/ « ,? ) (n,?), (/ac, 1)
2 (n ,?),(n ,4),(/oc, 1 ),(/oc, 3) (n,?), (n, 4), ( fa c , 1), (fa c ,  3)
3 (n ,? ),(n ,4 ),(/ a c ,l),(/ o c ,3 ) (n,?), (n, 4), ( f a c ,3)
4 (n ,?),(n ,4),(/ ac,3) (ft, 4), ( fa c , 3)
Figure 1.2: The solution of the reaching definitions analysis for the factorial program.
Data flow analysis is a mature research area, where frameworks have been developed to 
classify and solve different classes of data flow problems. These problems can be described 
using the formalisms of the different frameworks and a solution algorithm is then selected. 
The earliest framework for data flow analysis can be ascribed to Kildall [84], who was also 
the first to use semi-lattices in such analyses. A survey can be found in [88], which includes 
the rapid, continuous, distributive, monotone and k-bound frameworks.
The most popular framework for data flow analysis is the monotone framework due to 
[82], In this framework, data flow problems are defined through lattices (either complete 
or semi-lattices) of values with a meet (join) operator, often called the property space, and 
a family of transfer functions defined over those lattices. To create an instance of the 
framework, a (directed) flow graph is required, where the transfer functions are bound to 
the graph nodes using a function map. The association of a function to a particular node 
means that all the information gathered at the node is mapped to lattice values. This also 
allows for data flow problems to be phrased as equations that encode the information at each 
node in terms of the information at the predecessor (successor) nodes and the local transfer
10
functions. The solution to a problem is then obtained by computing a fixed point (least or 
greatest) of the equation system, where a lattice value is associated with each node of the 
flow graph. An interesting treatment of the monotone framework for concurrent systems is 
given in [48].
The only application of the data flow paradigm to the analysis of the 7r-calculus has 
been given in [81], where the issue of causality among processes and true concurrency is 
examined. However, as we are unaware of any security-related data flow analyses, we shall 
not discuss this paradigm any further.
1.4.2 Control Flow Analysis
A control flow analysis is concerned with answering the following question: Given a particular 
point in a program, what is the set of subprograms, functions, commands etc. that can 
be reached from that point? In other words, a control flow analysis attempts to record 
information about the different execution paths in the program. This information is then 
used to conduct program optimisation and transformation as well as determine runtime 
properties. Despite the fact that the early control flow analysis techniques were developed 
mainly for the functional programming paradigm, control flow analyses were later utilised 
in other paradigms as well, like the object-oriented, concurrent and logic programming 
paradigms.
Often, a control flow analysis is expressed as a constraint-based analysis and its solution 
relates the different points of control flow of the basic program blocks. Taking a functional 
program as an example, the set of constraints may be classified into three main classes, 
assuming a finite set of program labels. The first two classes relate function abstractions and 
variable values to their corresponding labels, respectively. The third class expresses which 
formal parameters of functions are bound to which actual parameters in function applications 
and whether the results returned from functions can be returned by the applications in which 
they appear.
For example, consider the following functional program [102]:
[[in x => [x]1]2 [fn y => [y]3]4]5
If we assume functions C(l) and label (x), where the former indicates the set of expressions 
that I may evaluate to, and the latter the values that variable x may be bound to, then the 
following classes of constraints may be stated for the above program. The first class relates
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values of function abstractions to their labels:
{fn  x => [x]1} C C (2)
{fn  y => [y]3} C C (4)
The second class of constraints relates values of variables to their labels:
label(a;) C (7(1) 
label(j/) C (7(3)
The final class expresses information about function applications, where the following con­
ditional constraints are introduced (the inclusion of functions fn  x => x and fn y => y 
provides for the possibility that both functions may be applied):
{fn  x => [x]1} C (7(2) => (7(4) C label(x)
{fn  x => [x]1} C (7(2) => (7(1) C (7(5)
{fn  y => [y]3} C <7(2) => (7(4) C label(y)
{fn  y => [y]3} C (7(2) => ¿7(3) C <7(5)
The least solution to the above equations is given as follows:
C (l) =  {fn  y => [y]3}
C (2) =  {fn  x => [x]1}
C( 3) =  { }
(7(4) =  {fn  y => [y]3}
(7(5) =  {fn  y => [y]3}
la b e l (x) =  {fn  y => [y]3}
la b e l(y )  =  { }
This solution reveals that the function, (fn y => y), is never applied in the program (since 
we have that la b e l (y )= { } ) ,  and the program may only evaluate to the function, fn  y => 
y, (since we have that C (5) =  {fn  y => [y]3}). Hence, the last two conditional constraints 
have false left sides leading to false right sides.
To achieve a more precise control flow analysis, the concept of k-C FA  analysis (C FA  
stands for Control i^low Analysis) was developed in [119], where k  stands for the level of 
context information taken into account in the analysis. Hence, a 0-C F A  denotes a context- 
insensitive or monovariant analysis. On the other hand, when k > 0, the analysis is described 
as context-sensitive or polyvariant. The presence of dynamic context information allows for
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the different instances of variables and program blocks to be distinguished and therefore, 
arrive at more precise results for the analysis. Several variations of the k-C FA  analysis exist, 
for example the uniform k-C FA , polynomial k-C F A  and the Cartesian product algorithm.
Control flow analysis has been combined with other approaches, like data flow analy­
sis, abstract interpretation and flow graphs, to achieve better quality, understanding and 
presentation of the final results. Data flow information may be included in the final set of 
results obtained from the control flow analysis, which then results in better quality of control 
flow information. The use of abstract interpretation techniques is necessary for timing the 
complexity of the analysis versus its precision. As with the data flow analysis, flow graphs 
are a handy tool to visualise results and gain better understanding of the flow of control 
among different program blocks.
1.4.3 A bstract Interpretation
An abstract interpretation allows for programs to be analysed by running their specifications 
over finite approximated semantic domains that are less precise than the concrete semantic 
domains, but that are characterised as being safe computable abstractions of the concrete 
domains. In fact, the original work by [45] has developed from being a specific framework 
for imperative languages to a. general framework offering solutions on the design of static 
analyses for different programming paradigms. It even became closely linked with other 
approaches like data flow analysis, control flow analysis and type systems.
The first step in designing an abstract interpretation is to determine whether the stan­
dard semantics of the language is sufficiently rich to be able to capture the property under 
consideration. If not, a non-standard semantics is designed as an extension or modification 
of the standard semantics to capture the property of interest. The resulting non-standard 
semantics is sometimes proven to be correct with respect to the standard semantics. Differ­
ent approaches exist for proving the existence of a correctness relation. The approach we 
follow in our framework is to show that for all the non-standard semantics elements, the 
standard semantic component can be extracted from these elements.
More formally, assume P  is a program, flP[) =  v G V is the standard semantic evaluation, 
and [P] =  / 6  L  is the non-standard semantic evaluation, then the correctness relation R  is 
formalised as a compositional function:
V P  : i i ( [ P J )  =  flPD 
V ui, i)2 €  V, l\, li €  L : R(h)  =  V\ A R(h) = V2 =/• R(h * h)  =  Vi *  1)2
Where, *, is a composition operation that constructs the complex meaning, l\ *  h ,  from
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the primitive meanings I] and 12. Often proving the existence of R  is largely dependent 
on the amount of information about the standard semantics retained in the non-standard 
semantics.
Since the concrete semantics (standard or non-standard) may operate over infinite do­
mains, the computation of this semantics is not guaranteed to terminate, even with the use 
of least fixed points. Therefore, a suitable approximation (abstraction) is required to keep 
the semantic domain finite. This abstraction is shown to be safe with respect to the concrete 
semantics by proving that a safety relation is preserved across the abstract semantic values.
This relation expresses the fact that every concrete computation maps to a corresponding
abstract computation, although the latter of course, is less precise.
Hence, if we assume that, [P ] 1 =  1* € I } ,  is the abstract semantics function, then the 
safety requirement can be formulated as a relation, S, defined as follows:
VP,IP] =  J, [ i f  =  Z" : ( U “) € S
Vfi ,/2 e L , l [ , i\  e £ '  : { lu ll)  A (J2 , J S ) e S  =>• (h * h ,l\  * 1“) e S
The definition of the safety relation 5  is highly dependent on the semantic domains and the 
choice of the abstraction adopted.
In the theory of abstract interpretation, the set of abstract semantics values, L\  is 
interesting because it is augmented with some ordering relation, C, which results in 1}  
having some structure, like a complete lattice. Moreover, we can impose the following 
implications between the complete lattice, L\  and the safety relation, S:
VI €£ , /} ,  4  eX«  : ( l , l\ ) £ S  A l\ HI* => (M*)
V l6 i , l l e £ ' , )i ' , Ç i , : ( M ,) e S  =► (I ,n i/ a) € S
The first implication states that if an abstract value, l\, is safe, then a larger value, l\, will 
also be safe and, therefore, the smaller value, |J, would constitute a more precise or better 
solution. The second implication states that for a set of safe abstract values, their greatest 
lower bound is also a safe value. In other words, for a concrete semantic value, /, there is
always a smallest abstract value, l~~l L' ,^ among a sub-lattice, L'® Ç Û , of safe values, that
is itself safe with respect to I. Practically, this has the effect that an abstract interpretation 
needs to be performed only once for a program to obtain the best solution.
An alternative approach to the safety proof involves the introduction of a pair of ab­
straction/concrétisation relations that are shown to form a Galois connection between the 
concrete and abstract domains. Hence, a tuple, (L , a ,7 , i J ) ,  is a Galois connection between 
the two complete lattices, (L, Ç, fl, U, _L, T ), and, ( L * , C, n , U, ± , T ) ,  where a  : L  —>• and
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7  •' —> L  are monotone functions, if the tuple satisfies the requirement that:
7 0 a  □ A 1.1
a  ° 7  C A m .m
Which express the safety of the abstract semantics at the cost of losing precision. On certain 
occasions, widening and narrowing techniques may also be used in combination with Galois 
connections to further approximate fixed points.
The main application of abstract analysers has been in combination with language com­
pilers that could be used in program optimisation and to prove that the program is safe with 
respect to a certain security policy. Examples of popular non-security-related implementa­
tions of abstract interpretation-based analyses include the strictness analysis, sharing analy­
sis, the ground substitutions analysis in logic programs and approximations of n-dimensional 
vector spaces over integers and rational numbers.
1.4.4 Type Systems
Type systems are widely used in programming languages to avoid unwanted behaviour of 
their programs during runtime. Some of this behaviour could be crucial to security violations, 
like private information leaks and restricted address space accesses. In general, a type is 
regarded as holding information that is true about the program entity it types. Moreover, if 
one thinks of a type as being a collection of values, then a subset of that collection constitutes 
a subtype. Subtyping expresses an ordering relation among the different types. It also may 
be thought of as giving more refined information about the subtyped entity.
One may also define a principal type as the most general type of an expression. For 
example, a lambda abstraction, Xx.x, has the principal type, a  —> a, where a  could be 
instantiated with any type. Principal types of language expressions are often computed 
from the types of their subexpressions using Robinson’s unification algorithms [113].
A typing environment is used to map the different program entities (statements, ex­
pressions, constants, variables etc.) to their types. Such environment may be constructed 
manually according to a set of axioms and rules. Consider the following imperative language:
S, S i, 52 :=  [®: =a] J 
I [skip]'
I S i ;  S ,
| i f  [&]! then Si e lse  S2
| while [b]1 do S
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Where 1,1' € {1,2,3,4} .  Then each statement may be considered as typed by the type 
S  —> £ , where, £ , is the type of the state of the program. This type could denote the result
of a reaching definitions analysis, RD. Based on this interpretation of E, one may introduce
the axioms and rules of Figure 1.3 [102],
(assign) [x :=  a]1 : RD  —» ((R D \{(x,l')}) U {(x ,l) } )
(skip) [skip]1 : RD  —> RD
S\ : RDi — > RD-x ¿2 : RD2 RD3
( s e q ) --------------------------------------------------—
S \; 1S2 : RD 1 —^ RD$
S\ : RD\ —^ RD 2 S2 ■ RD\ —^ RD 2
( i f)  --------- --------------------------------------------------
i f  [b] then S 1 e lse  S2 ■ RD\ —> RD 2
S : RD RD
(while) --------------------------------------------
while [&]* do S : RD RD
S RD^ —^ RD$
(sub) --------------------------  if RD\ C RD 2 and RD 3 C RD 4
S  .■ RD i —^ RD 4
Figure 1.3: Types for the reaching definitions analysis.
These axioms and rules are explained as follows. Axiom (assign) states that any previous 
assignments carried out on the variable, x, are removed from the final state RD, and x is 
declared as having the value assigned at current statement marked I. Axiom (skip) does not 
alter RD  and rule seq composes the type of a sequential statement, S\; S-2 , from the types of 
the composed statements, S i and S2 - Rule ( if)  deals with the conditional statement, which 
is given the type of either branch. Rule (while) assigns to a while statement the type of its 
body. Finally, rule (sub) deals with the subtyping of statements.
Given the factorial programme of Section 1.4.1:
F d=  [fa c  :=  l]1; while [n > l ]2 do ([fa c  := f a c  * n]3; [n :=  n — l]4)
It is possible to apply the axioms and rules of Figure 1.3 to arrive at the final type for F  as 
follows:
F  '■ { (n> ?)> i fa c ,  ?)} -> {(n, 4), (fa c ,  3)}
Which confirms to the results of Figure 1.2, Section 1.4.1, which shows that Rin( 1) =  
(jt,, ?), (/a-c, ?) and Rout(4) =  (n,4), (fac, 3).
Alternatively, a type inference algorithm may be constructed to infer the types of lan­
guage entities from the types of their surrounding context. The set of typing axioms and
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rules can then be used to make judgements about whether a particular program construct 
is well typed within the typing environment or not. Unification in the algorithm may also 
be used to generate principal types. Whenever all the programs of a language are shown to 
be well typed (by proving a type soundness theorem stating that well-typed programs are 
well behaved), the language is then said to be type sound.
Using static type checking, the layout of types in a program are tested against the typing 
rules to reveal any violations. Programs that do not enforce the typing rules and that 
contain trapped errors (errors detected by the typing system) are eliminated. Again, there 
is an element of approximation in the manner that static type checking works: if a program 
passes the type-checker, it is surely well typed. Otherwise, it is ill typed or cannot not 
guaranteed to be well typed. Since defining the typing system is a separate problem from 
constructing a type-checking algorithm, it is often the case that type system designers run 
into the problem of defining type systems that will only admit infeasible algorithms or 
sometimes, no algorithms at all.
Most type systems found in procedural languages are first order , i.e. they lack type 
parameterisation and abstraction. Whenever these are present, the system is called second 
order. Type parameterisation refers to those programs that are of the type AX.M , where M  
is the program and X  is a type variable. This means that M  is parameterised with respect 
to X , which is instantiated only by the context. Parameterisation is a feature often found in 
polymorphic languages, like ML. Type abstraction is a feature that often appears as opaque 
types in interfaces in modular languages, like CLU [86].
Type systems can also use special annotations, called effects , that express the effect of 
using each of the types defined by the typing environment. For example, a function type of 
the form n  -^ »T2 maps values of type n  to values of type r-i and as a result of this application, 
it may perform a call to function (p. Effect systems are often implemented as extensions of 
type inference algorithms and are useful in providing information about the internal steps 
of computation for each program expression.
Finally, one of the interesting topics in the subject of type systems is that of type equiv­
alence. Type equivalence relates separately written type expressions. By-name equivalence 
refers to those types that match by having the same names. On the other hand, structural 
equivalence refers to those types that match by having the same structure. It is usual to 
find typing systems that adopt a mixture of both equivalence relations.
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1.5 Security Properties
As we highlighted earlier, the task of protecting private and critical information from unau­
thorised actions conducted by malicious intruders or resulting from innocent errors has 
grown into an area of major importance in the design and analysis of computing systems. 
In the following paragraphs, we attempt to cover briefly some of the properties often dealt 
with when considering the security of computing systems and that are of interest to our 
framework. These include the secrecy and authenticity of information.
1.5.1 Secrecy
The problem of protecting the secrecy of private information is a long-standing problem 
that finds its roots in the pre-computing age. Models were devised to prevent unauthorized 
subjects accessing classified physical resources (like paperwork) owned by other subjects. 
The success of these models in the real world encouraged researchers to adapt the same 
ideas to protect the secrecy of information in the computing world.
The early computer security models were access control models that regulated the access 
of users and programs to sensitive data. These models could be classified into two main 
categories: mandatory access control (MAC) and discretionary access control (DAC) models. 
The fundamental difference between the two categories is that the former grants a system- 
wide policy the right to decree which subjects have access to which resources, whereas 
in the latter, the owner of each particular resource decrees itself which subjects can have 
access to the resource. The main example of MAC models is the Bell and La Padula [19] 
model, which is based on rigid military security policies and can be summarized by the no 
read-up/no write-down properties that prohibit low-level (unclassified) subjects obtaining 
high-level data. A variation of the Bell and La Padula model known as the Biba model [20] 
preserves the integrity of information by reversing the capabilities of subjects. Hence, low- 
level (unclassified) subjects cannot alter the contents of high-level resources. This property 
is known as the no read-down/no write-up property.
The rigidity of MAC models is relaxed in DAC models. Every owner of a resource 
is responsible for granting rights to access and modify that resource to other subjects. 
These rights may change with time and depending on the appearance of new entities and 
the disappearance of old ones. Hence, in addition to the system-wide policy that assigns 
subjects to groups, a local policy exists for each subject that specifies the access rights to 
its resources. An example of the implementation of DAC models is the permissions list of 
Unix files.
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DAC models, in general, suffer from the problem of malicious programs that run on behalf 
of a high-level subject and that may modify the access rights of resources belonging to that 
subject granting access to low-level subjects4. This problem is not present in MAC models, 
as any writing-down or reading-up between high-level and low-level subjects is prohibited. 
However, the MAC models can only monitor explicit flows of information and fail to capture 
the implicit flows.
Implicit flows were first referred to by Butler Lampson in his famous note on covert 
channels [85], in which he raised new questions on how private information could be leaked 
in computing systems. The note examined the task of confining a program and revealed 
the real boundaries that this problem could have. The transmission of data may occur not 
only as a result of sending that data over explicit communication channels, but also over 
media not intended for communications in the first place. Well-known examples of covert 
channels are the use of computer storage space to transmit data by filling or emptying the 
space and the revealing of sensitive information about the guards of conditional and while- 
loop statements within the bodies of those statements. Moreover, the solution to completely 
avoid such covert channels in system design, as suggested in [85, page 3], is rather restrictive.
As a result of these subtleties in the way information is passed around, new security 
models appeared that aimed at capturing the whole flow of information in a system, rather 
than just modelling the access of subjects to resources. A well-known example of information 
flow models is the lattice model proposed by Denning [46], which covers both explicit (e.g. 
assignments) and implicit (e.g. conditionals) flows. The security levels of subjects are 
arranged in a lattice whose ordering is determined by the system security policy. Information 
then may flow only from the low-level subjects to the high-level ones.
Other approaches have also been adopted to represent information flows in the presence 
of covert channels. These include non-deducibility [124] and non-interference [67]. There 
are two main problems associated with non-deducibility, as McLean explains [90]: First, it 
weaker than non-interference, which is problematic for cryptographic-based systems. Also, it 
may block the flow of information from low-level to high-level entities in particular systems. 
Second, it is non-compositional, which results in the inability to reason about the secure 
composition of insecure components.
Non-interference has also been a hot topic in recent years and one may state that there 
is no general consensus as to what constitutes the definition of non-interference. In their 
original work [67], Goguen and Messeguer presented a model of non-interference for deter­
ministic systems, i.e. systems whose output is solely determined by their input. The model
4Such programs are often called TYojan horses.
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is based on the observation that a system is non-interfering whenever the output of that 
system does not differ with respect to variations in its input. Otherwise, the system is 
interfering. The difference in system behaviour is expressed in terms of purging functions, 
i.e. functions that remove parts of traces of input commands from the resulting output. A 
non-interfering system identifies a purged output with a non-purged output.
Another definition of non-interference was given by the core calculus of dependency [2], 
which is an extension of Moggi’s computational A-calculus [98]. The dependency calculus is 
a general framework for the comparison of the different type-based dependency analyses, like 
program slicing, call-tracking, binding-time analysis and secure information flow analysis. 
Notions of strong and weak non-interference are formalised by a denotational model for 
the calculus, where the strong version requires the termination of the system and the weak 
version does not (thereby allowing high inputs to affect the termination of the system without 
affecting the non-interference result). The different analyses are then given as instances of 
the calculus satisfying either the strong or the weak versions.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the work achieved so far by Focardi and his team [55, 
62, 61, 58, 59, 56, 60, 57] in laying down the basis for a unifying theory of dependency that 
uses different variations of CCS in reasoning about most of the security properties, like the 
secrecy, authenticity, integrity and availability properties.
Other more recent definitions of the secrecy property build on some theory of process 
equivalence. For example, in the spi calculus [5], secrecy is defined in terms of testing 
equivalence between two instances of a system instantiated with two different messages. An 
intruder who is observing these instances is unable to differentiate between them.
As we mentioned earlier, the introduction of computer networking meant that intruders 
could now undermine the security of information while being transmitted from one computer 
to another. The solution to communication security was found in cryptography. While mod­
els of access and information flow control are primarily concerned with protecting sensitive 
data from unauthorised subjects, cryptography offers a different vision: security by obscu­
rity. Sensitive data can be sent over public communication channels as long as they are 
encrypted, which means that it is of little use to intruders. Discussing the fundamentals of 
cryptography is outside the scope of this section. We recommend [91, 116] as sourcebooks 
for those seeking background on this topic.
In our definition of the secrecy property, we shall adopt a form of explicit information flow 
model that monitors the movement of data among the different processes in a system. A low- 
level process obtaining data created by another high-level process results in an instance of the 
process leakage threat. The explicit meaning of the word “obtaining” here is strictly defined
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in terms of the message-passing communications in mobile systems, and in terms of message 
passing and message processing (e.g. decryption) in cryptographic systems. Issues related 
to the more complex notions of non-interference and equivalence-based secrecy are left as 
future work that builds on the current static analysis framework, and recommendations are 
made in the concluding chapter on future work. This choice of the definition of secrecy as 
the main working definition for our static analysis framework is in line with the current state 
of security models. Most of the current implementation systems rely on some form of access 
or information flow controls. Non-interference and process-equivalence are still immature 
areas largely confined to the research community and have not yet been proven practically 
successful, in particular, for the case of non-deterministic systems.
1.5.2 Authenticity
The authenticity property is generally defined as the assurance about the identity of the 
origin of a particular entity (agent, datum, message etc.). This identification may entail 
some trust in the sense that identifying a trustable entity could initiate different behaviour 
than in the event of identifying a less-trustable entity. For example, when performing online 
booking for air flight tickets, we would like to make sure that the booking site, to which 
the credit card details are submitted, has a valid digital certificate signed by a trusted third 
party (or a Certification Authority). This will increase the confidence about sending credit 
card details to the site. However, if no valid certificates were produced, then the site will be 
less trustworthy of submitting sensitive information.
The problem of authentication when dealing with isolated computing systems becomes 
a problem of authorization and the protection of the integrity of data from malicious or 
erroneous behaviour. Therefore, mechanisms like user login, token-based authentication and 
biometrics authorization become sufficient to protect static information from being modified 
by unauthorized intruders. Such modifications could be viewed as tampering with the origin 
of the stored data and, therefore, undermine the authenticity property of that data.
The presence of communications among systems introduces the necessity for authen­
tication protocols since the communicating entities may often be unaware of each other’s 
identities beforehand, thereby undermining techniques like user logins, which require some 
prior knowledge about the entities involved. The purpose of an authentication protocol 
then is to provide a well-defined sequence of messages at the end of which the two entities 
participating in the protocol will be assured of each other’s identities. This may take place 
with the aid of a trusted authentication server. Protocols that authenticate both partici­
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pating entities are called bilateral protocols. Unilateral protocols, on the other hand, refer 
to protocols that authenticate either of the two participating entities, but not both.
Most of the existing authentication protocols make use of either secret-key or public-key 
cryptography. Usually, in secret-key protocols, the presence of a trusted server is required to 
hold the long-term keys shared with each of the participating agents, while session keys are 
created for the duration of authentication sessions. Examples of secret-key systems include 
Otway-Rees [104] and Kerberos [92]. In public-key protocols, a Public-Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) is usually implemented to manage key distribution issues, especially those related 
to name-to-key bindings where certificates are used to validate or invalidate such bindings 
(see [63] on the topic of PKI). The presence of a server may not be required beyond the 
initial stage of creating the key pairs. The protocol could then involve creating session 
keys for each authentication session. Examples of public-key bilateral protocols include 
the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [100], whereas the Woo-Lam protocol [133] is 
an example of unilateral protocols. In either the secret-key or public-key protocols, fresh 
information must be provided in each session to prevent replay attacks.
Recently, other authentication models have been suggested. In the spi calculus [5], for ex­
ample, authenticity is formalised in terms of a testing equivalence relation. The authenticity 
of messages is preserved if an instance of a system instantiated with that message is testing 
equivalent to the system’s specification. Other models include the use of proof-carrying code 
in [13, 18] as a general framework for the design and implementation of authentication and 
authorization services using high-order logics. Also, in [59], the concept of non-interfering 
systems is used as the basis for defining the different security properties, including the au­
thenticity of messages. However, it is still to be seen how practical and feasible such models 
could turn out to be in real world situations.
The model of authentication that we adopt in our framework is based on a web of trust; 
systems are classified as running at different trust levels. Breaches will occur whenever 
highly trusted processes obtain data originating at processes with lower levels of trust. 
Similar to the notion of secrecy, the word “obtain” here has different meaning depending 
on the presence or absence of cryptographic operations in mobile systems. Generic mobile 
systems will obtain the untrusted information as a result of the value-passing behaviour, 
which denotes communications among processes. In cryptographic systems, both value- 
passing and value-processing behaviours may result in authenticity breaches.
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1.6 Further Reading
The main areas underlying the background to the research presented in this thesis were 
reviewed in this chapter. These areas are classified into four headings: Mobile systems, 
denotational semantics, static program analysis and computer security.
Recommended readings in the area of formalisms for mobile computing include [96], 
which is an introductory book on the subject of the 7r-calculus, and [114], which provides 
a comprehensive treatment of the theory underlying the 7r-calculus. The spi calculus is 
explained in detail in [6]. The main book on the subject of static program analysis is [102], 
which provides a chapter for each of the main approaches; data flow analysis, control flow 
analysis, abstract interpretation and type systems.
A recommended reading on the subject of denotational semantics is [122], which dis­
cusses the denotational methodology in the definition of programming languages semantics 
as introduced by Scott and Strachey [123, 117, 118]. A gentler introduction on denotational 
semantics (and other semantics) is given in [131]. The topic of computer security is wide 
and many references exist. However, one may suggest here [68 ] for a reading on general 
computer security, [63] on digital signatures, [35, 42] on authentication protocols, [116, 91] 
on general cryptography and [103] on electronic payment systems.
1.7 Outline of Our Approach
As we explained in the previous sections, the problem of computer security is a sophisticated 
problem that encompasses a wide range of theories and technologies. In this thesis, we 
tackle the problem of computer security from perspective of the static analysis of computing 
systems specified formally using nominal calculi. Hence, we attempt to establish static- 
analysis framework based on abstract interpretations for the analysis of mobile systems 
specified in the 7r-calculus and cryptographic systems specified in the spi calculus.
The framework relies on a denotational semantic model and is aimed at capturing one 
aspect of the behaviour of processes in the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus that has security 
significance, i.e. term substitution. This property then can determine which processes 
can obtain which terms (information), and based on this result, one can define secrecy 
and authenticity properties as the capturing of names created by high-level or low-level 
processes, respectively. Crucial to the termination of the analysis is the selection of a 
suitable abstraction in order to keep finite the semantic domains within which processes 
run. This abstraction has to be shown safe with respect to the concrete semantics.
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The structure of the rest of the thesis is organised as follows:
- Chapter 2: We survey state of the art work related to the area of the analysis of mobile 
and cryptographic systems as well as review some denotational models that have been 
proposed for the 7r-calculus.
- Chapter 3: We introduce the languages of the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus and 
review their syntax and structural operational semantics. We define standard denota­
tional semantics for the languages that model the operational behaviour of processes. 
The denotational semantics is shown to be sound and adequate with respect to the 
structural operational semantics.
- Chapter 4: We introduce a non-standard semantics that is a correct modification of the 
standard denotational semantics and we design an abstraction that keeps the semantic 
domains finite to ensure the termination of the analysis. We prove the safety of the 
abstract semantics with respect to the non-standard semantics. Finally, we apply 
the abstract interpretation to a number of examples including a file transfer protocol 
and a number of authentication protocols, like the Needham-Schroeder public-key, 
SPLICE/AS, Otway-Rees, Kerberos, Yahalom and Woo-Lam protocols.
- Chapter 5: We utilise the results of the abstract interpretation established in Chapter
4 to define the secrecy and authenticity properties. We apply these definitions to the 
results of the abstract interpretation of the example systems analysed in Chapter 4.
- Chapter 6 : We review two implementation prototypes of the static analysis framework 
for cases of mobile systems and cryptographic protocols. These are called the Picasso- 
A Pi-Calculus Analyser for Secrecy and Security Objectives, and Spicasso - A Spi- 
Calculus Analyser for Secrecy and Security Objectives tools.
- Chapter 7: Finally, we conclude the thesis and discuss its major contributions to the 
area of the static analysis of computing systems for the detection of security threats. 
We also give directions for prospective work that could spark from the work achieved 





Covering research undertaken in all the areas related to the scope of the framework of this 
thesis and reviewed in the previous chapter demands an enormous effort, which would merit 
its own body of work and thesis. Therefore, we shall concentrate on two main areas: static 
analysis techniques with applications in the area of security of mobile and cryptographic 
systems and denotational semantic models for nominal calculi. Furthermore, we narrow 
these areas to include only research that specifically deals with the language of the 7r-calculus 
and its cryptographic extension, the spi calculus.
2.2 Static Analysis Techniques for Program Security
In recent years, the use of static program analysis in analysing mobile and cryptographic 
systems and verifying their security properties has grown into a major area of research, 
where a variety of techniques have been proposed and implemented to varying degrees of 
success. In this section, we review research carried out in the areas of control flow analysis, 
abstract interpretation, type systems and other logic-based areas.
2.2.1 Control Flow Analysis
This approach has been adopted on a number of occasions by [24, 25, 26, 27], in which the 
flow logics approach [101] is used to predict certain security properties pertaining to mobile 
systems, like having the confinement of private information and the adherence to the Bell 
and La Padilla properties [19].
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The main analysis focuses on the usage of channels and the values sent over them in 
the 7r-calculus. In particular, a fresh name is associated with a superset of the set of names 
that can be communicated over that name. Also, an input parameter is associated with a 
superset of the set of names that may substitute it at runtime.
One major drawback with the manner by which the analysis is carried out is that it 
identifies all the copies of a fresh name arising from the restriction operator. This implies 
that non-uniform properties of names that change between the different runs of systems (as 
explained in Chapter 4) cannot be expressed straightforwardly. The analysis also suffers 
from the inability to detect certain deadlocks arising from situations where the channel of 
communication is a fresh name with restricted scope.
The separation between the problem of validating a given solution and the construction of 
such a solution as formulated by the flow logics approach, meant that the resulting analyses 
of [24, 25] are targeted towards the validation of a proposed solution rather than offering a 
constructive algorithm. However, a minimum solution for the validating analysis is proven to 
always exist, and in [26], a constructive algorithm for this minimum solution is also supplied 
assuming a finite set of names.
The security properties dealt with in [24, 25] are all based on the main control flow 
analysis. In [24], the confinement problem of private names is the main property. In [25], 
the no read-up/no write-down property introduced by Bell and La Padula [19] is investigated. 
This property is often regarded in the security literature as a rigid form of security.
Finally, [27] provides a control flow analysis for a variant of the spi calculus with history- 
dependent cryptography using the idea of confounders in encrypted messages. This facili­
tates the comparison of ciphertexts since, for example, {0, (v r)}k  7  ^ {1, r)}fc. The paper 
establishes two main results. First, it shows that the Dolev-Yao definition of secrecy [47] 
is expressible in terms of a control flow analysis. No specification of the Dolev-Yao most 
general attacker is provided; instead, it is computed using an approximation relation. The 
second result establishes that the analysis can capture the form of non-interference stated in 
[1]. This result elegantly separates between the issues of confidentiality and non-interference 
using the control flow analysis approach.
2.2.2 A bstract Interpretation
This approach has been applied effectively to the analysis of mobile systems. Notable works 
include [126, 127, 99, 51, 52, 53], In [126], a sound non-uniform description of how topologies 
evolve in closed systems that do not contain nested replications is presented. The approach is
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based on the abstract data structures of [83], where the abstract meaning of a process in the 
7r-calculus is represented as an undirected hypergraph (a hypergraph is a graph where an edge 
can connect more than two vertices) signifying the sequence of internal computations that 
evolve within a process from its initial specification. The analysis was further developed and 
greatly simplified in [127], where a refined semantics is introduced to capture the instance 
of a channel that establishes a link between two processes.
The study of system interactions in [127] has inspired the analysis of [51], where the 
main theme is detecting the leakage of confidential information in the presence of unknown 
contexts. The analysis is non-uniform and can distinguish between the different instances 
of a process. The open semantics takes into account the lack of specification of the intruder 
processes and unlike [126, 127], the analysis is not restricted to systems with no nested 
replications. Encoding the ability to deal with unknown specifications into the semantics is 
a different alternative to our approach, which adopts a specification of the intruder (i.e., the 
Dolev-Yao most general attacker).
The analysis of [51] was extended in [52] in an occurrence counting analysis for detect­
ing the exhaustion of resources, mutual exclusion and deadlock properties. On the other 
hand, a more generic parametric framework has been proposed in [53], which is capable of 
expressing the equality and inequality relations between names, i.e. the dependency among 
names at their creation point. The abstract interpretation approach has been used by [99] 
to approximate cryptographic protocols specified in a cryptographic language with finite 
principals and sessions (the spi calculus allows infinite principals and sessions) using tree 
automata. An implementation of the analysis exists. However, it has been applied to small 
protocols with finite runs only (mostly single runs).
2.2.3 Type Systems
Type systems have been extensively researched within the mobile systems and security 
community and notable examples include the works of [1, 72, 112, 37, 73, 77, 74], where 
properties related to information privacy, resource access control and trust have been tackled.
In [72], a typing system is suggested for a distributed variant of the 7r-calculus called D7t, 
where processes reside at named locations and communications occur locally. In order to be 
able to express remote communications, a process movement primitive is introduced. The 
typing system introduces the notion of location types, where each location is typed by the 
resources available to agents residing at that location. This will control the set of capabilities 
that an agent can perform at a certain location. For example, the agent may be able to send
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but not to receive data. Runtime errors are then used to express the breach of type safety. 
These errors can detect illegal movements of processes as well as illegal communications.
In [112], dynamic type checking is used to deal with malicious unspecified agents moving 
between different sites. Open secure semantics are given for the language of D7r, where 
special bad types are used to distinguish untyped code in what is known as a partial typing 
system, where only a subset of agents is well-typed. Filters are used by sites to judge the 
trustworthiness of an incoming agent. Based on this judgement, a notion of authority from 
which trust between the different sites harbouring processes can be built. Hence, the need 
for dynamic type checking is, in fact, reduced. The correctness of the behaviour of well-typed 
processes is shown to be safe with respect to well-behaving sites.
A more extensive treatment of the subject of trust in mobile systems modelled by the 
7r-calculus is given in [74], Here, a system of Boolean annotations is used to guarantee that 
only trusted data are used in trusted contexts. The system relies on a notion of trust during 
run time. An algorithm for creating the general types of the system is also suggested.
In [73], two security properties, the resource access control and information flow proper­
ties, are dealt with in a typing system for a variant of the asynchronous 7r-calculus [31, 76] 
with security levels. Using a security policy that assigns levels to processes, a process can 
only access resources that were created by processes running at the same or lower levels. 
Similarly, a process can only write to resources created by higher-level processes. On the 
other hand, implicit flow of information is dealt with by a notion of non-interference, which 
depends on a form of may-testing.
An advanced static type checking system is used in [77] to guarantee secure information 
flow for general process behaviour in the polyadic 7r-calculus extended with extra syntactic 
constructs. In this typing system, non-linear types are used as part of a finite partially 
ordered set of action types. The action type of a process is an abstraction of the causal 
dependency among the free channels of that process. With the use of secrecy indices, a 
subject reduction property of the resulting typed processes is given. This implies that 
composing a typed process with external processes does not change its internal secrecy. The 
subject reduction property is then used to express a form of non-interference among low-level 
and high-level processes. The resulting system is also used to embed the system of [130], 
using typed process representation.
One of the major drawbacks of type systems is their inability to express non-uniform 
properties due to the fact that they associate the same type with the different runs of the 
system. In [37], this problem was remedied by introducing a primitive for fresh type creation. 
Special channel types called Groups can be created, where names of a type belonging to a
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particular group cannot be communicated over channels of another group type (possibly 
with a lower secrecy level). This will protect against the leakage of secret channels from one 
group to another.
It seems, to date, that the work of [1] has assumed an authoritative role in the subject of 
security and types in the spi calculus. This is simply due to the wealth of basic concepts that 
the work contains, and in particular, the idea of mixing (primitively) typed and untyped 
data in the typing system and the idea that every participant in a security protocol must be 
typable. An overall view of secrecy principles is also given in the context of the spi calculus. 
The proposed typing system guarantees the protection of secret data against leakage through 
a notion of non-interference that is based on testing equivalence. However, the system does 
not clarify the issue of principal types and therefore, no complete and sound typing algorithm 
is provided.
Non-interfering security has also been treated in the area of type systems, although to a 
lesser extent. The work of Smith and Volpano [130] presents a type system for a sequential 
imperative language that can deal with explicit, as well as implicit information flow. Insecure 
explicit flow is detected as a flow from high-level to low-level variables. Implicit information 
flow, on the other hand, occurring within conditional and while-loop statements is formalised 
by a type soundness requirement that guarantees that the command levels of the branches 
of conditional statements and while-loop bodies be as high as the level of the guards of 
those statements. However, the type system fails in situations where programs do not 
terminate successfully as a result of assuming that the sequential composition of typable 
commands is also typable. This problem was later remedied in [120], and a type system 
for a multi-threaded imperative language was suggested. However, the resulting solution is, 
unfortunately, too restrictive; the guard of a while-loop is always limited to a low level of 
security and the body of the while-loop itself is classified as a low-level command. In general, 
both works [130, 120] adopt a notion of non-interference, which is closely related to the 
original view given in [67]: the final values of the low-level variables should be independent 
of the final values of the high-level variables.
A more refined type system for non-interference within concurrent languages is proposed 
in [31, 32]. The main work extends the system proposed in [120], However, the attitude 
towards the concurrent language semantics is that of small step as compared to the big step 
semantics adopted by [120]. The implication of this is that intermediate values of low-level 
variables are also considered (not only the final values). This further results in a stronger 
notion of non-interference that relieves restriction on the levels of guards and bodies of 
conditional and while-loop statements. The main difference between [31] and [32] lies in
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dealing with scheduling mechanisms of concurrent subprocesses (threads).
A simple treatment of non-interference is also given by [110] for an extension of the ir- 
calculus, which can express the independent execution of parallel processes. The definition of 
non-interference adopted in [110] is based on weak barbed reduction congruence [114]. The 
semantics of the language annotates processes with security levels drawn from a complete 
lattice. The final non-interference result then states that pruning high-level sub-terms does 
not affect the low-level sub-terms up to the weak barbed congruence.
Another extension of the asynchronous 7r-calculus, termed the security 7r-calculus is sug­
gested by [70] that incorporates a type system where security levels and read/write capa­
bilities are associated with input parameters and restricted names. May and must testing 
equivalences are then formalised for the language and based on these equivalence formali­
sations, notions of non-interference are enforced. The work is a comprehensive extension of 
the earlier work presented in [73].
Finally, the compositional security checker (CoSeC) developed in [56] is a static analysis 
tool that builds on the Concurrency Workbench [43]. Both tools are forms of semantics-based 
model checkers that can check for properties of processes based on different equivalences and 
preordering. The language of input for CoSeC is an extension of CCS with separately marked 
high-level and low-level observable actions. The treatment of the tool benefits only finite 
state systems and is targeted towards the checking of the non-deducibility-on-compositions 
property.
2.2.4 Other Approaches
Other approaches that cannot be directly classified under the previous headings or that may 
cover more than one approach have also been suggested and implemented. The work of [65] 
is an early attempt to present an abstract binding-time analysis as part of a meta-interpreter 
for the 7r-calculus. The analysis adopts a partial evaluation technique, which aims at using 
the known part of the input data in specialising programs. The results of the analysis can 
determine the static communications that can be executed at compile-time as well as the 
set of static variables that do not change during run-time. The main motivation behind the 
work of [65] was program optimisation rather than security (although the results are general 
enough to include some notion of security).
The Mobility Workbench [128] is an example of automated tools that are targeted towards 
the checking of process equivalences. In particular, the tool checks for the open bisimulation 
property in the 7r-calculus [114].
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In the work of [3] a typing system is given for a generic version of the spi calculus 
with constructor/destructor functions. Untyped predicate logic is also used to program a 
Prolog-based protocol checker that verifies secrecy properties. The methodology is extended, 
in [21], to check for the authenticity property. The equivalence of the two approaches is 
established. In [29, 30], a trace analysis is built over a symbolic version of the operational 
semantics of the spi calculus, and in [12], a well-crafted approach to the symbolic analysis of 
cryptographic processes, in general, is formalised. Earlier attempts to use symbolic semantics 
in the analysis of security protocols include [79, 11], where the reachability problem in the 
cryptographic protocols is discussed.
The works of [49] and [44] have concentrated on the use of automatic checking of equiv­
alences of processes in the spi calculus. The former presents a framework for a trace-based 
analysis of cryptographic protocols, whereas the latter defines a new equivalence, known as 
fenced bisimilarity, which removes some of the infinite quantifiers associated with testing 
equivalence in the spi calculus.
Finally, we mention the works of [35] and [66 ]. In [35], belief logics have been used to 
analyse a number of cryptographic protocols and the paper is a notable piece of work. The 
model checking approach has also been used with the Brutus checker for a dialect of the spi 
calculus in [66 ]. More recently, the Mobility Model Checker (MMC) has been introduced in 
[135], as a model checker for the 7r-calculus, which uses tabled logic programming.
2.3 Denotational Semantics of Nominal Calculi
Apart from the original structural operational semantics that was proposed for the 7r-calculus 
[97], denotational semantic models have also been introduced over the past few years. Some 
of these include the works of [33, 36, 39, 54, 69, 71, 121], Apart from a few examples, the 
majority of the work on denotational semantics of mobile systems has adopted an approach 
based on category theory. The obvious reason underlying this choice seems to be related to 
the fact that category theory offers abstract reasoning that can be easily utilised in deriving 
fully abstract denotational models.
The models of [54] and [121] are the first attempts to define a denotational meaning 
for processes in the 7r-calculus. Both are fully abstract with respect to late bisimilarity 
and equivalence. The major difference between the two is that [54] defines the semantics 
in terms of an internal meta-language for the main category. The language is, in fact, 
a type-equational theory based on a typed A-calculus with non-deterministic summation 
and recursion. The interpretation of processes is then given by translating into this meta­
31
language. This renders the model of [54] a general framework that relies on a uniform 
approach suitable for modelling a variety of nominal calculi. For example, it is possible to 
add an interrupt operator to the 7r-calculus. On the other hand, the model of [121] is more 
abstract and concentrates on properties of the categorical solution. This is quite interesting 
when dealing with the static analysis framework, as it offers concrete grounds on which the 
analysis can be built1.
Stark’s model was further refined in [39] using presheaf categories. These are more 
flexible as they support function spaces and offer models for synchronisation trees and event 
structures. Unlike the models of [54, 121], the resulting model is capable of expressing early, 
as well as, late semantics and hence, it is fully abstract with respect to early bisimilarity and 
equivalence. Since our static analysis framework is not designed to necessarily deal with the 
early version of the semantics, we opted for the less elaborate model given in [121],
Two set-theoretic denotational models are presented in [71] that are fully abstract with 
respect to may- and must-testing in the 7r-calculus. The models are obtained as solutions 
of domain equations in a functor category and are quite close to the works of [54, 121]. A 
higher-order version of the 7r-calculus, where functions as well as names can be communicated 
over channels, is modelled denotationally in [69]. An internal language is also given for the 
solution O-category, which is used in the process interpretation. The model is only proven 
to be fully abstract for transitions (computations) in the higher-order language.
In [33], a new notion of Cartesian closed double categories is developed from the theory 
of Cartesian closed categories and used as a basis for the interpretation of the 7r-calculus. 
A-notation is also used to develop a type system for the resulting interpretation. A final 
semantics in the style of [10] is also developed using categorical modelling in [78]. The 
resulting model gives a higher-order presentation of the 7r-calculus using the Edinburgh 
Logical Framework (LF) (based on typed A-calculus) as the meta-language. Strong and 
weak late semantics are both dealt with. However, the full abstraction of the model is not 
shown with respect to the corresponding bisimilarity and congruence relations. The result 
is only shown for transitions.
Finally, away from the category-based models, in the work of [36], a Petri net semantics 
is developed for the 7r-calculus with recursive definitions [114]. The semantics is based on 
Place/Transition nets with inhibitor arcs (i.e. PTI-nets) and is proven to be sound with 
respect to early transition semantics of the 7r-calculus. The model also gives a definition of 
non-interleaving semantics, which are used to generate causal trees.
1The semantic domains were concretely defined in an unpublished note by Stark. This note can be 
downloaded from h ttp : //w w .d cs  .ed.ac.uk/hom e/stark/publications/fuladm .htm l
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have covered related work carried out within the areas of static program 
analysis and denotational semantics for mobile systems and cryptographic protocols speci­
fied in the languages of the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus, respectively. One may identify 
from such related work a general lack of overlapping research between these two areas (static 
analysis and denotational semantics) in the context of security analysis of processes in the 
7r-calculus and spi calculus. Most of the static analysis work has concentrated 011 the use of 
operational semantics. The use of a denotational framework would benefit both the theory 
and implementation of static analysis in this area. Theoretically, concepts like least fixed 
points are inherent in the nature of the denotational approach and, practically, the imple­
mentation of these concepts is straightforward in the functional programming paradigm, 





The concept of a name as the main abstraction underlying different low-level details of 
computing systems has resulted in the proliferation of a family of models of computation 
known as nominal calculi. Many such models are process algebraic, programs are modelled as 
processes equipped with operations to express their evolvement. The 7r-calculus has emerged 
in recent years as an authoritative and highly expressive nominal calculus for the modelling of 
mobile systems. In this chapter, we review the syntax and structural operational semantics 
of the 7r-calculus and its cryptographic extension, the spi calculus. We give denotational 
semantics for both languages that are based on domain theory.
3.2 The 7r-calculus
For years, the 7r~calculus has provided a powerful, yet simple, theoretical framework for 
modelling and reasoning about mobility. The notion of a name constitutes the central 
concept on which the calculus is based. Names are allowed to stand for channels as well as 
data. Therefore, by sending and receiving names, processes can communicate information 
to other processes and can also change the topology of their network. This view of mobility 
is described as “the movement of links in the virtual space of linked processes” [96, II-8] .
Several versions of the 7r-calculus exist, including the monadic synchronous version, which 
was originally developed in [97]. In this version, communications occur by synchronising 
channels and carry messages that are single names. Other versions exist such as the polyadic 
7r-calculus [95] and the asynchronous 7r-calculus [31, 76].
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3.2.1 Syntax
In the 7r-calculus, names constitute a countably infinite set x ,y ,z  € N' possibly subscripted 
with numbers, as in .. Processes P, Q 6  V are built from names according to the
syntax of Figure 3.1.
P, Q :=  0 Null
x{y).P Input action
x{y).P Output action
if x =  y then P  else Q Conditional
(;vx)P Restriction
P  +  Q Summation
P  | Q Parallel composition
\P Replication
Figure 3.1: Syntax of the 7r-calculus.
Informally, these rules are described as follows. A null process, 0, is an inactive process 
that cannot evolve any further. A guarded process may perform an input action, x(y).P, 
or an output action, x(y).P , and then continues as the residue, P. For the case of x(y).P, 
a message z received along x will substitute y as in P[z/y]. A conditional process, if x =  
y then P  else Q, compares two names, x  and y, and if they are the same, it continues as P , 
else it continues as Q. A restriction, (vx)P , constrains the scope of a name, x, to a process 
P. The summation, P  +  Q, chooses non-deterministically between two processes, P  and Q, 
discarding the other. The parallel composition, P  \ Q, interleaves P  and Q allowing for any 
communications between the two processes to occur. Finally, the replication, !P, spawns as 
many parallel copies of P  as required by the context.
The standard notions of a-conversion and name substitution apply, as well as the notions 
of free names, fn (P ), bound names, bn(P), and the set of all the names of a process, 
n(P) =  }n (P ) U bn(P). A name y is bound in (vy)P  and x(y).P , otherwise it is free. Using 
a-conversion, it is possible to have a set of bound names, bn(P), that is totally distinct, i.e. 
no two bound names of a process are the same. Also, a-conversion can be used to achieve 
the requirement that bn(P ) D/n(P) =  { } .  In all the systems we deal with, these distinction 
requirements are always assumed to hold.
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3.2.2 Structural Operational Semantics
We adopt the version of the structural operational semantics for the 7r-calculus as given in 
[39]. The semantics is defined in terms of two relations: the structural congruence relation, 
= , and the labelled transition relation,
The structural congruence relation is defined as the smallest equivalence on processes that 
satisfies the following rules and is closed by the renaming of bound names (a-conversion):
- (V / = , |, 0 ) and {V /= ,  +, 0 ) are commutative monoids
- (ra)0 =  0
- (yx)(vy)P  =  (yy)(vx)P
- (■vx){P  | Q) =  (P  | 0 x)Q), if x i  fn (P )
- IP =  P  | IP
{  P, if ar =  y
- if  x =  y then P  else Q =  <
I Q, otherwise
The labelled transition relation is defined by the set of rules of Figure 3.2 and closed by the 
structural reshaping of processes. In these rules, 7r-transitions represent input actions, x(y), 
free output actions, x(y), bound output actions, x(y) (= (yy)x(y)), and silent actions, r.
(O ut) x (y ) .P ^ H p
(In) x (y ) .P x- H p
(Open) P *-H  P ' ^  (v y )P *-H  P' if x ±  y
(Res) P  P' => (v x )P  —^  (v x)P' if x   ^fn(n)
(Sum) P ^ P ' = > P  +  Q - ^ P '
( P a r )  P ^ P ' ^ P \ Q - ^ P ' \ Q
(Comm) P  P ', Q xM  Q' =► P  | Q P ' | Q'[y/z]
(C lose) P  ^  P ', Q Q' => P  | Q [vy){P' \ Q'ly/z})
Figure 3.2: Rules of the labelled transition relation in the 7r-calculus.
The relation is late in the sense that input variables are not instantiated until actual 
communications take place (in Rules (Comm) and (C lose)). The transition rules (O ut) 
and (In) describe transitions of processes guarded by output and input actions. Rule (Open) 
changes a free output to a bound output by restricting the message of communication. The 
(Res), (Sum) and (P ar) rules preserve transitions under the restriction, summation and
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parallel composition operators. Finally, communications are described in rules ( C o m m ) (free 
output actions) and ( C l o s e ) (bound output actions), where the external effect of a com­
munication appears as the silent action, r . In rule ( C l o s e ) ,  the scope of the communicated 
message is extruded to include the recipient process.
3.2.3 Denotational Semantics
Our starting point for the development of the denotational semantics is the set of predomain 
equations given by Stark [121], which describe a process in terms of the most basic actions 
it can perform, i.e. input, output and silent actions as well as deadlock (termination):
P i  £* 1 +  IP(Pi_L + In +  Out) (3.1)
In  “  N x ( N  Pij_) (3.2)
Out =  N  x [N  x P i± + N  -» P i± ) (3.3)
Where P i, In and Out represent the predomains of processes, input and output actions, 
respectively, allowing for bound output actions. N  is the predomain of names, and P (—) 
is Plotkin’s powerdomain whose result is joined with the one-point domain, 1 , following 
Abramsky’s result [8 , Def. 3.4]. This is necessary to be able to express deadlock (or termi­
nation). The domain of processes, P i± , is then obtained by lifting P i.
The binding effects inherent in input and bound output actions are expressed as functions 
N  —> P i± . These functions accept any name and instantiate a process (the residue) with
that name. Functions are also suitable since they allow for the renaming of bound names
(a-conversion) to take place without affecting the denotational meaning of a process. In 
[121], a special function, —°, is used to achieve a name freshness requirement in bound 
output actions. As we explain later in this section, we use a special labelling mechanism in 
the denotational semantics, which achieves a similar effect by maintaining that new copies 
of bound names created are always distinct.
In addition to equations (3.1)—(3.3), the following mappings, leading into P i± , are defined 
by Stark [121], who based them on similar mappings introduced by Abramsky [8 , Def. 3.3]:
0 : 1 - +  P i±  (3.4)
{ ] - [ } :  {Pi_L +  In + Out)jl -> P i±  (3.5)
l±) : Pi_l  x Pij_ -> P i±  (3.6)
new : (N  —> Pij_) —> P i±  (3.7)
According to Abramsky [8 , Def. 3.3], the above mappings are continuous (this was not 
mentioned by Stark in [121]).
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The empty set map, 0, denotes a deadlocked or terminated process. The singleton 
map, {j — (}, is used to interpret elements of the input and output predomains as well 
as processes guarded by silent actions as elements of Pix- The choice map, l±J, is the 
standard powerdomain union of two elements in P ix- Finally, the new operation is useful 
in interpreting the effects of restriction on processes. In [121], an extra mapping, par, is 
added to interpret the effects of parallelism on processes. Our version of the denotational 
semantics deals with parallelism by using a special multiset of processes running in parallel 
with the interpreted process.
A solution to equations (3.1)-(3.3) and the associated mappings (3.4)-(3.7) is given 
in [121] using symmetric monoidal closed functor categories. In our case, we adopt a more 
concrete solution based on domain theory. Such a concrete solution is sufficient for the static 
analysis framework defined in later chapters, where definitions of the concrete domains are 
required without reference to the underlying abstract functorial meaning.
We now turn our attention to the definition of Pix- Assuming /C is the set underlying 
any domain, then elements p ,q  £ K,(Pij_) can be defined in two stages. First, elements 
arising from 0, {] — |} and l±l are defined as in Figure 3.3.
Elements of In :
x G K,(N),Xy.p € K (N  -» P ix ) => 0 , Xy.p) e JC(In)
Elements of Out :
x ,y  e fC(N),p e tC(Pij_) {x,y,p) 6 JC(Out)
x e K{N ),Xy.p  6 K {N  -> P i± ) =$■ (x, Xy.p) € fC(Out)
Elements o f P i±  :
flj-| }e/C(Pix),0eK (Pû)
p ,q £  IC(Pix) =» P'S q £ JC(Pix)
p 6 IC(Pix) {]ia«(p)|} e  K {P ijl)
i e  IC(In) {]m(i)[} e  fc(P ix )
o € K,{Out) {]out(o)j} 6  IC(Pix)
Figure 3.3: Elements of In, Out and P i± .
According to equation (3.2), elements of the predomain of input actions, In, are pairs 
(x, Xy.p), where the first element, x, stands for the channel of communication and the second 
element is a function, Xy.p, that accepts a name, z, and continues as a process, p{z/y\ € P ix-
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According to equation (3.3), elements of Out are either free output actions, (x , y,p), or bound 
output actions, (x , Xy.p). A free output consists of the channel x, the free message y and the 
residue p. A bound output, on the other hand, is expressed as the channel x and a function, 
Xy.p, where y is the message of communication bound to the residue p.
Building on elements of In and Out, elements of the summation P i±  + In +  Out are 
ensured to be distinct by tagging each element with one of the appropriate tags tau, in and 
out. By applying the singleton mapping, {] — [}, it is possible then to create elements of 
the powerdomain P i±  that are singleton sets containing elements of the summation P i±  +  
In +  Out. The undefined process, {J_L[}, is the bottom element necessary in order to perform 
fixed-point calculations over the domain Pij_. Using 0, it is possible to include the empty 
set element in P i±  [8 , Def. 3.4]. Finally, l±J, combines two elements of Pij_.
The second stage consists of interpreting the effects of restriction on processes. This is 
done by giving a concrete definition for new (3.7) over elements p £ P i± , as in Figure 3.4.
new( Ax.0) =  1
new(Aa;.{|_L|}) =  {]_L[}





if x =  y 
otherwise
IIB
new(Xx.Qout(y,z,p)$) =  < {}out[y, A z.p)§, if x =  z j^ y
{|out(y,z,new{\x.p))\},S otherwise
new(Xx.\\out(y, Xz.p)fy) =  < 0 ,
-j]out(y , Xz.new(Xx.p))|},
if x =  y 
otherwise
new(Xx.{\tau(p)\}) =  {]tou(new(Aa;.p))|}
new(Xx.(pi Wf>2 )) =  new(Xx.pi) l±l new(Xx.p-2 )
Figure 3.4: The definition of new for the 7r-calculus.
In general, new captures deadlocked situations arising from the attempt to communicate 
over restricted non-extruded channels. It also turns a free output action into a bound output 
action once a restricted message is directly sent over a channel (scope extrusion). In all the 
other cases, restriction has no effect and it is simply passed to the residue or distributed 
over the choice operation.
After fully defining elements of the domain P*_l, it is possible to denote the meaning 
of processes in the 7r-calculus in terms of these elements. For a process, P , we define the 
semantic function <S7r ([P]) p <f>s £ P i±  by the set of rules of Figure 3.5. An earlier version of
39
the semantics was given in [14], based on Stark’s original categorical solution.
(5*1) S " l0 ]p 4 > s  =  0
(5*2) S*([x{y).P]) p <j>s =  {|in(<£s(<As,x),Ay.ft*([{]P[}p]) 05)|}
(5*3) 5*0r<y).P]) p cj>s  =
( |+| {]iou(p)|} ) l±J fl0ui(<ps(0 s ,®)1¥’s ( 0 s ,y ) ,f t w([fl-P|}/>]) 0 «s)|}
x'(z).P'Ep
where, p  =  ft*([{|P|}p p[P '/x ‘{z).P']]) 05 [z <ps{<t>s,v)]
if, ips{4>s,x) =  vs{4>s,x')
(5*4) 5*([t/ x =  y then P  else Q\j p 4>s =
p} <f>s, if <ps(<l>s,x) =  ips{<t>s,y) 
Pi <t>s, otherwise
(5*5) 5 * HP +  Q i  p <j>s  =  ft*({]P|}„ p }  0 5  i ± J  f t * ( [ f l Q | } P  p ^  <j>s
(5*6) 5 *([P  | OJ p 05  =  ft*{{]P|}p W, {]Q[}P W, p]) 05
(5*7) 5*([(ra)P]) p (¡>s =  new(\x.'RM[§P$p'£p p} (j>s)
(5*8) 5*([!P]) p 05 =  ^ * ( - 1 )
where, .P*(n) =  /ei pi =  5*([ n  P [bn i(P )/ bn{P)] ]) p 4>s in
i=l
7 1+ 2
let P2 — 5*([ n  -P[&ni(P)/6n(P)] ]) p 05 in
i- 1
*/ Pi =  P2 then pi else P *  (n + 1) 
and, bni{P) =  {xi \ x E bn(P)}
( f t*0) ft'dp]) 05 =  lil 5 *  ([P]) (p\{jP|}p) 05
_____  _______ ________  ___  ___
Figure 3.5: The denotational semantics of the 7r-calculus.
The multiset, p, contains all processes composed in parallel with the analysed process, 
P .  The standard singleton, {| -  ¡}p : V —>■ p ( P ) ,  and the multiset union, l±lp : p(V) x p{V) -> 
p{V ), are special mappings defined over p and should not be confused with {J — )} and W 
defined earlier in (3.5) and (3.6). The special environment, 05 : N  -> N±, maps a name 
to another name that substitutes it in the semantics. In fact, this environment will hold 
substitutions of input parameters by messages received during communications. Since the 
standard denotational semantics is a precise semantics, an input parameter can only be 
mapped to, at most, one name in any possible choice of control flow (i.e. in any side of W).
The tps : (N  —> N±) x M  —> N  function is used to retrieve the true value of a name, x ,
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given substitutions recorded in 4>s :
f  z, if <f>s (x) =  z
I x, otherwise, when =  ±
The meaning of the composed processes in p is given by rule (7£*0) as the summation of
the individual meaning of each of the composed processes. The concrete semantics of each
process construct is defined by the cases of rules (5* 1 -5 *  8 ). Rule (5*1) interprets the 
meaning of a null process directly as the empty set map, 0. Rules (5*2) and (5*3) deal 
with the cases of processes guarded by input and output actions after which the residues 
are composed with elements of the p multiset. In (5*3), any communications that may take 
place between the output action and appropriate input actions guarding processes in p are 
taken into consideration and cf>s is updated accordingly. The interpretation is a summation 
of all such communications and the no-communication case. This preserves the associativity 
property of the parallel composition operator, P  \ Q.
Rule (5*4) interprets conditional statements based on matching the values of names x 
and y returned by <ps- Depending on the values of these names, the equality condition will 
either hold or not, hence determining the process composed with p. Rule (5*5) interprets 
separately each of the processes in a choice as composed with processes in p and then 
distributes the choice over the two results. Rule (5*6) is straightforward allowing for two 
parallel processes to be composed with the rest of processes in p. Rule (5*7) interprets the 
meaning of restriction using the new operation, defined earlier in Figure 3.4.
Finally, rule (5*8) interprets a replicated process, IP, by calculating the special function,
!Fn : N —> P i± , starting from the bottom number, n =  —1, which computes the bottom 
- l
element, 5*([ Yl P[brii(P)/ bn(P)\ ]) p <fis — {]-L|}. The calculation continues by incrementing
¿=i
n until the condition of the «/-statement holds true. In other words, the least fixed-point is 
reached. Due to the fact that the semantic domain, P i± , is infinite, this calculation is not 
guaranteed to terminate at a finite number, n.
A labelling mechanism is also used in the rule to perform a-conversion on the spawned 
copies, P , by subscripting all the bound names of P. The renaming is necessary to maintain 
the distinction of bound names from other bound and free names. Hence, input parameters 
recorded in <j>s can be mapped to at most one name. It is interesting to note that the 
compositionality rule of the denotational semantics is preserved under this a-conversion, 
since the resulting process on the right side of the rule, P[brii(P)/ bn(P)\, is still a subprocess 
of the replication !P, by being structurally equivalent to the subprocess, P. In fact, the 
substitution, P [brii(P)/bn(P)], will only affect bound variables of the A-abstractions in 
rules (5*2) and (5*7), leaving the denotational meaning as given by these two rules intact.
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To relate the denotational semantics of the 7r-calculus to its structural operational se­
mantics, the following theorem states that the elements of the domain of processes, P i± , 
reflect and preserve transitions in the structural operational semantics.
Theorem  1 (Soundness and Adequacy of Pi± w .r.t. transitions)
The interpretation o f  processes in P i±  is sound and adequate with respect to transitions in 
the structural operational semantics o f the n-calculus.
P roo f. The soundness property relies on the ability of semantic elements to match transitions 
in the operational model:
=> out{x,y,S*<[Q]) p (fis) G S n ([P]) p (fis
=> out(x , Ay.¿>*([<3]) p (fis) G ([P]) p <j>s 
=> in(x, Xy.S^([Q]) p <j>s ) €  <S*([P]) p 4>s
=>■ tau(ST([Q]) p <fis) 6  S n ([P]) p (fis
On the other hand, adequacy requires that the semantic transitions be mapped correctly to 
the operational model:
out(x,y , q) G 5 ff([P]) p (fis => 3Q : P  ^  Q A <S"([QD P ffis =  q
out(x, Xy.q) G S'flP]) p (fis => 3Q : P  ^  Q A ^([Q]) p (fis =  q 
in(x, Xy.q) G <S7rflPD p (fis => 3Q : P  Q A iS^JQ]) p (fis =  q
tau(q) G 5*([P]) p (fis => 3Q : P  Q A ¿»'([Q]) p (fis =  q
Both these properties can be shown to hold for the model of P i± . Soundness can be
proven by showing that the rules of the denotational semantics respect rules of the structural 
operational semantics, whereas adequacy can be proven by defining a formal approximation 
relation, p  < P , between elements p  G P i±  and processes P  G V- Such a relation is often 
used in adequacy proofs for the A-calculus (for example, as in [109]). □
3.3 The Spi Calculus
Of the many extensions that have been proposed to the 7r-calculus, the spi calculus remains 
one of the most popular in the security community. The original work introduced in [5] 
extended the language of the 7r-calculus with cryptographic primitives allowing processes to 
send and receive private information over public channels in a secure manner. This implies 
that processes exhibit a message-processing behaviour in addition to the message-passing 
behaviour inherited from the 7r-calculus.
p ^-Hq
p ^ H q
p x- H q
P ^ Q
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The denotational semantics we propose for the spi calculus builds on an extension of 
Stark’s predomain equations for the 7r-calcuius [121]. The extension is capable of handling 
the complexity inherent in the communicated data structures as well as the possibility of 
extruding multiple names through those structures.
3.3.1 Syntax
We review here the syntax of the spi calculus [5] without hashing functions. Unlike the 
7r-calculus, where names are the only terms, in the spi calculus, terms are divided into two 
types: primitive and complex. The notion of primitive terms is a refined notion of names 
that distinguishes between constants a ,b ,c ,k ,A ,B ,C . . .  £ Af that cannot be instantiated, 
and variables x ,y ,z ,X ,Y . . .  £ V that can be instantiated. We allow primitive terms to be 
subscripted with numbers. Complex terms are obtained by applying cryptographic and tuple 
creation operations. Based on this, one may define terms L ,M ,N  £ Term and processes 
P,Q  £ V according to the syntax of Figure 3.6. We write k+ and k~ to distinguish between 
the public and private parts of a key pair. These parts are related by the fact that they can 
reverse each other’s encrypting effects.
Informally, the syntactic rules are described as follows. A null process, 0, is incapable 
of evolving any further. An input guard, M (x).P , allows for a process to input a message, 
N , over a channel defined by M  and continues as the residue P[N/x\. An output guard, 
M (N ).P , allows a process to send a message, N, over the channel defined by M  and continues 
as P. Although the forms of the input/output actions allow for the generic use of terms 
as channels, this is only valid for the cases where the term is a name or a variable that is 
instantiated to a name. The same is required of keys, since keys are treated as names due to 
their unguessable nature. The restriction, parallel composition, replication and conditional 
processes are all inherited from the 7r-calculus.
A tuple splitting operation, let (x t , . . .  ,x n) =  M in P  else Q, attempts to split a term, 
M, and binds the resulting components to local variables, x i , . . . , x n, in a process P. 
However, if this fails (i.e. M  has an incorrect arity), then a different process, Q, is 
chosen. Secret-key decryption, case L  o f {x}jv  in P  else Q, and public-key decryption, 
case L  of {[a;]}w in P  else Q, attempt to decrypt a term L  with key N. If successful, the re­
sulting term is bound to a local variable x in some process, P , otherwise, a different process, 
Q, is chosen. Similarly, the signature verification process, case L  o f [{a:}]« in P  else Q, at­
tempts to verify a term, L, using N  and if successful, the resulting term is bound to a local 
variable, x, in P. Otherwise, if the verification fails, a different process, Q, is chosen. For the
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M ,N := Terms
x ,y ,z Variables
a, b, c Names
k+ Public key
k~ Private key
(M\,.. „  Mn) n-tuple
{M } n Secret-key encryption




M {x).P Input guard
M (N ).P Output guard
(lva)P Restriction
P  1 Q Parallel composition
\P Replication
if  M  =  N then P  else Q Conditional
let , . . . ,  Xji) -  M in P  else Q Tuple splitting
case L  o f {x }n in P  else Q Secret-key decryption
case L  of {[x]}/v in P  else Q Public-key decryption
case L  of [{a;}]jv in P  else Q Signature verification
Figure 3.6: The syntax of the spi calculus.
sake of conciseness, we omit all the above else parts in the let and case process constructs 
whenever Q =  0.
The standard notions of term substitution and a-conversion, as well as the free and bound 
variables and free and bound names of processes and terms, ft)(A), bv(A), fn(A ), bn(A), all 
apply as usual. We also use the notion of bound names and variables of a process, written 
as bnv(P) =  bn(P ) U bv(P). A process P  or a term M  is closed if fv(P) =  { }  or fv(M ) =  {} . 
Henceforth, we shall only deal with closed processes and closed terms. Moreover, we only 
consider systems whose bound names and bound variables are initially distinct from each 
other and from the set of free names of the particular process.
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3.3.2 Structural Operational Semantics
The structural operational semantics of the spi calculus is a direct extension of the structural 
operational semantics of the 7r-calculus given in Section 3.2.2. The structural congruence 
relation, = , is defined in a similar manner to before, with the exceptions that the restriction 
operator is only applicable to names, and the commutative monoid (V/  = , +, 0) disappears.
The structural congruence relation is defined as the smallest equivalence, closed by the 
renaming of bound names and variables (a-conversion), that satisfies the following rules:
- (V /= ,  1,0)  is a commutative monoid
- (v a )0  =  0
- (i' a )(v b )P  =  (vb)(v  a )P
- (v a )(P  | Q) =  (P  | (v a)Q ) if a £ fn (P )
- \P = P  | \P
by the structural congruence of processes. S7r-transitions include input actions, rn(x), free 
output actions, fn{N ), bound output actions, rik)m(N) (where {n  i , . . . ,  n^} Ç
fn(N))  and silent actions, r . The rules are described as follows. Rules (O u t) and (In) 
express free output and input transitions. Rule (Open) transforms a free output to a bound 
output by restricting names appearing free in the message of communication. Rules (Res)
- if M =  N  then P  else Q
P, if M  =  N  
Q, if M ^ N
P[M \/xi,..., Mn/xn\,
- let (xi , . . . ,  xn) =  L  in P  else Q
otherwise
- case L  o f {a;}fc in P  else Q
- case L  o f  {[x]}^- in P  else Q
- case L  o f  [{x}]fc+ in P  else Q
P [M /x ], if L = m „ -  
Q, otherwise
The labelled transition relation, is defined by the set of rules of Figure 3.7, closed
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(O u t ) m (N ).P *% $  P
(I n ) m { x ) .P " ^ P
( O p e n ) P  T1^ V  P' =*• ( v m , . . .  ,v n k)P  p i  if m $ { m , . . .  , n fc}
and { n i , . . .  ,n k } Ç fn(N ) 
( R e s ) P  P 1 (y n )P  ——t (isn)P 1 if n  ^ fn(sn)
( P a r )  P ^ P ’ ^ P \ Q ^ P ' \ Q
( C o m m ) P  m-^ 9  P ' , Ç Q' => P  \ Q ^  P' | Q'[N/x\
( C l o s e ) P  (l/ni' - ^ )MW P ' ; Q ^  Q' => P  \ Q (vn u . . . ,  v n k){P' \ Q'[N/x\)
Figure 3.7: Rules of the labelled transition relation in the spi calculus.
and ( P a r ) state that transitions are preserved under the restriction and parallel composi­
tion operators, provided that the side conditions are satisfied. Finally, communications are 
carried out in rules ( C o m m ) and ( C l o s e ) for the cases of free and bound output actions, 
respectively. The external effects of these communications appear as silent actions, r.
3.3.3 Denotational Semantics
The denotational semantics of the spi calculus builds on an extension of Stark’s predomain 
equations for the 7r-calculus (Section 3.2.3). The extended equations are as follows:
Spi — 1 +  f ’(SpiJ_ +  In + Out) (3.8)
In  “  N  x (T -> Spi_l) (3.9)
Out “  N  x ( T  x Spi± +  N  -> . . .N  (T x Spi± )) (3.10)
T  “  N +  S E C  + P U B  + S IG  + TU P  (3.11)
S E C  S  T  x N  (3.12)
P U B  S  T  x N  (3.13)
S IG  “  T x J V  (3.14)
T U P  “  T  x . . .  x T  (3.15)
Where S'p*, In and Out are the predomains of processes, input and output actions (including 
bound output actions), respectively. N  is the predomain of names and T  is the predomain 
of terms defined using N  and the predomains of secret-key ciphertexts, S E C , public-key 
ciphertexts, P U B , digital signatures, S IG , and finite tuples, TU P. We do not include in 
the equations a predomain of variables, V, since we only deal with closed terms and processes. 
All the cryptographic terms are expressed as pairs consisting of a term (plaintext) and a
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name (key). Finally, P (—) is Plotkin’s powerdomain operation, with the single element 
domain, 1 , representing deadlocked or terminated processes joined to the result of P (—) as 
in [8 , Def. 3.4], Lifting Spi, to give Spi± , results in the domain of processes.
In addition to the presence of a predomain of terms, there are other differences between 
these equations and equations (3.1)-(3.3) of Section 3.2.3. First, input actions contain a 
functional element, T  —> Spi± , that is capable of being instantiated with any term, not just 
names. Second, free output actions are also equipped to send messages that are generic 
terms, T. Moreover, bound output actions are expressed as a finite number of functions, 
N  —► .. .N  —» (T x Spij_), that take as arguments names and yield other functions until 
eventually resulting in a pair representing the message of communication, T, and the residual 
process, Spi± . This expresses the fact that bound outputs in the spi calculus can extrude 
the scope of multiple names, not just one name, as is the case with the 7r-calculus.
A number of continuous mappings leading into Spi± are also defined, to express the 
manner in which semantic elements are constructed [8 , Def. 3.3]:
0 : 1 Spi± (3.16)
-Q — (} : (Spi± + In + Out)±_ —> Spi± (3-17)
l±J : (Spix x Spi± ) -¥ Spix (3.18)
new : (N  —> Spi±) —> Spi± (3.19)
The description of these mappings is largely similar to their counterparts in the denotational 
model for the 7r-calculus (Section 3.2.3). The empty set map, 0, constructs deadlocked or 
terminated processes. The singleton set map, {] — |}, constructs elements of the domain 
Spi± resulting from input, output and silent actions, as well as the bottom element,
The standard powerdomain union, l±l, represents non-deterministic choice, and finally, new 
is used to interpret the effects of restricting a single name to a process.
We construct a concrete solution for equations (3.8)-(3.15) that is based on domain 
theory. To specify elements of Spi± , it is necessary to determine elements of all the other 
semantic domains. We start with the predomain of terms, T. Assuming K, is the set 
underlying any domain, then elements t € 1C(T) are defined in Figure 3.8. Due to the 
assumption that cryptographic functions are total over their arguments, which are of the 
appropriate type (e.g. keys are names), the predomain of terms, T, appears to be fiat with 
discrete structure and no bottom elements. The disjoint union guarantees that cryptographic 
terms with similar elements are distinguished from each other as well as from the 2-element 
tuples (pairs). This is achieved by tagging the cryptographic terms with appropriate tags, 
sec, pub and sig, while leaving ordinary pairs without tags.
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a, b, c . . . G !C(N) Names
t G £ (T ), k G IC{N) => (i, k) G K {S E C ) Secret-key ciphertexts
t G K {T ),k+  G K{N ) => (i,fc+) £IC {PU B) Public-key ciphertexts
t G K (T), k -  G K {N ) =>■ (t, k~) G IC(SIG) Digital signatures
i i , . . .  , tn G K,(T) =£■ ( i i , . . .  , tn) G K {TU P) Tuples
K {N  +  S E C  + P U B  + S IG  + TU P) = Terms
{a  1 a G N } U {sec(t, k) | (t , k) G S E C }  U
{pub(t,k+) 1 ( i ,  fc+ ) G P U B }  U
{s ig (t,k~ ) \ (t ,k ~ ) G S IG }  U
{(*!»■•• .* n )  1 ( t l ,- - - ,tn )  G T U P }
Figure 3.8: Elements of the predomain of terms T.
Elements o f In :
a  G IC(N), Xy.p G /C (T  - »  Spi± ) => (a , Ay.p) G /C (/n )
Elements o f O ut:
a  G IC(N),t G IC{T),p  G K(Spi± ) =>• (a ,t,p )  G IC(Out)
a  G K.(N), A n i . . .  Anm.(t,p) G
/ C ( i V - h  . . . J V - u  { T x S p i j J ) => (a ,A n i •■•Anm.(t,p))  G K(Out)
Elements o f Spi± :
m e W S p i x ),ibzK :(S p i± )
p , q e  IC(Spi± ) =>■ p  l±l g G K,(Spij_)
p  G IC(Spi± ) => flia«(p)|} G fC(Spi± )
i G JC(In) => {]*«(*) |} G IC(Spi± )
o  G IC(Out) => { ] out{o) [} G fC(Spi± )
Figure 3.9: Elements of In, Out, and Spi± .
From these semantic terms, the concrete elements of the predomains of In and Out are 
given leading to a solution of equations (3.8)-(3.10) specifying elements of the domain of 
processes, S p i j First, elements arising from 0, -fl — |} and l±J are defined in Figure 3.9.
The effects of restricting a name to a process are interpreted by giving a concrete defini­
tion of new in terms of the simpler elements arising from 0, W and fl — |}. This definition is
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shown in Figure 3.10. The main difference in the definition of new from that of Figure 3.4 
(Section 3.2.3) is that a bound output is allowed to have a finite number of bound names, 
not just a single name. Apart from terminating communications over fresh non-extruded 
channels and turning a free output action into a bound output action, restriction has no 




J 0 , if a =  n1{Jin(o, Ax.neu;(An.p))|}, otherwise
new(Xn.§out(a, t,p)\}) =
r Si P II S3
floul(a, An.(i,p))[}, if n € n(i) anc n /  a
flou£(a, i, neui(An.j>))|}, otherwise
new (An. {| oui (a, Ami . . .  Amfc.(i,p))[}) =
0 , if a  =  n
* {]aui(a, An.Ami. . .  Amjt.(i,p))j}, if n G n(t) and n / a
{joui(a, Xni] . . .  Amjt,((, newiXn.p)))^, otherwise
new(\n.{\tau(p)\}) = {j£a«(new(An.p))[}
new(\n.(pi WP2)) = new(Xn.pi) l±J new(Xn.p2 )
Figure 3.10: The definition of new for the spi calculus.
The denotational semantics for the spi calculus can now be given as a semantic function 
gspi (jp]j p (j>s g Spi± defined by the set of rules of Figure 3.11. The multiset, p, is used 
to hold processes composed in parallel with the analysed process, where rule (TZspi0) is 
used to interpret the contents of p. The environment, 4>s '■ V T±, where V is the 
predomain of variables, captures any term substitutions that occur in the semantics. The 
special function, <ps '■ (V —> ^x) x Term —> T, returns the semantic value of a term, given 
substitutions recorded by <j>s:
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(S spil) <Sspi([0]) p 0s = 0
(Sapi2) S spi([M(y).P]) p <t>s  =  {\in( s^(<l>s ,M),\y.'JZspi^P\iP}  0s)|}
where, ip(0£, M) e N
(S ap{3) S api([M(L).P]) p 0 S =
y  {|iau(7^(H]P[}P W, p[P'/M'(z).P']]) 0s [* ^  <ps(<l>s,m
M’(z).P'Ep
l±l {] out(<ps(<l>s,M),vs((t>s,L),'R.spl([§P§p]) 0s)[}
where, <ps{<f>s,M) =  ips(0s, M') € N
(S 3piA) S spi([{va)P]) p 4>s  =  new(\a.K3viWP\}PVPpli 0s)
(S 3pt5) <Sspi([P \Q] p<t>s =  ^ ( { I P L ^ i lQ ^ l i l p p D  4>s
(S apl6) <Sspi([!P]) p 4>s =  T 3vi{-1 )
where, !F3pt(n) =  let pi =  S 3plt[ P[bnVi(P)/bnv(P)] ]) p <f>s in
i= 1
le tp 2 = S 3pi<[ n  P[bnvi(P)/bnv{P)\  ]) p 0s =  in
i =  1
i f  p i =  f>2 then pi else P 3p'l(n +  1 )
and, bnvi(P) =  {xi | x e bnv(P)}
(S 3pi7) <S3pi([j/ M = L then P  else QJ p 0s =
f  1l3pi([{\PWP WP p]) <j>s, if <ps(<!>s,M) = ips(<t>s,L)
| l±lp p\) 4>s, otherwise
(S3pl8) S apl([let ( x i , . . . ,  xn) =  M in P  else Q{ p 0s =
' UppWs, if !ps{<t>s, M) = (tl, . . . , i n )
■ where, /*>'$ = 0s [a: i >->■ 11, . . . ,  xn i-> tnJ
7£’p,([{|Q[}p Wp pp 'As, otherwise
(Sspl9) S 3pl([case L  o f {x}w in P  else Q]) p <ps =
fcsjn([{|P|}p p]) f/)^ ; if ips ((j>s,L) =  sec(t,k ) and ips(4>s,N) =  k
1 where, 0s =  0s [x (-► t]
f t3pl([{|Q[)-p Wp pj 0s , otherwise
(5 spt10) <S3p*([case L 0/ -3*]}^ in P  else Q]) p (j>s =
7£sp,([{|P[}p Wp p]) 0's, if ips(4>s,L) =  pub(t,k+) and ips{<t>s,N) =  k~
‘ where, >^¡3 =  0s [x >-»• i]
f tspl([{|Ql}p Wp pD 0s , otherwise
(,S'Si’tl l )  iSip,([case L of [{xjjjv in P  else Q]) p 0s =
ftS!” ([{|P[}p Pi 0s, if <Ps(0s , i )  =  sig(t,k~) and <ps(0s , N ) = k+
1 where, <j>'s  =  0s [as i-> i]
7£3p’([{|Q[}/> Wp p]) 0s, otherwise
(U3pi0) H3pi<lp]> 0s =  1+) S*p,([Pi (p\{|P[}p) 0s
_______________________________pep___________________________________
Figure 3.11: The denotational semantics of the spi calculus.
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V0S, M  : (fs(<Ps, M) —
if M  £ V
Af, if M  € N
sec((ps{<t>s,M'),<ps(<l>s,N)), if M =  {M '}N
pub{ips{4>s,M'),<ps {(t>s,N)), if M  =  {[M']}w
sig(<ps(<l>s,M'),<ps {(t>s,N)), if M  =  [{M'}]n
(tps{4>s,M1 ) , . . . , ( p s (<l>s,Mn)), if M =  ( M i , . . . ,  Mn)
Note that since we only deal with closed terms, the case where M  =  x  € V and <j>s{%) =  -L 
will never be encountered (open terms).
The description of rules (cSspil)-(<Sspil l )  is as follows. Rule (S sp,l)  interprets the mean­
ing of a null process as the empty set mapping, 0. Rules (S spt2) and (S spi3) deal with 
processes guarded with input and output actions, respectively. The rule for output actions, 
(<Sspi3), considers communications between the output channel and appropriate input chan­
nels guarding processes in p. The <j>s is updated appropriately with semantic elements. 
Rule (<S,p,4) uses the new mapping to interpret the meaning of a restriction. Rule (Ssp% 5) 
interprets directly parallel composition by the addition of the parallel subprocesses to p.
Finally, rule [Sspi6 ) interprets a replicated process, !P, by calculating the higher-order
function, T spl : N —> Spi± , starting from the bottom number, n =  —1, which computes the
- l
bottom semantic element, <Ssp*([ P[bnvi(P)/bnv(P)] ]) p <j>s =  {]-L[}. The value of n is
¿=1
incremented in each iteration until the condition of the ¿/-statement holds true, or in other 
words, the least fixed-point is reached. Due to the fact that the semantic domain, Spi± , 
is infinite, this calculation may not terminate within finite limits. The rule also uses the 
labelling mechanism to rename all the bound variables and names of the spawned processes 
by subscripting those variables and names with a number signifying each spawned copy. 
Since this renaming of bound variables and names is, in fact, a-conversion, the resulting 
process on the right side of the rule is structurally equivalent to a subprocess of the replication 
on the left side. This preserves the compositionality of the denotational semantics since the 
a-converted process is still a subprocess of the replication.
The rest of the rules rely on the meaning of terms as held by the fis environment before 
resolving the analysed process. In rule (<Sspi7), the meaning of two terms is compared, and 
depending on the result, one of two processes is chosen and added to p. Rules (<Sspt8 ) -  
(cSsp* ll )  deal with tuple splitting and cryptographic processes. The result of the tuple 
splitting and cryptographic operations are used to update the 4>s with the appropriate 
semantic terms. A residual process, P , signifying the success of the operation is also added 
to p. In case an operation fails, an alternative process, Q , is chosen and added to p. We can 
now state the following theorem.
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Theorem  2 (Soundness and Adequacy of S p i± w .r.t. transitions)
The interpretation o f processes in Spij_ is sound and adequate with respect to transitions in 
the spi calculus.
Proof. T h e  s o u n d n e s s  p r o p e r t y  r e l ie s  o n  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  s e m a n t i c  e l e m e n t s  p  t o  m a t c h  t r a n ­
s i t i o n s  in  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  m o d e l .  H e n c e :
P m-^>Q  =* o u t{ rn ,T m ^spim  P<Ps) e 5 ^ | P |  p<Ps
p {Vm ,. . .^ ) r n W  Q ^  0u t(m ,X n i. . .  Xnk-{T([N]),Sspi<[Q]) p ips))  e<Sspi([P]) p cj>s
p  m(æ) q  ^  ,n ^  Xx Sspi ^  p(j>s)(,  S sPi ç p j p f a
P  — > Q => tau(Sspi<[Q]) p fis) £ S spi({P]) p <ps
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a d e q u a c y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  s e m a n t i c  t r a n s i t i o n s  m u s t  b e  m a p p e d  c o r ­
r e c t l y  t o  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  m o d e l .  H e n c e :
out(m,t, q) e  p <ps ^  3Q ■ P " ^  Q A T<[N} =  t A S s p i([QD p 4>s  =  q
out{m,Xn1 ...X n k .{t,q ) )  e  <Ss p i([P I) p  => 3 Q  : P 1" 1" " ^ * ^  A T W  =  
t A  S spi{Q } p < P s= q
in(m, Xx.q) 6  ^ ( [ P ] )  p <t>s =» 3Q  : P  ^  Q A S ^ f lQ ] )  p cj>s = q 
tau{q) e i t^tPD P <t>s => 3Q:PAQ A S**([Q]) P <t>s =  q
T h e  p r o o f  o f  s o u n d n e s s  p r o c e e d s  b y  i n d u c t i o n  o n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  d e n o t a t i o n a l  s e m a n t i c s ,  
w h e r e a s  t h e  p r o o f  o f  a d e q u a c y  r e q u i r e s  a  f o r m a l  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  r e l a t i o n ,  p  <  P , b e t w e e n  
e l e m e n t s  p € Spi± a n d  p r o c e s s e s  P  €  V. □
3.4 Conclusion
In t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  w e  h a v e  g i v e n  a n  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  s y n t a x  a n d  s t r u c t u r a l  o p e r a t i o n a l  s e m a n t i c s  
o f  t h e  7r - c a l c u l u s  a n d  i t s  c r y p t o g r a p h i c  e x t e n s i o n ,  t h e  s p i  c a l c u l u s .  T h e  m a i n  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  
t h i s  c h a p t e r  h a s  b e e n  in  c o n s t r u c t i n g  a  d e n o t a t i o n a l  s e m a n t i c s  f o r  t h e  7 r -c a lc u lu s  b a s e d  o n  a  
d o m a i n - t h e o r e t i c  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e d o m a i n  e q u a t i o n s  g i v e n  b y  S t a r k  in  [121]. We h a v e  a ls o  
m o d i f ie d  t h e s e  e q u a t i o n s  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  m o d e l  p r o c e s s e s  in  t h e  s p i c a l c u l u s  b y  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  
a n  e x t r a  p r e d o m a i n  f o r  c o m p l e x  t e r m s ,  T, t o  b e  a b l e  t o  m o d e l  c i p h e r t e x t s ,  d i g i t a l  s i g n a t u r e s  
a n d  t u p l e s .  We a l s o  a l l o w  m u l t i p l e - n a m e  e x t r u s i o n s  t o  o c c u r  in  b o u n d  o u t p u t  a c t i o n s .
T h e  s t a n d a r d  d e n o t a t i o n a l  s e m a n t i c s  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  c o n c r e t e  b a s is  f o r  b u ild in g  t h e  a b s t r a c t  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  in  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  s e m a n t i c  d o m a i n s  w ill b e  e x t e n d e d  
t o  i n c l u d e  e l e m e n t s  t h a t  e x p r e s s  t e r m  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  o c c u r r i n g  in  p r o c e s s e s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  





A f t e r  d e f in in g  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e n o t a t i o n a l  s e m a n t i c s  o f  t h e  7r - c a l c u l u s  a n d  t h e  s p i c a l c u l u s  
in  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r ,  w e  u s e  t h e s e  s e m a n t i c s  a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  c o n s t r u c t i n g  a b s t r a c t  in ­
t e r p r e t a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  t w o  l a n g u a g e s  in  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  T h e  a p p r o a c h  w e  f o llo w  is  b a s e d  o n  
e x t e n d i n g  t h e  s t a n d a r d  s e m a n t i c s  o f  a  l a n g u a g e  t o  o b t a i n  a  c o r r e c t  n o n - s t a n d a r d  m e a n i n g  
t h a t  c a p t u r e s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  in  t h i s  c a s e ,  term substitution. O u r  d e f in i t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o r r e c t n e s s  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  n o n - s t a n d a r d  s e m a n t i c s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  s t a n d a r d  s e m a n t i c s  
is  t h a t  t h e  s t a n d a r d  m e a n i n g  o f  a  p r o c e s s  b e  e x t r a c t a b l e  f r o m  i t s  n o n - s t a n d a r d  m e a n i n g .
T h e  n e x t  s t e p  i n v o l v e s  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a  s u i t a b l e  a b s t r a c t i o n  ( a p p r o x i m a t i o n )  t h a t  
r e s t r i c t s  t h e  s e m a n t i c  d o m a i n  t o  a  f in i te  s iz e ,  t h e r e b y  a l l o w in g  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  a n y  l e a s t  
f i x e d - p o i n t  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  T h i s  a b s t r a c t i o n  is  r e q u i r e d  t o  b e  s a f e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  c o n c r e t e  
n o n - s t a n d a r d  s e m a n t i c s ;  a  t e r m  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o c c u r r i n g  in  t h e  c o n c r e t e  s e m a n t i c s  w ill n e c e s ­
s a r i l y  b e  c a p t u r e d  in  a n  a b s t r a c t  m a n n e r  b y  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s e m a n t i c s .  H o w e v e r ,  d u e  t o  t h e  
im p r e c i s e  n a t u r e  o f  a b s t r a c t i o n s ,  f a ls e  p o s i t i v e s  c a n  a p p e a r  in  t h e  f in a l r e s u l t s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
in  x(s)  | xx(y) | z(w) \ zz(u), if , x =  xx  =  t\ a n d  z =  zz =  t2 , t h e n  w e  h a v e  in  t h e  s t a n d a r d  
s e m a n t i c s  t h a t  s c a n  o n ly  s u b s t i t u t e  y, a n d  w c a n  o n l y  s u b s t i t u t e  u. H o w e v e r ,  a b s t r a c t i n g  
t h e  a b o v e  v a l u e s ,  s u c h  t h a t  x =  xx  €  { i i , ¿2 }  a n d  z =  zz  €  { ¿ 1 ,^ 2 } ,  t h e n  s m a y  s u b s t i t u t e  y 
o r  u, a n d  s i m i l a r l y ,  w m a y  s u b s t i t u t e  y o r  u. T h i s  is  b e c a u s e  t h e  a b s t r a c t i o n  i n t r o d u c e s  t h e  
s c e n a r i o  w h e r e  x =  zz  a n d  z  =  xx, w h ic h  is  i m p o s s ib le  i n  t h e  c o n c r e t e  s e m a n t i c s .
F i n a l l y ,  w e  g iv e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  e x a m p l e s  o f  p r o t o c o l s  s p e c if ie d  in  t h e  l a n g u a g e s  o f  t h e  
7 r -c a lc u lu s  a n d  t h e  s p i  c a l c u l u s  a n d  a p p l y  t h e  a b s t r a c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t o  t h e s e  s y s t e m s  t o  
c a p t u r e  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t e r m  s u b s t i t u t i o n s .
53
4.2 The 7r-calculus
A s  w e  d e s c r i b e d  in  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e  m a i n  n o t i o n  o f  b e h a v i o u r  in  t h e  7r - c a l c u l u s  is  
n a m e  p a s s i n g ,  w h e r e  p r o c e s s e s  c o m m u n i c a t e  b y  e x c h a n g i n g  n a m e s  o v e r  c h a n n e ls  a llo w in g  
t h e  o v e r a l l  t o p o l o g y  o f  t h e  n e t w o r k  t o  e v o lv e  o v e r  t i m e .  A n a l y s i n g  t h i s  b e h a v i o u r  o ffe rs  
v a l u a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p r o g r a m  p r o p e r t i e s  in  g e n e r a l  (e .g .  c o n t r o l  a n d  
d a t a  f lo w  i n f o r m a t i o n ) ,  a n d  a b o u t  s e c u r i t y  p r o p e r t i e s  in  p a r t i c u l a r  ( e .g .  p r o c e s s e s  o b t a i n i n g  
p r i v a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  p r o c e s s e s  o b t a i n i n g  i n a u t h e n t i c  m e s s a g e s ) .
T h e  s t a n d a r d  s e m a n t i c  d o m a i n  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r  w a s  d e f in e d  o v e r  t h e  p r o c e s s  
d o m a i n ,  P i± .  T h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  in  t h i s  d o m a i n  is  n o t  s u f f ic ie n t  t o  r e a s o n  a b o u t  
n a m e  s u b s t i t u t i o n s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  w e  e x t e n d  t h e  d o m a i n  t o  in c l u d e  m a p p i n g s  f r o m  t h e  s e t  
o f  i n p u t  p a r a m e t e r s  o f  a  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  t o  s e t s  o f  n a m e s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  p o s s ib le  i n s t a n t i a t i o n s  
o f  t h o s e  p a r a m e t e r s  d u r i n g  p r o c e s s  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  d u e  t o  t h e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  
p r o c e s s e s  h a v i n g  in f i n i t e  t r a c e s  in  P i±  a n d  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  c r e a t e  in f i n i t e  n u m b e r s  o f  i n s t a n c e s  
o f  b o u n d  n a m e s ,  a n  a b s t r a c t i o n  is  r e q u i r e d  t o  s a f e l y  e n s u r e  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  s e m a n t i c s .  
T h e  m a i n  i d e a  u n d e r l y i n g  t h i s  a b s t r a c t i o n  is  t o  p l a c e  a n  u p p e r  l i m i t  o n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  c o p i e s  
o f  e a c h  n a m e  t h a t  c a n  a p p e a r  in  t h e  a b s t r a c t  m e a n i n g  o f  a  p r o c e s s .  A n  e a r l i e r  v e r s i o n  o f  
t h e  w o r k  p r e s e n t e d  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n  c a n  b e  f o u n d  in  [1 5 ] .
4.2.1 Non-standard Semantics
T o  t r a c e  n a m e  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  d u r i n g  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  p r o c e s s e s  in  t h e  7r - c a l c u l u s ,  w e  d e f in e  
t h e  s p e c i a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  (j>£ : N  —► p(N ), w h ic h  m a p s  e a c h  n a m e  o f  a  p r o c e s s  t o  a  s e t  o f  
n a m e s  t h a t  m a y  i n s t a n t i a t e  t h a t  n a m e  d u r i n g  r u n t i m e .  T h e  n u ll  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  (¡>£o, m a p s  
e v e r y  n a m e  t o  t h e  e m p t y  s e t :
Vx € N  : </>£0(x) =  { }
W h e n  c o m p u t i n g  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  a  p r o c e s s ,  P, e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  s e t  bn(P), r e p r e s e n t i n g  i n p u t  
p a r a m e t e r s ,  w ill o b t a i n  v a l u e s  in  (p£ w h e n e v e r  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  t a k e  p l a c e .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  a  
m e s s a g e ,  z, is  r e c e i v e d  o v e r  a  c h a n n e l ,  x, in  a n  i n p u t  a c t i o n ,  x(y).P , t h e n  z  w ill b e  a d d e d  t o  
t h e  s e t  o f  n a m e s  g i v e n  b y  (¡>e{y). T h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s e m a n t i c s  is p r e c i s e ,  i .e .  e v e r y  i n s t a n c e  
o f  a  b o u n d  n a m e  is  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  f r o m  e v e r y  o t h e r  i n s t a n c e  in  t h e  s e m a n t i c s ,  m e a n s  t h a t  
t h e  s e t  4>e{y) w ill b e  a t  m o s t  a  s i n g l e t o n  s e t  p e r  c h o i c e  o f  c o n t r o l  f lo w .
A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  s u b s t i t u t i o n s ,  a  d o m a i n  D± =  N  —> p(N ) is  f o r m e d  w i th  t h e  fo llo w in g  
p a r t i a l  o r d e r i n g  r e l a t i o n ,  b a s e d  o n  s u b s e t  in c l u s io n :
V<t>£\,<p£2  e  D_L : (f>£ 1  CD± </>£ 2  Vx G N  : 4>£l ( x )  C  <f>£2(x)
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with the bottom element of D±  being the null environment, (/>£q. The union of <p£ environ­
ments, U0 , can be defined in terms of the standard union, U, as follows:
V fc u fo i  G D_l,x G N : {(t>£ 1 U0 4>£2){x) =  4>ei[x) U <f>£2 (x)
The non-standard semantic domain is then the product P ij  x D± ordered pointwise on
its elements, with a bottom element, (_Lpjx , J-_d±). Based on the domain P i±  x D±, the
non-standard semantics of the 7>calculus can be defined using the function £*([P]) p f c  G 
P i±  x D ±, shown in Figure 4.1.
The semantics utilises a multiset, p, to hold all processes in parallel with the analysed 
process. The contents of this multiset are interpreted in rule (7^*0), which uses the choice 
mapping, l+J, to group the p  G P i±  elements and the union of environments, U0 , to group 
the (j>£ G D_l elements in the resulting semantic pair. The semantics also defines the special 
function, ipg : (N  ->■ p{N )) x Af —>■ N, which retrieves the value of a name, x, given earlier 
substitutions recorded by cf>£:
The rest of the rules (¿'7rl ) - ( £ 7r8 ) are described informally as follows. The interpretation of 
null processes in rule (5*1) is given as a pair expressing the empty set map and an unchanged 
(f>£ environment. Processes guarded by input and output actions are treated in the following 
rules, (£*2) and (£*3), respectively. Possible communications between output actions and
accordingly. As a result of the substitution in (j>£, the input parameter is removed from the 
residue. Along with the fact that bound names are maintained distinct (rule (£ * 8 )), this 
results in the possibility of having a single substitution only per choice of control flow. To 
indicate the presence of a communication, the silent action, tau, is added to the process.
Rule (£*4) deals with the conditional process comparing the values of two names. One 
process or another is chosen to be added to p depending on whether the equality of the two 
names holds or not. Rule (£*5) deals with the summation of processes, where elements of 
the semantic pairs resulting from the non-standard interpretation of the two subprocesses 
are related pointwise using the choice map, 1+1, and the union of environments, U .^ Rule 
(£ *6 ) joins two parallel processes to the rest of parallel processes supplied by the p multiset. 
In rule (£*7), the interpretation of restriction is carried out using the new map on the 
process element of the resulting semantic pair. The $£ element remains unchanged (since 
internal communications are preserved under restrictions).
the matching input actions are treated in rule (£*3), where the value of <p£ is updated
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(£* 1) £*{0 ])pd>£ = (Mi)
(£*2) ¿"'([»(jO.P]) p =  ({M<p£(<fc,a:),A2/.p')|},<fc;)
where, (p',<%) =  ft*([{]P|}pD <t>£
(£ff3) £ ,r([x(y).P]) p <t>e =
( l+| {|io«(p')|} W {|owi(‘P£'(</^ ,a--).^(0i'.3/).7,")|}. U* 4>e)
x'(x).P'ep x'{z).P'Gp
if, <pe{4>£^) =  <P£(</>£, z')
where, (p ',^ )  = ft'dfl^Dp Wp plP//as, (*).P/]]) >-> {«Pf {<!>£,y)}]
and, (p",<t>£) = ft*([{]PDp5 0£
(£*4) £*([«/ a; =  y then P  else Q]) p f c  =
ft*<H]P|}/» 9/> p]) 4>e, if <ps(<l>s,x) =  <pe(<l>£,y)
pD &£> Otherwise 
(£*5) £*([P +  (QD = ( ( p ' W / ) , ( f t U # ^ ) )
where, (p\ $ -) = ^  Pi <t>£
and, (p",^-) =  '^([{lQ|},WppJ) <(>£
(£*6) ¿ '"([P IQ D P fo  =  ^ {JP & p W ^ flQ ^ W p p ])*
(£*7) £*([(t/®)P]) p (¡>£ =  (new{Xx.p1 ),(/>£)
where, (p',<%) =  TV'W\P$p W, p]) </>£
(£*8) £ ff([!PDp0£ =  ^ ( - 1 )
where, ^ ( n )  = let ?>i =  £*([ [] P[6n,-(P)/6«(P)] j) p in
<=in+2
let v2 = £ wd I] P[6nj(P)/6n(P)] D p <j>£ in 
i=i
¿/ t>i =  V2 then v\ else ?yr(n +  1) 
and, bni(P) = {x,- | x € 6n(P)}
(w*o) ft* dpi ^
/j,e p  Pep
where, {p1, <t>'e ) =  £ * <[P]) (p\{|PDp) <t>£
Figure 4.1: The non-standard semantics of the 7r-calculus.
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The rule for replication, (¿T71^ ), computes a special function, P *  : N -¥ P i±  x D±, 
starting at n =  - 1 , which contains the bottom element, (_Lpj± , ±d_l), and continues by 
incrementing n, until it reaches a least fixed-point, at which the meaning Vi 6  P i_l x D± 
cannot be increased any further. Due to the infinite nature of the non-standard semantic 
domain, computing this fixed point is not guaranteed to terminate. Later, we discuss a 
possible abstraction that maintains the computability of the least fixed-point while sacri­
ficing the precision of the semantics. Also, any spawned copies of !P are a-converted to 
distinguish between the new copies of bound names. This a-conversion does not affect the 
compositionality of the semantics since the process on the right side of the rule is still a 
subprocess of the left side of the rule (up to a-conversion).
The following theorem states that the non-standard semantics of the 7r-calculus is correct 
with respect to the standard denotational semantics introduced in the previous chapter.
Theorem  3 (Correctness of the Non-Standard Semantics)
VP € V : («S^IPJ p <ps = P )  A (£*([P i p cf>£ =  (p', <j>'£)) =>- p =  pt
Proof. The proof is by induction over the structure of the rules of the standard and non­
standard semantics. □
Intuitively, the theorem states that for any process, P , it is possible to extract the 
standard meaning of P , as interpreted by «S'^P]) p 4>s, from its non-standard meaning, as 
interpreted by £*  ([P]) p <j>£. In other words, the former is equivalent to the first element of 
the pair generated by the latter.
4.2.2 A bstract Semantics
As we mentioned earlier in the previous section, the non-standard semantics of the 7r-calculus 
contains least fixed-point calculations that may not be computable (in the rule for replica­
tion). To obtain a computable semantics, whose termination is guaranteed, a safe abstraction 
is required to remove the source of infinite growth in the semantic domain P i±  x D±. For 
example, consider the following system:
!((i'z)x{z).P  | x{y).Q)
As a result of the infinite communications within this system, its non-standard semantics 
will yield (as part of its meaning) an infinite trace of silent actions tau(tau(tau(... as well 
as a (j>£ environment that maps every instance yj to {z j} ,  for j  £  N.
To reduce the semantic domain to a finite level, we first assume a finite predomain 
of tags, Tag, ranged over by t , t ’ etc. Given a process, P , we place distinct tags on all
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m e s s a g e s  o f  o u t p u t  a c t i o n s  o f  P. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t a g g i n g  \(v x)y(x).y(y).y(z).y(z)  r e s u l t s  in  
\(v x)y(xt).y(yt').y(z).y(zt"). C o p i e s  o f  t a g s  a r e  r e n a m e d  b y  s u b s c r i p t i n g  t h e m  w i th  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  t h e i r  c o p y . F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  r e p l i c a t i o n  a b o v e  c a n  s p a w n  t w o  c o p i e s :
\(vx)y{xt).y{yt’).y(z).y{zt") |
( v x x)y{x^).y{y^).y{z1).y{z )[’ > | {v x2)y{xt^ ).y (yt^).y(z2).y(zt^ )
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  w e  d e f in e  t h e  f u n c t i o n ,  value-of ( { ¿ i , . . . ,  tn } )  =  {x \ , . . .  ,x m},  w h ic h  c a n  b e  
a p p l i e d  t o  a  s e t  o f  t a g s ,  { i i , . . . ,  tn},  r e t u r n i n g  a  s e t  o f  n a m e s ,  { a r i , . . . ,  xm } ,  t a g g e d  b y  t h o s e  
t a g s .  H e n c e ,  f o r  t h e  a b o v e  p r o c e s s ,  w e  h a v e  t h a t :
value.of ( { t , h , t 2,t', t[ , t2 , t” , i " ,  t2 } )  =  { a ; ,  x ± , x2, y , 2 , Z! , 2 2  }
N e x t ,  w e  d e f in e  t h e  f o l lo w in g  a b s t r a c t i o n  f o r  n a m e s  a n d  t a g s ,  w h ic h  p l a c e s  a n  u p p e r  l i m i t ,  k, 
o n  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  c o p i e s  o f  n a m e s  a n d  t a g s  t h a t  c a n  b e  c a p t u r e d .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  s e le c t in g  
k  is  n o n - d e c i d a b l e  a n d  r e l i e s ,  t o  a  g r e a t  e x t e n t ,  o n  u s e r ’s  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  t h e  s p e c i f ic  p r o g r a m  
b e i n g  a n a l y s e d .
Definition 1 Define the abstraction function, a k : N  x  (N + Tag) —> (N N +  Tag^), by:
! xk , if  x =  xa and i >  k x, otherwise
N o t e  t h a t  TV11 =  N \ {xj \ j  >  k }  a n d  Tag11 =  Tag\{tj | j  > k }.  U s in g  a b s t r a c t e d  n a m e s  
a n d  t a g s ,  w e  c a n  d e f in e  t h e  a b s t r a c t  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  <f>j^  : —> p(Tag^), m a p p i n g  a b s t r a c t e d
i n p u t  p a r a m e t e r s  t o  s e t s  o f  a b s t r a c t e d  t a g s  w h o s e  n a m e s  c a n  p o s s i b l y  r e p l a c e  e a c h  in p u t  
p a r a m e t e r  in  t h e  s e m a n t i c s .  D u e  t o  t h e  i m p r e c i s e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  a b s t r a c t  s e m a n t i c s ,  4>a (x ) 
m a y  b e  l a r g e r  t h a n  a  s i n g l e t o n  s e t .  T h i s  i m p r e c i s i o n  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  t o  d i s t in g u is h  
b e t w e e n  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o p i e s  o f  i n p u t  p a r a m e t e r s  a n d  t a g s  b e y o n d  t h e  kth c o p y .
T h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  i n t e g e r  c o n s t r a i n t  is  d e p e n d e n t  o n  t h e  d e f in i t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t y  w e  a r e  
i n t e r e s t e d  in  a n d  w ill d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p r e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  a b s t r a c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  
A  uniform  a n a l y s i s  ( i .e .  k =  1 )  is  i n c a p a b l e  o f  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o p i e s  o f  
r e p l i c a t e d  p r o c e s s e s  a n d  i t  is  s u i t a b l e  f o r  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  r e m a i n  u n if o r m  a c r o s s  t h e  r a n g e  o f  
c o p i e s  o f  n a m e s .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a  f le x ib le  non-uniform  a n a l y s i s  ( i .e .  k >  1 )  is  s u i t a b l e  
f o r  p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  r e q u i r e  m o r e  p r e c i s i o n ,  s i n c e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o p i e s  o f  p r o c e s s e s  s p a w n e d  
f r o m  a  r e p l i c a t i o n  c a n  b e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  ( b y  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  t h e i r  b o u n d  n a m e s  a n d  t a g s ) .
T h e  a b s t r a c t  s e m a n t i c  d o m a i n ,  D^_ =  A r|) —> piT agt), is d e f in e d  a s  t h e  d o m a i n  o f  4>_a 
e n v i r o n m e n t s  o r d e r e d  b y  s u b s e t  in c l u s i o n  ( w i t h  U 0  d e f in e d  a s  in  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n ) :
V4>A\,4>A2 G : 4>A1 4>A2 ^  Va; e  N't : 4>a\{x) C  0 .A 2 (x)
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The bottom element, -L ^ , is the null environment, (¡>ao, mapping every abstract name to 
the empty set. Using D^ _, the abstract semantics of the 7r-calculus is defined as a function 
4*([P]) p 4>a 6  the rules of which are shown in Figure 4.2.
(4 *1 ) 4 *  ([05 p<t>A <i>A
(4 *  2) Av ([x(y).P} p <Pa = <t>A
(4 *3 ) 4*([z(i/t).P]) p (j>A = ( ^ i n ^ ^ p v ^ w - p ' i i <t>'A) u 0 <I>A
x'(z) .P 'ep
where, <f>'A =  (¡>A[ak (z) 4>A{otk{z)) U {afc(i)}]
if, <PA(<t>A,x) n Pa Ì&Ai * ')  t  { }
(4 *4 ) A * ([if x =  y then P  else Q]j p (¡>a  =
i  } p ^p p ì 4>a if, <pa{4>a,x) n tpA(<l>A,y) ^  { }
otherwise
(.4*5) 4 *([P  + Q]) p <j)A = u0 K«WQ\}pVp PÌ <Pa
(4 *6 ) 4 *  <[P \Q} p 4>a } P Wpfloup ttip pd <pa
(4 *7 ) 4 *  i(ra)P ]) p (pA = ^*([{|P|}p 4>a
(4 *8 ) 4*i!P D  p (f>A P * ( - i )
where, !Fn(n) =  let 0 i =  4 *([ J ]  ren{P, i) ]) p <j>A in
i= 1 
71+2
let 0 2 = 4*([ n ren (p ,i)  ]) p (j>A in 
i= 1
if 4>i = 02 then 0 i else F n(n + 1)
and, Vx € bn (P ),y l G n(P) : ren(P ,i) =  [P ^ t i/x ] )^  /y 1]
( f t* 0 ) 4>a I V  (P i  ( p \ m P) <t>A
rep
Figure 4.2: The abstract semantics of the ?r-calculus.
The multiset, p, holds as usual all the processes composed in parallel with the interpreted 
process. The function, <pA '■ ->■ p(Tag^)) x J\i p(iVlt) is defined as follows:
V a (4>a,x) =  <Pa(<I>a,x){} 
where, <p'A((/>A,x ) s =
i f  a k(x) 6  s then { }  else (J <p'A (< t> A ,y ) s \ j{a k ( x ) } ,  if <t>A(ak {x)) ^  { }
y e v a lu e - o f { < j> A { o t k { x ) ) )
{a/t(a;)}, otherwise
The function ip'A{(j)A, x )s terminates only when it evaluates all the abstract input parameters 
in value-of (<j>A(a k (x ))), whose tags were added to 0A in (.4*3). Note that this termination is
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guaranteed since ip'A never performs a recursive call on an input parameter it has encountered
before and the number of input parameters is kept finite by the abstraction, a k-
The rules of the abstract semantics are described informally as follows. Rules, (.4*1) and
(.4 * 2 ), for null processes and input actions do not change the value of the <f>A environment,
since no communications take place in these rules. Rule (4 *3 ) deals with output actions,
where the meaning of a process guarded by an output action is given as the union of two
(¡>A environments. The first environment reflects all possible communications between the
output action and matching input actions in p. A communication is fired whenever the
sets of values of two channels, as given by <pA, have a non-empty intersection. This means
that there must have been tags with the same values substituting both channels earlier in
the semantics (if the channels were closed under input actions), or that the names of the
channels are the same (if the channels were free or restricted names). The effect of the
communication is reflected by adding the abstract value of the tag of the message to the
value of the substituted input parameter in <f>A. The second environment is an unchanged
<t>A reflecting the no-communications scenario.
The rest of the rules, ( .4 *4 )-(4 *7 ), are straightforward. The rule for replicated processes,
(.4 * 8 ), attaches subscripts to bound names and tags of the spawned processes according to
the number of copy of each process. This is necessary to ensure that these names and
tags remain distinct throughout the semantics. The rule uses a least fixed-point calculation
for a special function, T *  : N —> Dj_, where the bottom number, n =  —1, computes the
- l
bottom semantic element, 4*([ n  ren(P ,i) ]) p </>a  — -*-£># • It is easy to note that the least
¿=i x n
fixed point of occurs at the minimum number, n, such that 4 *([ f]  ren(P ,i) ]) p (f>A =
1= 1
n+ 2
4*([ n  ren(P ,i) ]) p (/>a - This implies that adding two extra copies of P  could not induce
i= 1
any further communications: First, between P  and the other processes in parallel, second, 
between the two added copies of P, and finally, within P  itself.
We state, by the following theorem, the fact that the computation of such least fixed 
points are guaranteed to terminate.
Theorem  4 (Term ination of the least fixed-point calculation)
The calculation o f rule (.4*8) terminates.
Proof. We give a sketch of the proof of the termination property. Two requirements must 
be satisfied. First, the semantic domain must be finite. This is satisfied by the definition 
of Dj_. The second requirement is to prove that !Fn(n) QDt !Fv (n +  1) (i.e., proving the
n
monotonicity property of ^ *(n )). This requirement can be restated as 4 *  flJTPI) P &A
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n-\- 2
An([ H P]) p (¡>a - To prove this, we simplify the inequality into An<[Q]) p (¡>a  C An([Q \
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P  | P]) p tpAi where Q =  J^P- This is further simplified to become A*I[Q} p ij)A E 
■A*([Q]) P1 4>a, where p' =  p ttlp flPdp {jP|}p. This result can be proven by induction 
over the rules of A n. In particular, the most interesting rule is that of (^4^3), where the 
value of 4>a changes. Since p Ç p', then x'(y).P' G p =>• x'(y).P' G p'■ This implies 
that any communications (and the associated substitutions) taking place in 4^ 7r([Q]) p <Pa 
will necessarily take place in A?<[Q§ p' 4>a• This eventually leads to the conclusion that 
A*§Q]j p 4>a E A *  ([QD p1 (f>A, since the final environment resulting from An([Q]) p 4>A will 
be a subset of the final environment resulting from A^ ([Q]) p' (¡>a (i-e- the larger system 
induces more name substitutions). □
In order to be able to prove the safety of the abstract semantics with respect to the non­
standard semantics, we need first to prove the safety of the union of environments, U .^
Lem m a 1 (Safety of [J^ in the ir-calculus)
Vi G { 1 . .  . n } ,n  G N, cf>i €  6  '■
(0  =  Ü0 4>i) A O ' =  Uÿ 0î) A
t = l . . . n  i = l . . . n
(3y € Af : <p£{<pi,y) £ <t>i{x) => 3 i  G # ( a fc(æ)) : value.of ({t}) - {ak{y)})
=> (3y G M  : <P£{<j>,y) G 4>{x) => 3 t  G (j>'{otk(x)) : value.of {{t})  = { a k{y)})
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.I. □
Hence, the lemma establishes that for any set of concrete environments, {(p i,. . .  and
their abstract counterparts, {((>[,..., 4>‘n}, which are related by the abstraction function, a k ,
and the tag evaluation function, value-of, then the unions, <fr =  IJ<j <j>i and </>' =  I Jc4 0 -,
i = l . . . n  i= l . ..n
will maintain this relation. Intuitively, the relation states that a name, y, captured by the
<p£ function in the concrete semantics, will appear as a tag, t, in the abstract environment,
such that the value of t is equivalent to the abstraction, a k (y)•
From this lemma, the safety of the abstract semantics can now be established formally.
Theorem  5 (Safety of the abstract semantics of the 7r-calculus)
VP,P,0£, §A ■
( ¿ ^ ( [ P D  p  4>e =  {p A 'c )) a  G A ' I P D  p 4>a  =  Va ) a
(3y G M  : <pe{4>£,V) G <f>£ (x) =>■ 3f G <j>A(a k(x)) : value-of ({t})  =  { a k (y)})
=> (3y G JV  : <p£(<t>'£,y) G <j>'e(x) => 31 G (j>'A(ak{x)) : value-of ({t}) = {ak(y)})
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.2. □
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The theorem states that values present in the final environment resulting from the con­
crete non-standard semantics will always be present, as tags of their abstract values, in the 
environment resulting from the abstract semantics.
4.2.3 The Intruder I
Often when analysing properties of systems, it is the case that the external context is taken 
into consideration, so as to achieve a more robust and modular analysis. This context is 
sometimes viewed as the larger and more powerful network, which is an arbitrary collec­
tion of intruder processes, I ,  assumed to be running concurrently with the system under 
analysis. The capabilities of this intruder include intercepting, reading and modifying any 
messages that travel over public channels as well as creating fresh messages, sending them 
to other processes and using them later for further communications. These capabilities vary 
depending on the network. For example, a local area network may be limited in its ability to 
communicate with computers external to the network as a result of its isolation from other 
networks by a firewall. It is also less able to create communication noise as a result of the 
high quality of service normally expected from local area networks. On the other hand, the 
Internet has a vast amount of information and is capable of communicating with virtually 
every computer that has some sort of connection to it (either directly or via a gateway).
For the case of the weakest intruder, its specification is I  =  0. However, the model of I  
adopted in our framework draws on the lines of the most general attacker as given by Dolev 
and Yao in [47]. In the case of non-cryptographic systems, this model lacks the cryptography 
aspect and only captures the input/output capabilities of the Dolev-Yao model:
I  d=  (ui) (J(Kinit) I ! i(/c).( J J  x(y).i(K) I n x(^).t((tU {z}) | (v net)i(nU {net})))
Vcc ,y(zK  VxE/t
In this specification, k is a set of names representing the knowledge of the intruder, (vn et) al­
lows for the intruder to create fresh data at any time, and i is a channel used for the intruder’s 
internal communications. The initial subprocess, i(ninit), outputs the set of names, Kinit, 
representing an instantiation of the intruder’s initial knowledge (in general, «¿„¿t =  fn(P ), 
for the analysed process, P).
The above specification allows the intruder to build its knowledge, re, by repeatedly 
inputting over names in its knowledge. The inputted name is then passed as part of the 
new knowledge to the next instance of the intruder. The intruder can also perform output 
actions. These are either free output actions sending messages over channels already in re, 
or bound output actions that create a copy of the name net and send it over the internal
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channel i. This allows the intruder to learn net without the need to output it first to external 
processes. The learning behaviour is interpreted as the standard union, U, over k .
4.2.4 The F T P  Server Example
We consider here the example of a simple File Transfer Protocol (FTP) system:
ftp =  (!start(x).(v login)(if x =  start then (v pwd) (Server | Client)
else ((vpwd)(Server) | I)
)
) | start(start1 1 ) .start(start42).start(start43) .s tart(Istart14)
Server (v deal) login(z).if z =  pwd then 
login (data) .(
deal(datat5) \ \deal(w).login(wte).login(u).if u =  logout then 0 
else deal(ut7) ) else 0 
Client d=  (v request) (login(pwdts).login(requestt9).login(res).login(logouttw))
Where the tagging scheme, t l , t 2 , . . .  is chosen such that all tags are distinct from each other 
(any other tagging scheme maintaining the distinction property could be used instead). The 
three start signals spawn three instances of the Client/Server system and the fourth Is ta r t  
signal allows the intruder, I ,  to participate in a session with the server. Each instance of the 
client/server system shares a one time password, pwd, that is not reusable. Additionally, 
communications between the server and the client or intruder processes are carried out over 
a secure login channel, login (which could be a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connection). The 
client process performs a sequence of communications, sending the password and the request 
for data, and inputting the result from the server. After that, the client process logs out.
The server process accepts a password over the login channel after which it checks whether 
that password matches the current copy it shares with the client (intruder). If the password 
is correct, it waits for a data request and then deals with that request. For simplicity, the 
server just routes back the request over the session channel without altering it. The server 
process then waits for another input, after which it terminates if the new signal is logout. If 
not, it deals again with further requests sending the results over the login channel.
We adopt the following tagging scheme for the specification of I:
(vi)  I ! * ' ( « ) ■ (  I I  x(yty).i(KtK'2) \ J J  x(zz).i(n\ J{zz}tK3) | (i'net)i(KU {net}M )))
Vcc,2/G« VzEtt
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Assuming the intruder’s initial knowledge is set to =  {login, logout], we obtain the 
following least fixed-point value for <j>A by applying A* ([ftp]) {] [}p 4>Ao, where the integer 
constraint is set to k =  1 (uniform analysis):
k  H> {¿6 1 , i8 i , i9 i , 1 10 i , i/ili, tK2 i , i« 3 i, i/t4i}
£1 i-> {¿1, ¿2, ¿3, ¿4}
Zi i-> {¿6 i , f8 i , 19 i, ilO i, tlogin1, tn et\}
(t)A =  %  H  {tQ\,tB>i,t^i,tlQ\,tlogin1 ,tn e t i}
w\ { i5 i}
datai 1—y {t6 i,t8 i ,t9 i,t l0 i ,t lo g in 1 ,tn e t i}  
res\ H> { t6 i,t8 i ,t9 i,t l0 i ,t lo g in 1 ,tn e t i}
Where the name values for the above input parameters can be converted using <px-
VAi^Ai k) — {neti,pw dx, requestx, logout, loginx}
<Pa (4>a ,% 1) =  {start, L start}
'Pa (<Pa , z i) — {pw dx, request^, logout, login 1 ,n e ii}
(Pa(4ia , u 1) — {pw d ly request x, logout, loginx,net\) 
ipA(<f>A,w 1) =  {pwd1, request 1 , logout, loginx, net} }
(Pa(<!>a 1 datax)  =  {pw dx , request±, logout, loginx, net 1 }
‘PAi'pAt resx) =  {pwdx,requestx, logout, loginx, net\}
We have used underlining to indicate the presence of abnormal information in the intruder’s 
knowledge in the final (¡>a environment. The interpretation detects that the intruder is 
capable of obtaining the pwd and request names, which is a dangerous result. This result is 
a false positive since the uniform interpretation does not distinguish between the different 
copies of the login channels. Therefore, it appears to be possible for the intruder to capture 
any of the other names outputted over different login names. Moreover, it is impossible to
distinguish between the information each instance of the client and server processes obtains.
For example, the res input parameter captures a request, but also the puid, logout, login and 
net messages. As (j>A is uniform, it is impossible to distinguish between different sessions.
To refine the above results, we increase the value of k from 1 to 4. The intermediate 
values of k =  2 and k =  3 will still yield the above false positives for k =  1 (since the 
intruder’s session interferes with clients’ sessions), therefore, we do not include them here. 




k  {i/ilj-, tn2i, tn3 i, tn^i}  for * =  1 . . .  4 
X i i-> { f l }  X2 {t2 } xs K> { i 3 }  X4 H- { ¿ 4 }
zi  i-> { i 8 i }  z2 ^  { i 8 2 }  z3 { i 8 3 }  Zi h-> {tnetutlogin^,
tlogout4 }
U\ 1—> {¿10l} u2 {¿IO2 } U3 1  ^ {¿103} U4 h-> { }
w i >-> { ¿ 5 i }  w2 { i 52}  11)3 h* { i 53}  W4 (->■ { }
datai 1—y { i 9 i }  data2 ^  { i 9 2}  data3 t-> {¿ 9 3 }  data4 { }
resi 1  ^ { i 6 i }  res2 ^  { ¿ 6 2}  res3 h-> { f 6 3 }
The results can be converted back to their name values using the function, as follows:
iPA{4>Ai k) =  A, A =  {netijlogiTij^, logout \ i  — 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 }
Va {<I>a , x  1 ) =  {start} tpA (<i>A,X2) =  {start}
V a {4>a , x  3) =  { s i a r i }  (pA (<pA ,X i)  =  { Is t a r t }
<Pa {<Pa , z  1 ) =  {pwrfj }  <Pa {4>A,Z'i ) = { p w d 2}
<Pa{<Pa,Z3) = { p w d 3} ipA {<t>A,Zi) — A
¥U(</U,ui)  =  {/oi/owi} <p a {4>a , u  2) =  {/oj/oui)
<PA(<t>A,U 3) =  {W oui} ¥\aWu,«4) =  { }
VA{<t>A,w 1 ) =  { re^ites^}  ipA((t>A,w2) =  {request?}
lPA(<t>A,W:i) =  {request3} VA(<t>A,m) =  { }
<Pa (<Pa , datai) =  {request x} (fiA ^ A , data?) =  {request2 }
VA(<f>A, data3) =  {request 3} ^ a {<Pa , data4) =  { }
V A i ^ r e s x )  =  {requestj }  <Pa (</>A, res2) =  {request2}
<PA (<t>A, res3) =  {request3}
The results of the non-uniform analysis (A; =  4) reveal that the intruder is incapable of 
obtaining information from sessions involving clients. It also shows that the server, in fact, 
does not process any request from the intruder, since the latter lacks the required password 
(in this case, pwd 4) . Also, a more precise distribution of information between the three copies 
of the client and server processes is reflected in the results. For example, it is clear that a 
client can only receive a request message as a final result held by the res input parameter. 
Also, each copy of resi captures the corresponding copy of request for i  — 1,2,3.
Another version of the FTP system may contain a faulty client specified as follows:
Clien td=(urequest)(login (pwdts) .login (request*9) .login(res) .login (logout110) .covert (pwdt u ))
The specification of the client reveals, over a covert channel, the password it shares with the
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server to the intruder. Now, if we perform the abstract interpretation for k =  1 setting the 
knowledge of the intruder to «¿„¿t =  {covert, login, logout}, we obtain the following results:
<t>A =
k i-> { i6 i , ¿81, ¿91, f 10i, t a l i , tK2 i, i/t3i, tK4 i} 
x\ h-» { i l ,f2 ,  ¿3, ¿4}
zi {i6 i,i8 i,i9 i,il0 i,i/ o ^ 'n 1,ineii,icoverti} 
ui { i6 i,i8 i,i9 i,il0 i,iio g « n 1,in eii,icoverii} 
w\ 1-4 { i5 i}
data 1 1—y { i6 i ,i8 i ,i9 i , i l0 i , i% 2 n 1,in eii,ico i;erii} 
resi (->• {i6 i,i8 i,i9 i,il0 i,i/ o 9 tn 1,in cii,ico « crii}
Which when converted using yields the following results:
< k ) =  {n eti,p w d x, request1, logout, logins, covert} 
VA^AiX  1) =  {start, I s t a r t }
iP a{4>A7z 1) =  {pw d 1 ,request1, logout, login1, net\, covert} 
P a (4>a , u 1) =  {pwd1 ,request1 ,logout,login 1 ,n e ti, covert} 
<P a((I>A,'w\) =  {pw dly requestly logout, logins net\, covert} 
<Aa(0 .a, datai) =  {pwd1 ,requestx, logout, loginl5 neii, coueri} 
lP a{(I)a ,  res 1) =  {pw dx, requestl} logout, login1, net\, covert}
The intruder obtains the pwd and request names. Refining the interpretation further by 
setting k  =  4, reveals that the intruder, in fact, can only capture the password (when the 
client reveals it over the covert channel):
k  H  {iK li,iK 2 i ,iK3 j,iK 4 i ,U l 1_Li n 21_ill3} for i =  1 . . .  4 
£1 H-» {¿1} x 2 i-> {¿2} X3 i-» {i3 } X4 t-> {i4 }
Z \  I—> { ¿ 81}  Z 2 I—> { ¿ 82}  Z 3 t—> { ¿ 83}
Z i  i-» {tnetj, tlogin4, tlogoutj, ¿ l it ,  ¿112, ¿113} 
u\ 1 y {ilO i} u2 { i l 0 2} U3 t-> { i l 03} U4 { }
Wl { t5 l }  U)2 i->- {i5 2} ws h-> {i53}  W4 i-+ { }
data 1 1—y {¿9 i} data2 i-> {t92} data$ H> {f93} data4 { }
res 1 1-+ { i6 i }  res2 >-y { i6 2} res3 i-> {¿63 }
<t>A =
With the converted results obtained using ipA as follows:
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<p a (4>a , k ) =  A, A  =  { n e t i ,  log in n , lo g o u t , c o v e r t ,p w d j
i  =  1 , 2 , 3 , 4  and j  =  1 , 2 , 3 }
<PA{<l>A,x l )  =  { s t a r t } <PA{<l>A,x 2) =  { s t a r t }
<Pa(<I>a, ®s) =  { s t a r t } VA(<t>A,x 4) =  { L s t a r t }
<PA(4>A,Zi) = { p w d 1} V a {<Pa , z 2)  = { M }
V a {<!>a , z 3) = { p w d 3 } VA{<t>A,Zi) = A
¥>a {<Pa ,U i ) =  { l o g o u t } lP A {rl>A ,U 2) =  { l o g o u t }
<PA(<t>A,U3) =  { l o g o u t } VA{.<t>A,U 4 ) =  { }
<Pa {(/>a , w  i )  =  { r e q u e s t  x } ipA(<t>A,W2 ) =  { r e q u e s t 2 }
(Pa M a ,™  3) =  { r e q u e s t ^ } <Pa (4>a , w  4) =  { }
<Pa (<Pa > d a t a x ) =  { r e q u e s t ^ V A i& A , data2) =  { r e q u e s t ? }
<Pa (<I>a , data3) =  { r e q u e s t 3 } V A ^  A , d a t a  a ) -  { }
<PA{<t>A, resi )  =  { r e q u e s t  x } <PA{<t>A,res2 ) =  { r e q u e s t ? }
VA{<t>A,res3) =  { r e q u e s t 3 }
The results of the non-uniform interpretation reveal that the intruder is incapable of com­
promising the system, even in the case where it compromises the password of each client. 
This is due to the fact that these passwords are one-time passwords. The name request does 
not appear in any of the values for k (the intruder’s knowledge). Also, the session between 
the server and the intruder (for z4) indicates that the intruder is incapable of processing its 
data by the server, since it cannot pass beyond the login stage.
4.3 The Spi Calculus
We extend in this section the approach we introduced in Section 4.2 for constructing an 
abstract interpretation for the spi calculus. The standard semantics is enhanced to be able 
to capture the property of term substitutions occurring as a result of the message passing 
and message processing behaviours. Terms can substitute local variables in the residual 
processes due to input/output as well as the success of the cryptographic operations, like 
decryption or signature verification. Such substitutions may reveal sensitive information to 
intruder processes. For example, if the intruder inputs the key to the decryption of a class 
of ciphertexts, it will be able to decipher any sensitive information encrypted with that key.
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4.3.1 Non-standard Semantics
The non-standard semantics of the spi calculus extends the standard denotational semantics 
introduced in Section 3.3.3, where term substitutions are recorded in a special environment 
: V —> p(T) that maps each variable of a closed process to the set of semantic terms that 
may substitute that variable during the evaluation of the meaning of a process. Since the 
non-standard semantics is precise (copies of bound names and variables are always distinct), 
each variable will be mapped to a singleton set at most per choice of control flow, representing 
the term that substitutes the variable.
A domain, D ± =  V —> p(T ), can be constructed, ordered by subset inclusion:
W>£i, </>£2 € Dj_ : (j>£i C_dx <j>£2 V i £ y  : C <p£2 (x)
With the bottom element, -Ldx , being the null environment, </>£o, that maps each variable 
to the empty set. The union of environments operation, U0 , can also be defined as follows:
6  D_L,x  G V : (cj)£i U0 4>£-i){x) =  <j>£i(x )  U (¡>£2 (x)
The non-standard semantic domain is formed by pairing D± with the standard semantic 
domain, S p iL, resulting in Spi± X D ±. The bottom element of this domain is the pair 
(J_5Pj± , J_j5x ) representing the empty set map, 0 , and the null environment, cj>£o.
The non-standard semantics for the spi calculus is defined by the semantic function, 
£ spi([P]) p cj>£ e [Spi± x D ±), on the structure of P  as in Figure 4.3. The p multiset holds 
all the processes in parallel with the process under interpretation. The definition of the 
<PS '■ {V ~i► p(T )) x Term —> T  function allows for the meaning of a term to be computed 
under a particular <j>£ environment:
t, if M  6  V  A 4>£{M) =  {t}
M, if M  e TV
\/(p£, M  : (p£ (<l>£ ,M ) =  i
sec(<p£ ((¡>£ ,M '),ip£ (4>£ ,N )), if M =  {M '}n
pub{<p£((j)£ ,M '),ip£ (<l)E,N)), if M =  {[M'Jjv
sig{ve(<t>s,M'),tpe (<j>£ ,N )), if M =  [{M'}]n
( .< P s {< t> £ ,M 1 ) , . . . , t p £ (<f>£ , M n ) ) ,  if M =  ( M i M n )
The semantic rules are described as follows. In rule (£ sptl) ,  the meaning of a null process 
is described as the pair (0 , 0 £r), where cf>£ is the environment supplied to the rule initially. 
Rules (Sspi2) and (£ spt3) deal with the cases of input and output actions, respectively. 
Communications are dealt with in rule (£spi3) for output actions, therefore, (fi£ remains 
unchanged in rule (£sp*2) for input actions. The rule for output actions requires that terms
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( £ * p i  1 )  £ » p i  ( [ ( ) ] )  p fa =  (8 ,* e )
(£*pi2) £*p‘([M(x).PD P <t>£ =  ({J»n(vpf (</>£, M), Ax.p')|}, <fc)
where, (p',<t>'e ) = ft*p,fl{)P|},,]) 0t’ and, <pe{4>£,M) e JV
( f , P , - 3 )  £ « p < ( [ M ( L ) . P ] )  p <f>£ =
( (+) {]iait(p')[} W flout(v>£(te,A/),9£(fc)L),pw)l}» U 0 U* </»f)
M'(t).P'Zp M'(z).l>'£p
if, <Pei<l>£>M) = <ps{<t>£yM') € N
w h e r e ,  ( p ' , ^ )  =  p [P '/M '{z).P ')} <t>£ [z - * ■  {<pe(4>£,L)}}
and, (p",M ) = n * ’>iW P b D ‘i>e
(£1*4) £*pi([(t/a)P]) P Qc =  (new(Xa.p'),<j>'c )
where, (p ',^ )  = K ' ^ P |}„ W, p)
(ppig) £*P*([P | QJ p 0e = n ^ m r V r M i p V p P l )  <t>£
( p p « 6 )  £ « P < ( [ ! P ] )  p  =  ; F ep ,' ( - l )
where, jT"p,(n) =  /e£ i»i = £®p,([ f]  P[bnvi(P)/ bnv(P)] J) p in
i=i
/ci i)2 = £ sp‘([ n  P[6nt>,(P)/6nv(P)] ]) p m 
t=i
if Vi =  V'z then v\ else Jrsp,(n  +  1 )  
a n d ,  bnVi(P)  =  { x ;  | x  €  bnv(P)}
(£spi7) £ ap,([if M =  L then P  else Q]) p <j>£ =
f t ^ y P O p ^ p D  <t>£< if ?£(<!>£, M) = *£(</>£, L) 
ft^dflQDp WP PÌ) otherwise
Figure 4.3: The non-standard semantics of the spi calculus.
69
(£®pi8) £ • *(fet [xu . . . ,x „ )  =  M in P  else QJ p <j>£ =
f f t ,pi([{lP(}P a ,p j  <fft , if y £ {4>£,M) = ( t u ..
< where, — <j>e[®i ^  {¿i •-> {in}]
[ '^ '([{IQ D p Wp pD otherwise
(£ s*” 9) £ Sf'i([case L  of {x}/v  in P  else f,?j) p (f>£ —
( ■72.*pi([{jP|>p p]) if =  sec(t, /c) and (PfOfc.JVj; =  fe
< where, =  (j>£[x >-» {i}]
[ 'ft*pi([{!Q|}p pD <1>s , otherwise
(£ sp,10) £ 8p‘ (Jcase L of {[a:]}/v in P  else Q]) p <j>£ =
f t sp,([{]Pl}p pD <t>’£ , if ips(<Pc, L) = pub(t, k+) and ^(«fo, TV) =
where, 0'£ =  <}>£ [a: {i}]
7 ^ 'O Q U p t±ip pD otherwise
(£spi|i) £»p»(jcase i  0y f[x}]/v in P  else Q]) p <t>£ =
Wp pj) if (fie(<i>£,L) -  sig(t, Ar) and , JV) =  A:+
4 where, 4>'£ = <p£[x {i }]
^ s,,i(I{lQl}p pD 4>e, otherwise
( f t 3pi0) K 8'1'(IpD <f>e — ( 1+) p'• U * $ :)>  where> ( p ' , 4 )  =  £ 8p'( [ i>D (p\{|P|}p)
__________________________ Pep p£P________________________ _____________ _
Figure 4.3: The non-standard semantics of the spi calculus (continued).
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used as channels should evaluate to names, and communications occur whenever an input 
channel is matched in p. The value of <j>g is updated with the message term substituting 
the input parameter. Rule (£sjn4) interprets the meaning of a restriction using the new 
operation on the first element of the resulting pair, whereas the second element reflects the 
environment resulting from the residue. This is justified as internal communications are 
preserved by restriction. Rule (£spi5) adds two parallel processes to the multiset, p.
The replication of processes is dealt with in rule (£ spt6) by computing a special function, 
jrspi . Spi± x Dj_, starting at the bottom number, n =  —1, and incrementing n until 
we reach a least fixed-point for vx G Spix x D±. Such a computation is not guaranteed 
to terminate due to the infinite nature of the non-standard semantic domain, S p iL x D j_. 
Also, a-conversion renames the set of bound names and variables of each process copy, while 
maintaining the compositionality of the semantics. Rule (£ spi7) deals with a conditional 
process, where the meaning of the overall process is chosen from the two branch processes 
based on the semantic equality of the compared terms. Pair splitting is dealt with in rule 
(£ spi8) where the (j>£ is updated to hold the result of the substitution of local variables by 
elements of a tuple. The rest of the rules (£sp,9 )-(£ spill )  deal with cryptographic processes 
performing secret-key decryption, public-key decryption and digital signature verification. 
The success of these operations will result in the (ps being updated and it depends on the 
meaning of the term being decrypted (verified) and the cryptographic key used. If the 
operation fails, a different process is chosen and added to p , without affecting <f>£.
The correctness requirement for the non-standard semantics of the spi calculus, with 
respect to its standard semantics, is expressed in the following theorem.
Theorem  6 (Correctness of the Non-Standard Semantics of the Spi Calculus)
VP 6 V : (.Sspi ([Pi p 4>s =  P) A (£api tfPD p <t>£ =  (p1, <t>'£)) =► p  =  p'
Proof. The proof is by induction over the standard and non-standard semantics. □
The theorem states that the standard element of the non-standard semantics is equivalent 
to the value obtained from the standard semantics. In other words, the standard meaning 
can be extracted from the non-standard meaning.
4.3.2 A bstract Semantics
In this section, we redefine the abstraction used in interpreting processes in the 7r-calculus 
(Section 4.2.2) to accommodate the cryptographic behaviour of processes in the spi calculus. 
In a 7r-calculus process, terms can only be names; therefore tagging names appearing as 
messages was sufficient to construct a mapping from input parameters to sets of tags (the
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cenvironment).  In a spi calculus process, terms can be constructed from cryptographic 
operations, and hence, they are complex data structures that may grow in depth as a result 
of replicated behaviour. Therefore, different tagging is required in the spi calculus.
We begin by assuming again, a finite predomain of tags, Tag, ranged over by t, t, t, where 
t is the tag of a generic term, t is the tag of a primitive term (name, variable) and t is the tag 
of a complex term (ciphertext, signature, tuple). Next we tag (sub)terms of the analysed 
process with unique tags. More precisely, we tag M  in the following constructs:
- let (®i, . . . ,  xn) =  (M i, . . . ,  Mn) in P  else Q
- case { M } l  o f {2t}tv in P  else Q
- case o f  {[*]}•jv in P  else Q
- case o f  [{x}]jv in P  else Q
- N (M ).P .
For example, tagging the term { ( { a } c, {b }e)}d yields { ( {a 41} “ , {ft42} 42)43}^ . Now, we can 
define the following functions over tags, terms and processes:
- v a lu e-o f({t i,. . .  ,tn}) =  { M i , . . . , M „ } .  This function can be applied to a set of
tags, { i i , . . . , t n}, returning the corresponding set of terms, Hence,
v a lu e -o f( { t l ,i i} )  =  { a A, { ( {a 41} « , { 6 4'2} f  f } f  }.
- tags^of(P) =  { i i , . . .  ,£„}■ This function returns the set of tags, { i j , . . . ,  i„ }, used in
a process, P . For example, tags-of .rn({{b*2 , c43)4l}£2).0) =  { i l , £2,i3, ¿1, ¿2}.
- untag({M [,. . .  ,M'n}) =  {M i, . . .  ,M n}. When applied to a set of tagged terms,
{M [ , . . . ,  M'n}, this function removes all associated tags yielding a set of untagged
terms, {M ly . . . ,M n}. Hence, untag({aib, {(a 41,{6 42} 42)43} 4^ }) =  {a, { (a ,{6 }e)}d }. 
The function behaves as id if a term, M', has no tags.
We now introduce the ak,k' abstraction function, which keeps to a finite level, the number 
of copies of bound variables, names and tags captured in the abstract semantics.
Definition 2 Define the abstraction, atk,k‘ : N x N x ( V ’ +7V + Tag) —> (V^  +  Tag*):
ift, i f  M =  ti € Tag and i >  k
t v , i f  M  =  ti £ Tag and i > k'
Xk, if M  =  Xi 6 V and i > k
Ofc, if  M  =  ai £ N and i > k
M, otherwise
V M  e  (V  +  N  +  T a g ) , i , k , k '  G N : a k i k , ( M )  =  <
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The resulting abstract predomains, , N  ^ and Tag\ can be defined as V 1 =  V\{a;j | j  > k}, 
=  N \{aj | j  > k }  and Tag1 =  Tag\({ij \ j  > k }  U { i ’j | i > k'}). Informally, k 
constrains the number of bound variables and names, and tags of primitive terms, whereas k 1 
constrains the number of tags of complex terms. In effect, constraining the tags of primitive 
terms implies limiting the copies of bound names and variables carrying the tags, whereas 
constraining the number of tags of complex terms means limiting the depth of complex data 
structures.
For example, in the process !(i/n)a{n4) | la(x), it is possible to spawn infinite copies of 
each replication, !(vn)a(nt) | !a(x) \ (i/ni)«^*1) | a(x\) \ \ a(x 2) | —  It
is clear that t is an indicator to the number of copies the new name, n, has after spawning 
each process. On the other hand, the process !a(ar).a({a;}j,) | a{b), which can be rewritten 
as !a(x).a({a;}jj.) | a(a ;i).a {{x i}^ ) | o(x2).a ({x 2 }^) | a(b) | . . .  demonstrates the role 
of t as an indicator to the number of times the ciphertext, { x } k, is applied to the name, b.
Using the a k,k' abstraction, we construct the abstract environment (j>A '■ —> p(Tag^),
which maps each abstract bound variable of the analysed process to a set of tags, representing 
terms that could substitute that variable during the abstract semantics. An abstract domain 
=  V* —> p(Tag^) is formed ordered by subset inclusion:
V<t>A\,4>A2 £  D ^ x  e  V i : <pA1 <¡>¿2 &  <!>ai{x) c
The bottom element, A-Dt , is the null environment, <Paoi mapping each variable to {} .
Taking D^_ as the abstract semantic domain, we can define the abstract semantics of the 
spi calculus by the function A api ([P]) p <f>A £  shown in Figure 4.4. The semantics utilises 
the multiset, p, to hold all the processes in parallel with the analysed process. The special 
function, <pa '■ (V® p(Tag^)) x Term —> p(Term ), returns a set of terms corresponding to 
a term, M , given substitutions captured by (¡>a-
cpA((f>A,M) =  where, M' -  M [ak!k>{t)/t}[ak)kl(x )/x ][aktk'(n)/n) and,
(p'A(<j)A,M)s =  i f  M  £  s then { }  else
U if M e V
L  R v a lu e - o f { ( j> lA { u n t a g { M ) ) )
{ M } ,  if, M  6 A/-
{VN 1 £ ip'A(<f>A, N )sU{M}> L 1 € ¥j/.4(</U,-£')sU{M}
{\/N' £ V a^ A i N ) L 1 £ V'a^Ai L )au{M}
{VN 1 £ <p'a(4>A>N)sU{m },L i £
{V M j e  ip'A ( 4 ‘A ’, . . .  , M ' n  £  ip'A ((j)A, M n ) s U { M y :
}, if, M = ( M 1, . . . , M n)i
{N % ,  }, if, M = { N } i
m y » }, if, a t = {[jv]}i
[{iV 'jl, } , if, M = [ { N f L
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( A '*  1 ) -4spi([01) p <t>A =  <!>a
(A'*12) ^lspi([M(x-)./JD P <f>A =  0.4
M*p*'3) ^ d M Ì L O ./T )  P <f>A =  ( U * # 0  <t>A
M'(z).p'ep
if, untag{ipA(<j>A, M)) n untag{ipA{<j>A, M'))C\M ^  { }  
where, 4>'A = K * ([{|P|}, W„ p[P'/M'{z).P'}) <f>'\ 
and, <t>'X =  •-> 4>A{<*kM(z )) u {«it.fc' (¿)}]
(Aspi4) A ^ i(ua)P ]) p<j>A = n ^ ^ P D p ^ p ] )  <fiA
M spi5) A ^ {P \ Q ])p 4>a =  ^([{IP&pWpflQUpWppD <t>A
(Aspl6) A ^ IP ])  p <t>A =  ^ ( - 1 )
where, T api (n) =  let 0i =  yl8p,([ J ]  rcn{P,i) ]) p <j>A in
1=1
n-f2
let, 02 =  -4sp,([ [I  ren(P,i) ]) p tpA in 
i=l
»/ 0| =  02 i/ien 0i e/se r^spi(n +  1) 
and, Va: € bnv(P),t € tags.of(P) : ren(P,i) =  (P[®»/*])[it/i]
(^"P'T) ytsp, ([i/ M = L then P else Q]) p 4>A =
I  '£ 8pid{]P[}p w/> pi (t>A’ if’ untag{ipA(<j>A, M)) n untag{(pA((pA, L)) -£ { }  
________ I ^ 'd Q Q D , telp pD (fta , Otherwise___________________________________
Figure 4.4: The abstract semantics of the spi calculus.
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( y t s p i 8 )  - 4 ! ' p i ( [ / e t  ( & ! , . . . , * « )  =  M  in P  else Q J )  p <j>A —
\
U *  n * { m p  W p  P H U .
i f  3 ( M i \ . . . , M ^ ) e < p A (ft>A,M)
<
w h e r e ,  <t>'A =  (l>A[^k,k' ( * i )  *-* <t>A (^k,k' ( s i ) )  U  { c*k,k• ( * i  ) } , • • • ,
« M ' i ® " )  ^  « M « * , * '  ( ® n ) )  u  { a f c l f c - ( i „ ) } ]
^  ^ ‘ ( f l Q t t ^ W p p ] )  <t>A, o t h e r w i s e
( ✓ 4 s p i 9 )  , 4 s p , ( [ c a s e  L  of { x } / v  in P  else Q } p <t>A =
U o  n ^ W P h  Up p]> * U ,  i f - n  e  <PAi<f>A,N)
<
w h e r e ,  <j>'A -  (¡>A [akik'(x) >-* <f>A (ak,k> ( & ) )  U  { a k , * * . ( * ) } ]
^ W p i W I } p W p P ] >  4>A, o t h e r w i s e
( * 4 s p i 1 0 )  ^ S p ‘ ( [ c a s e  L  of { ¡ x ] } / v  in P  else Q]) p (f>a —
U 0  K * p i ( [ { ! P l } p  W ,  p D  4>\, i f ,  n -  €  V a (<Pa ,N )
<
w h e r e ,  <j>'A =  <t>A[&k,k'{x) * - »  ( ® ) )  u  { « * . * ' ( * ) } ]
' ^ 8 i " d { ! Q | } / .  p ] )  <Pa , o t h e r w i s e
a *p> ( [ c a s e  l  of [ { : c } j w  in P  else Q]} p (¡>A =
U *  W p  p j  <fi'A , i f ,  n +  f  N )
I t  « ’ ) ] „ -
w h e r e ,  <pA =  <f>A [otk,k'(x) (¡>a ( « * , * ' ( » ) )  U  { < * * , * ' ( £ ) } ]
7 i * p i ( [ f l ( 9 | } p  W p  p )  0 > v ,  o t h e r w i s e
{%• * o )  p D  4>a  =  U *  A ^ i P }  ( p \ f l p | } p )  <pa
rtp
Figure 4.4: The abstract semantics of the spi calculus (continued).
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The description of the rules is as follows. Rules ( A ^ l)  and (Aspl2) return the (pA environ­
ment unchanged. Communications are dealt with in rule (A spi3) for output actions, where 
synchronising output and input channels yield a communication, in which the tag of the 
message is captured by 4>a- The semantics is imprecise, since 4>a only captures an abstract 
tag as a value for an abstract variable. Rules (A3pi4) and (.Asp*5) deal with the cases of 
restriction and parallel composition directly by placing the subprocesses with the rest in p.
The rule for replication, («Aspt6), performs a least fixed point calculation using a special 
function, T spi : N —> D\. This least fixed point occurs at the minimum number, n, such
n  . n + 2
that A spi<[ n  ren (P ,i) ]) p (¡>a =  I I  ren(P ,i) ]) p <f>A- The termination property of
1 i=l 
this calculation is stated formally in the following theorem.
Theorem  7 (Term ination of the least fixed-point calculation)
The calculation of rule (Aspi6) terminates.
Proof. To prove the termination property, it is necessary to satisfy two requirements. First,
the semantic domain must be finite. This is satisfied by the definition of D^ _. The second
n  n
requirement is to prove the monotonicity of A spt  ^ Il-P ]) P i-e- *4spi([ fl-P ]) P &A E
n+2
Aspl({ f l  P  ]) p 4>a- To prove this, we simplify the inequality into w4.sp,([ Q ]) p 4>a E 
Q | P  ]) p 4>a, where Q =  J^P. This is further simplified to become A spi([ Q ]) p <Pa Q 
Q I) p' <Pa, where p1 =  p l±)p {JP|}P. This can be proven by induction over A svl<{ P  ]) p <Pa- 
In particular, the most interesting cases are rules (^ 4spi3) and (^lsp*8)-(^4spil l ) ,  where 4>a 
changes. For example, in rule (^ 4spl3), we have that since p C p\ then M '(y).P’ € p 
M'(y).P' e  p'. From this we can conclude that .4sp*([ Q ]) p 4>a Q A spi([ Q]j p' <I>a, since the 
environment resulting from A s'plf[ Q]i p 4>a will necessarily be a subset of the environment 
resulting from *4spi([ Q ]) p1 (f>a (i-e. the larger system induces more term substitutions). □ 
The rule for replication also uses the labelling mechanism to a-convert the set of bound 
names and variables of each copy of the replication, IP, as well as its set of tags. This 
renaming does not affect the compositionality of the semantics. The rule for conditional 
processes, (^ 4sp*7), relies on the equality of two untagged terms under (¡>a- If in the case 
that the equality does not hold, a different alternative process is chosen. The rule for tuple 
splitting, (*4spi8), attempts to split elements of a set of tuples corresponding to the value 
of ipA^AtL) of a term, L. The (¡>a environment is updated with the tags of the elements 
of each tuple. In case no tuples exist in the set, an alternative process is chosen and <f>A is 
left unchanged. The rest of the rules, (^lspz9)-(^lspil l ) ,  deal with cryptographic processes. 
Again, a process attempts to decipher (verify) a term, L, closed by lpa(4>a,L). The tags of 
the deciphered plaintexts are added to (/>a- Else a different process is chosen without affecting
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<pA. Finally, rule (7£S3” 0) groups all the environments resulting from the interpretation of 
processes in p with the union of environments operation, U .^
We restate here the safety of the operation for the case of the spi calculus (formalised 
earlier for the case of the 7r-calculus in Section 4.2.2).
Lem m a 2 (Safety of IJ^ in the spi calculus)
Vz G { 1 . . .  n } ,n  G N, (pi G D_L,0 -  G D\l  :
(<t> =  U * <!>i) A ( 0 '=  U* <t>'i) A
j— 1 fi T.— 1 *.. ?7.
(3 M  G Term : <p£((fii,M) G (fii(x) =► 3 t  G (fii(ak,k' (»)) : va/ue_o /({ i} ) =  { M '}  A 
untag(M') =  (Vx G bnv(M) : Mfa*.,»«(* ) /* ]))
=> (3 M  G Term : y£(<fi,M) G 0 (x ) =>• 3 i G <p'(ak,k'(x)) : m iu e_ o /({ i} ) =  { M '}  A
untag(M') = (Vx G bnv(M) : M[ak,k'(x)/x]))
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.3. □
From this result, we can state the safety of the abstract semantics by the following 
theorem.
Theorem  8 (Safety of the abstract semantics for the spi calculus)
VP,P,4>S,<t>A ■
(£^([P]) P (fie = (p,<fi'£)) A ( A ^ m  p (fia — <fi'A) A
(3M  G Term : tp£((j>£,M ) G (fi£ (x) = > 3 i  G <fiA(ak,k'(x)) '■ value-of({t}) = {M1} A
untag(M') - (Vy G bnv(M) : M[ak,k'(y)/y]))
=>• (3M  G Term : ip£((fil£,M) G <p'E(x) 3 i  G <P'A(oik,k'(x)) : m fce_ o /({ i} ) =  { M '}  A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M[ak,k'(y)/y]))
Proof. Refer to Appendix A.4. □
The theorem states that for any term, M , captured in the non-standard semantics by 
including its ips((fi'£,M ) value in the value of a variable, (fi'£ (x), then that will correspond 
to capturing a tag, t, in the abstract semantics, by (fi’A(ak,k'(x))■ The appropriateness of 
t is expressed by the ability to obtain an abstract form, Va; G bnv(M) : M[ak,k'(x)/x], 
of the concrete term, M , by evaluating t using value.of and untagging the resulting term, 
M ', using untag. More concisely, every concrete term, M, captured in the non-standard 
semantics is also captured in the form of the corresponding abstract tag, t, in the abstract 
semantics.
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4.3.3 The Intruder I
The specification of the intruder in the spi calculus is inspired by the model presented by 
Dolev and Yao [47]. The model describes the general guidelines along which the most general 
attacker in cryptographic protocols can be specified. This model was shown by [40] to be 
sufficient to subsume any other adversary and the specification is dependent on the language 
of choice. In this section, we specify the most general attacking process in the spi calculus. 
Informally, any such specification should adhere to the following criteria:
• The attacker can read, learn, modify and block any messages passed over the network’s 
public channels, as well as create fresh messages. It can also send the messages it has 
in its knowledge to other processes.
• The attacker can compose tuples from learnt messages and can decompose learnt tuples 
to their basic elements.
• The attacker can apply cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption etc. 
to any of the messages it has in its knowledge using any of the keys it knows about. 
The cryptographic model of the spi calculus coincides with Dolev-Yao’s cryptographic 
abstraction as both assume perfect cryptography.
The above features can be stated more formally in the spi calculus by the specification of 
Figure 4.5. The specification contains the subprocess ¿{«mit), which initialises the knowledge 
of the intruder by setting Ki„u =  { M „ , . . . ,  M0}, where for the analysed process P  running 
in parallel with I ,  we have that fn (P )  =  {M n, . . . ,  M0}. Moreover, we refer to the set of 
names obtained by k during the interpretation as The knowledge of the intruder, k ,
is increased due to the message-passing behaviour whenever input actions occur or fresh data 
are created as part of bound output actions, k also increases due to the message-processing 
behaviour whenever decryption, signature verification or tuple-splitting operations succeed. 
In both cases, standard union is performed between k  and the extra term.
Apart from the initialisation process the rest of the specification consists of a
replication of processes each of which is guarded by an input action, i{n), over the special 
channel i. The input parameter n is instantiated with sets of terms. This is necessary to 
be able to express the fact that I  can learn from its own behaviour. For example, in order 
for k to obtain the new name net without necessarily outputting net to external processes, 
I  sends net over channel i. Similarly, in order for k to learn all the terms it has encrypted, 
signed etc., it needs to send them again over channel i. On the other hand, the main body 
of the process consists of the parallel composition of all the possible input/output actions
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I  d=  (ui) ( i(Kinit) I !i(re).(
[y net)i(K  U {n et}) \
n  M (N ).i (k) |
VAi.TV ere
M (x).i(n  U {a;}) |
VMS«.




n i ( m L) . i {« u { [ ( jv }M >  i
VAi,Af,i6«
I ]  M ((N u . . . , N n)).i(K U { [Nu . • ■ M  }) 1
case M  o f {a;}jv in i(nU  {a:}) |
VM,JVere
case M  o f  {[a;]}^ in i(n  U {a;}) |
VM,JV 6«
case M  o f  [{a;}]  ^ in i (k U {a;}) |
vm,nek.




Figure 4.5: Specification of the Dolev-Yao attacker in the spi calculus, 
and cryptographic operations quantified over all the terms currently in k .
4.3.4 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Example
The Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol [100] aims at establishing au­
thentication between two entities, an initiator, In it , and a responder, Resp. The protocol 
can be described by the following reduced sequence of messages using nonces N ,N ' [87], 
which assume that both agents have each other’s public keys K fnit and K ^ esp, beforehand: 
Message 1 Init H> Resp : In it, Resp, {N , In it}K + on CResp
R e a p
Message 2 Resp —»• Init : Resp, Init, {N , N ‘} Kj  on C[nit
Message 3 Init Resp : Init, Resp, {N '}K+ on CResp
R e a p
After which Init and Resp have authenticated each other’s identities. We also include 
Messages 4 and 5 to indicate the mutual trust established after the protocol:
Message 4 R e s p I n i t  : {M ',N }Ni on c jnit
Message 5 Init -> Resp : on CReap
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Where M' and M  are messages created by Resp and Init respectively. Here, Init fully trusts 
that M' is from Resp and similarly, Resp fully trusts that M  is from Init. Nonces N 1 and N 
can be used as keys since these are names. This is done in order to indicate the importance 
of these nonces for the security of messages following the completion of the protocol.
The specification of the Needham-Schroeder protocol in the spi calculus is given in Figure 
4.6, where the continuation processes of Init and Resp are denoted by F  and F 1, respectively 
(F  and F' are arbitrary dummy values and do not play any role in the analysis). In this 
specification, we have used non-recursive definitions In it(X ,Y )  and R esp(X ,Y )  to describe 
the behaviours of the protocol initiator and responder participants. Here, X  is an agent 
variable representing the identity of the initiator and Y  is an agent variable representing the 
identity of the responder. Both X  and Y  may be instantiated by agent names A ,B ,C  —  
Hence, Init (A, B ) = Init[A /X , B /Y ]  indicates that the initiator is agent A and it is initiating 
the protocol to agent B  and R esp(A ,B) = R ,esp[A /X ,B/Y ] to indicate that the responder 
is agent B  and it is expected to respond to agent A. Note that the specification of the 
responder performs a matching check between variable u'XY and the supplied parameter X  
to determine whether or not it is the expected initiator. If not, the responder halts, else it 
continues with the protocol. Variable u'XY will be instantiated to the name of the initiator 
as included in the Message 1.
It is important to distinguish at this point between the concept of a role and that of an 
agent. Init and Resp are roles that can be played by the same agent or by different agents. 
In general, we assume from now on the presence of two honest agents, A and B. In addition 
to these agents, the intruder I  exists and it is specified as in Section 4.3.3 by the Dolev-Yao 
model. Agents A and B  are honest in the sense that they can assume no other specification 
apart from the In it(X ,Y ) and R esp (X ,Y ) processes. For example, agent A can act as Init 
in one session and as Resp in the next. As a result, it is necessary to include all the possible 
combinations involving two agents A and B  as is done in the specification of the Protocol 
process. Additionally, when A (or B )  acts as the initiator or the responder of the protocol 
(playing the Init or Resp role), it has the option of communicating with the intruder I. 
Therefore, the specification must allow for this possibility equally as well by including the 
options In it(A ,I), In it(B ,I) , R esp(I,A ) and R esp (I,B ).
Assuming the intruder I  has initially the knowledge Kinu =  { A ,B ,I ,K f ,K j~ ,K ^ ,K ^ ,  
ca, c b , ci, } ,  we perform the abstract interpretation by applying A spi([Protocol]) {] 1}^  (p^ o 
for 0 :1,1 (uniform analysis). The least fixed point values for untag((pA{<pA,x)) f°r some of 
the variables, x, are shown in Figure 4.7. Since the definitions of security properties in the 
next chapter rely on names only, we only show these. Also, underlining is used to draw the
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I n i t ( X , Y )  =  [ v N x Y ) [ y M x y )  (
c y { X , Y , dN x Y t X ^ K ^ . c x {x x y )-
l e t  (u x y , V x y , z x y ) =  x x y  i n
c a s e  z x y  o f  i n
l e t  [ r x Y , v x y )  =  w x y  i n
* /  { i 'x y  =  N x y )  t h e n
c 7 { X ,  Y ,  Quxy]}K ^ . c x t m s g l ' ^ Y ) -
c a s e .  m s g l ’x Y  o f  { m 8 g l ' X Y } v x y  i n
l e t  (m s g \ x Y , t x Y )  = - m s g l ' X Y  i n
i f  [ t x Y  =  N x y )  t h e n
c7{{M xY >vxY }N Xy)-F (n isg lxY ))
R e s p ( X , Y )  *  ( u N 'x y ) ^ M ' x y )  (
Cy {x'x y )-IcÌ {u'x Y > y'x Y > Z'x y ) ~ X'xY *71
i f  (u 'x y  =  X )  t h e n
c a s e  z ' x  Y  o f  {[w'x r ]},f - i n
l e t  (r'x  y > v'x y ) =  w'x y  *n
i f  { v 'x y  =  AT) t h e n
ex (Y, X ,  { [ r ' v  y  , N'x y  1 }  / < • +  )-c y  [t'x y  )  •
l e t  ( o ' x  y i  f ' x Y > e ' x y )  =  y  *n
case e'x y  o f  \[h'X Y ^ K -  i n
i f  V 1'x y  =  N 'x y )  t h e n
c x  (  { M'x y  t r 'x y  }  N'x Y ) c y  ( m s g 2 x  Y  ) ■
c a s e  m s g i ' x Y  o f  { m s g 2 ' X Y } r <x y  i n
let (insg2xY ,Si'xy ) =  rnsg2'XY in
i f  (o 'xy  =  n 'xy ) l h e n  F ' ( m s g 2 X Y ))
P r o t o c o l  d=  ( v K a )  ! ( / m i ( A , B )  | I n i t ( A , I )  \ R e s p { B , A )  | R e s p ( I , A ) )  \
( u  K j } )  \ ( I n i t ( B , A )  | I n i t { B ,  I )  | R e s p ( A , B )  | R . e s p { I , B ) )  |
( u K T ) ( I )
Figure 4.6: Specification of the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
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attention of the reader to interesting values.
k i y {A, B , I ,  , K j , K \i K B , CAi cbj c/,
N A ii,N B riiN jA1 ,N'i m , K b i ,N ' b a  i ,
Ma i i , Mb i i , , MIB1, MABl, M 'BAl, n eti}
msg2ABi >-> {M a b i} U A 
m sg2BAi ^  {M Ba i} UA
m s g l A B i  
m sg lBAi •-+ { M 'b a i} 
m sg lAn  >-> {n et 1} 
m sg lBn  >-)■ {n e t i}
m sg2 iB i {n e t i}  
m sg2 iAi >-> {nei i }
Mbi  ^  {N a b i}  U A Vabi i-* {N 'abi} u A 
t b a i  ^  {N b a i}  U A v ba i ^  {N'BA1} U A 
rAn  !->■ {N a i i }  U A vA 11 {n e t i}  U A
t b ii '->■ {N b i i } U A v b ii •-> {n e t i}  U A
^'abi l—^ {N'abi } LJ A V h ) { J V 4 B1} u A  
^'bai {N'bai } u A r 'I B 1  {n e t i}  U A 
K a i  W a i }  u A r 'B A 1 h-> {N b a i}  U A
h'iBi •-> { NiB \} u A r'IAl >—>■ {n e t i} U A
where, A =  untag((pA{4,A ,K))
Figure 4.7: Results of analysing the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
In these results, we find that nonce N 'A B 1 created by B  in response to A and nonce 
NBa  1 created by A in response to B  appear in the knowledge of the intruder k  along with 
the corresponding messages MA B 1  and M ‘BA1. Although we only show the name subset 
of the final results, the intruder is also capable of learning any complex terms that can be 
constructed from this subset. Also, we find that both A and B  when acting as responders 
in communication sessions involving themselves only, may accept messages and nonces from 
I  as well. These interfering messages and nonces can be any value captured by the intruder.
The anomalous results correspond to the famous man-in-the-middle attack, first pub­
lished and fixed by Lowe [87]. In this attack, the intruder I  is capable of masquerading as 
the initiator to the responder in communication sessions involving honest agents A and B  
only. This will eventually cause the responder to reveal secret messages to I  and will cause
I  to undermine the authenticity requirements of the responder.
The important case where the attack occurs is when the initiator of the protocol, which is 
an honest agent A, attempts to initiate a session with the intruder I ,  which then manipulates 
this session to initiate another session with the other honest agent B  while impersonating A. 
At the end of the protocol, I  convinces B  that it is communicating with A. The following 
sequence of messages describes a particular instance of the attack. Two sessions a  and b are
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running in parallel. In a, A is the initiator and I  is the responder, and in b, 1(A) is the 
initiator and B  is the responder (1(A) denotes I  masquerading as A):
Message la A - t l : A, I ,  {N l t A }K+ on c/
Message lb 1(A) -► B  : A ,B ,{ N u A }k + on cb
Message 2b B  -> 1(A) : B ,A , {N\,N 2 } k + on ca
Message 2a. I  A : i , a , { n u n 2} k +a on cA
Message 3a A I : A ,I ,{ N 2}*+ on c i
Message 3b 1(A) ->• B A ,B ,{N 2} K t on cb
Message 4b B  -+ 1(A) {M ,N x} n , on ca
Message 5b 1(A) -*  B  : {M ',N 2} Ni on cB
The attack occurs due to the fact that the two nonces encrypted and returned by B  in 
Message 2b bear no indication as to the identity of the initiator that B  expects from the 
previous message lb. Hence, the intruder is capable of using these nonces in the context 
of its communication with agent A. In the next chapter, we formalise the secrecy and 
authenticity properties of the protocol.
4.3.5 The SPLIC E/A S Protocol Example
The SPLICE/AS protocol was first suggested by [134] as a public-key protocol that estab­
lishes authentication between two agents. The protocol was found flawed in [80], and two 
attacks were published that allowed the intruder to impersonate initiators and responders.
Here, we consider the modified version of the protocol as suggested in [80], where we 
have removed the messages dealing with the distribution of the public keys as in [42], and 
assumed that both the initiator and the responder have obtained each other’s public keys 
in a secure manner. Then the resulting sequence of messages describes the protocol, where 
TV is a nonce (we have further omitted timestamps):
Message 1 Init —>• Resp : Init, Resp, {Init, {N }K+ } K -  on CResp
Message 2 Resp -¥ Init : Resp, Init, {Resp, N }K + on c jlut
These messages establish authentication between an initiator and a responder whenever 
the responder verifies successfully the digital signature created by the initiator in the first 
message and the initiator receives back its nonce from the responder in the second message. 
One may include Messages 3 and 4 to indicate that both the initiator and the responder are 
confident enough to exchange secret messages:
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Message 3 Init -» Resp : {M } n  on CResp
Message 4 Resp ^  Init : {M'}/v on c jnu
Where we have assumed that nonce N  is used as a shared session key. Alternatively, a 
separate session key K  could be created by the initiator and sent to the responder.
The specification of the modified SPLICE/AS protocol in the spi calculus is given in Fig­
ure 4.8. The continuation processes of Init and Resp are denoted by F  and F', respectively. 
Here we have used non-recursive definitions to arrive at a simple specification.
Init(X , Y) =  (v N XY)(vM XY) (
W (X ,Y ,[{X ,{[N Xy]}K i }}K- ) .
cx (xXY).let (uXY,y XY,z XY) =  x XY in
case zXY o f {[w x y s^ K-  in
let (rXY,vXY) =  wXY in
if  vXY =  Nx y  then
i f  rXY =  y  then
W ({M XY} V X Y ).cx (msgl'XY). 
case msgl'xY o f  { m sg lXY} VXY in 
F (m s g lXY)
Resp(X, Y) ^  (tvM'xy) (
cY(x'xY)-let (u'xY, y'xYi Z'XY) =  X'XY in
if  u'XY =  X  then
case z'XY o f [{w'XY}]K + in
let (r'XY, s'XY) =  w'xy
case s'xY o f {[v'XY]}K-  in
cX (Y, X , {[y, v'x y]}k +)-cY (msg2'XY) ■
case m sg 2 'XY o f {m sg 2 XY} v'xv in
c5c({M'x y } v'xy .F (m sg2XY)
Protocol d=  (v K a ) \ (Init (A, B )  | Init (A, I)  \ Resp (B , A) \ R esp(I,A )) \
(u K g )  \(Init{B,A) | In it(B , I)  | R esp(A ,B ) | R esp (I ,B )) |
L _ _
Figure 4.8: Specification of the SPLICE/AS protocol.
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Assuming Kinit =  { A ,B , I ,K f ,K ^ ,K ^ ,K ^ ,c a , c b ,c t }, we arrive at the least fixed 
point results of Figure 4.9 by applying the abstract interpretation A api ([Protocol]) {] [}p </>Ao 
with ai , i  (uniform analysis). Again, the results show the values for untag (tpA(<j)A,x)) f°r 
some of the variables, x. The intruder is also capable of constructing further complex terms 
from the name subset shown in Figure 4.9.
k  i-»- { A , B , I , K ^ , K t  , K ~ ^ , K ^ , c a , c b , c i ,
N aii, N b h , N ab i, NBa i,  M a h , M b ii, M a b x i > M'r m , neti}
m sg lABi  !->■ {M'aB I} U untag(<pA((j>A, « ) ) v a b i  { N a b i }  U untag(<pA(<t>A,K))
m s g l s A i  {M'BA1} U untag(<pA(<j>A, k)) v b a i  i-»  { N b a i }  U untag(<pA(<j>A, k))
m sglA ii {n e t i} v a i i  ^  {N a i i }  U untag (<pA(<pA, k))
m s g ls n  ^  {n et i } v b i i  i-> {N B n } U untag(<pa (</>a , k))
m s g 2 A B i  ^  { M a b i } v ' a b i  ^  {N a b i  }
msg2BAi {Mbai } VBA1  ^  {- ^BAl}
m s g 2 i A i  i-> {n et i } v'jbx  ^  {n e t i}
msg2jsi  i-+ {n e t i} < 4 1  ^  { « e i l }
Figure 4.9: Results of analysing the SPLICE/AS protocol.
Examining the results of the abstract interpretation, we find a few irregularities. The 
intruder was successful in capturing nonce N a b i  created by A as initiator to B  and nonce 
N b a i  created by B  as initiator to A. Messages M a b i  and M b a i  created in sessions between 
A and B  were also captured. Additionally, we find that initiators, in communication sessions 
involving A  and B  only, have captured messages from, I , that can be any of F s  names.
In the next chapter on security analysis, we explain these anomalous results in the light 
of an impersonation attack that is carried out by I  on initiators in communication sessions 
involving agents A  and B. Assuming that agent A is acting as the initiator and agent B  as 
the responder (1(B) denotes I  masquerading as B ), the following steps describe the attack:
Message la A  -> 1(B) : A, B , {A, {N }K+ }K - on cb
Message lb I  B  : I , B , { I , { N } K t } K - on cb
Message 2b B  —y I : B , I , { B ,N } k + on cj
Message 2a 1(B) ->• A : B , A, { B ,N } k +
A
on ca
Message 3a A 1 ( B ) : {M jjv on cb
Message 4a 1(B) ->■ A : {M fj N on ca
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The main problem here is in the initiator’s message (Message la), which lacks any indication, 
inside {N }K+, to the initiator’s identity (A in this case). Further formalisation of the 
security breaches of this attack is given in the next chapter on security properties.
4.3.6 The Otway-Rees Protocol Example
The Otway-Rees protocol was introduced in [104] with the purpose of creating session keys 
without the use of timestamps. We review here a modified version of the protocol [35]:
Message 1 Init —> Resp : N i,In it, Resp, {N i,In it, Resp} k  ,r,,iS on cResp
Message 2 Resp -> S  : Nx, Init, Resp, {N i, Init, Resp}KJnilS,
Where the initiator and the responder establish a shared session key K  with the aid of a 
server S  with whom they share the long-term secret keys K inus and K n esps , respectively. 
Ni is a nonce created by the initiator and N2 is a nonce created by the responder. We also 
add the follow-up messages to indicate that both entities use K  as the session key:
The specification of the Otway-Rees protocol in the spi calculus is shown in Figure
4.10. F  and F' are continuation processes of the initiator and the responder processes, 
respectively. The non-recursive definitions of Init and Resp simplify the specification and 
can be instantiated for any of the honest agents A and B . The initiator, in addition, requires 
an extra argument denoting the responder. The server is assumed to be trusted and keeps a 
secure database of the long-term secret keys it shares with different agents and the intruder.
Given the initial knowledge of the intruder is set to «.¿„¿t =  { A ,B , I , ca, c b , cs ,K i s }, 
where K is  is the long-term key shared between I  and 5 , applying the abstract interpretation 
A api ([Protocol]) {] [}p o for ai, i  (uniform analysis) reveals the name subset results of Figure
4.11, where we have applied untag(<pA(<j>A,x)) for some variables, x. In these results, we 
notice that the intruder was capable of capturing additional messages M a b i ,  M b a i  created 
by A and B  acting as initiators, and messages M'A m , M 'B A 1  created by B  and A acting as 
responders. All these messages were created in protocol sessions involving A and B  only. 
Also, we find that any of the names in the knowledge of the intruder may appear as values 
for the m sg  1 and msg2 input parameters in sessions involving A and B  only. This implies
JV2, {N u Init, R esp}Kli<i3Ps 
Message 3 S  -> Resp : N i ,{K ,N 1 } Klnits, { K ,N 2 }K R„ pS




Message 5 Init Resp : {M } k  on cnesp






=  { v N X y ) { v M X y ) (
g y  (N x  Y , x, Y, {N x  Y , X ,  Y  }Kx s ). 
cx (x x Y )-let ( y x Y ,* X Y ) =  x x y  in 
case z x y  of { w * y  } / < - * $  in 
let [v X y , u X y ) = w x y  in
if UXY = N x y  Ihcn C Y ({M X Y}vXY)-cx (m sg'2'xY )- 
case msg’2'X y of {m,sg2xY}vXv 2 7 1  F{'nisg^xY))
=  (uN'X Y )(uM'X Y ) (
c y (ft jfy ) .Z e i (w'xy>9'xyiz'xY’u'xy) =  Kxy in
if  O'x y  ~~ X  then c s (Ii 'x y ì N'X Y ì {w'X y , X , z 'X y } i<y s )-
C Y { v ' x Y )-let W x Y ' T ' x Y  i S 'x y ) ~ V>X Y
e a s e  s'XY of { o ' X y } / f v s  in
let ( / x y , e ' X y )  = o 'XY in
if e'XY =  N'x y  then ^ ( t 'X Y ,r'X Y ).CY(msgl'X Y ). 
case m sgl'XY of {m sg lX Y}f'XY in  
Cx({M 'x Y }fXY)-F '(m89 l XY))
d =  c$(xs)-lct ( u s ,x ,y ,z s ,v s ,r s ) =  x s in
(is K X y )  C y ( u § ,  { K x y ,  U s }  ! < , $ '  { ^ x y t ^ S  } K u s )
( v K AS) \( In it ( A ,B )  | In it (A ,I)  |
Resp(B,A)  | R esp (I,A ) \ S) \
( isK n s) \(In it(B ,A )  | in it ( B ,I)  |
Resp(A, B)  | Resp(I, B)  | S )  | 
( is K ,s ) ( I  | \S)
Figure 4.10: The specification of the Otway-Rees protocol.
Maih , M rai , MA m , M'¡{M,
K A n ,K rm > K iA \ ,K in \ ,n et] }
m sg2Am {M'Am } U untag(ipA(<f>A, /c))
msg2,)A\ >-> {M'BAl} U untag{ipA(<pA, k))
m sg2Ai\ t-> { n e i i }  
m sg2im  >-» { n et\}
msglABi {M a u i} U untag(<pA(<l>A, k,))
m sg l,)Ai {M um  } U untag(<pA(<!>A, k))
m sg lifn  { n e i i }
m s g iiA] i-> {n et\}
f'l)A\
r f M ^ { K JA1}
f'Am  l-> {K A m ,K im }  
f'tm  ^  [ K im ]
VHAl >-> {K i!Al , K ii}] }
V A n  •-> { / C l / 1 }
vAm  •-> { K ah\,K i a i } 
v u i i •-> { K u n  }
Figure 4.11: Results of analysing the Otway-Rees protocol.
that the intruder was successful in passing its knowledge to agents A and B  in those sessions. 
On the other hand, the f'A m , I hah vaoi and vuA\ input parameters will be instantiated 
with session keys received by B  and A. These include the additional keys K ja i and K im -  
The anomalous results above are due to the presence of two kinds of impersonation 
attacks carried out by the intruder, I. First, we discuss the attack by [106]:





k { A , B , I , ca, ch, cs,I<i s ,
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A -* 1 (B ) : N \,A ,B , {N i ,A ,B } k as on Cfi
/ -> A : N{ , I ,A , { N [ , I ,A } Kis on cA
/I —y I ( S ) : N{ , r , A , {N { , I ,  A }K ls,N!t, {N [ , I ,  A }Kas on cs
1(A) S : N { , /, A, {N [ , I ,A } Ki $,N u { N [ ,I ,A } Kas on cs
S  -> 1(A ): on c A
Message 4a 1(B )  -» A : Nit { i f ,  Afi}*-AS on ca
Message 5a A —> 1 ( B ) :  { M } k  on cb
Message 6a 1(B )  -> A : {M '}k  on ca
Where I(X )  means I  masquerading as X . The intruder I  manages in this attack to com­
pletely isolate the initiator A by accessing and tampering with messages sent to and from 
A and with the aid of a parallel session that it initiates with A. I  is capable of using S  to 
create a bogus key K , which is then passed back to A for use with B  (which plays no role 
and its part is masqueraded by I) . The success of I  in carrying out this attack is helped 
by nonce being sent without encryption in Message 2b, which I  then replaces with the 
nonce created in the other session where A initiates communication with B.
The second attack we present here is a slightly modified version of the attack first pub­
lished by Boyd and Mao in [28]. In their version, an assumption was made that the server 
should not be sensitive to the freshness of the nonces it receives (in other words, it cannot 
remember their history). This assumption can be relaxed in our version of the attack, which 
is described by the following sequence of messages:
Message la 1(A) ^ B :  Nu A ,B ,{N u A ,B } Kis on cb
Message lb I  —y B  : N [ , I ,B , { N { , I ,B } Kis on cb
Message 2a B  I(S )  : JV1, A , B , { M , A , J 3 } A:JS,JV2,{JVl j A , B } JfflS on cs
Message 2b B ^ I ( S )  : N { , I ,B , { N [ , I ,B } K ls ,N i , { N i , I ,B } KBS on cs
Message 2c 1(B) -> S : N ( , I ,B , { N { , I ,B } K is ,N 2 , { N [ , I ,B } Kbs on cs
Message 3b S  -► 1(B) : N { , { K , N [}Kis , {K , N2} Kbs on cb
Message 3c I(S )  ^ B :  NU {K ,  , {K , N2} Kbs on cb
Message 4b B  —► 1(A) : on ca
Message 5b 1(A) ^ B :  {M }k on cb
Message 5b B  —» 1(A) : {M '}k on ca
After which the responder B  believes that K  is a key shared with A, since it came encrypted 
along with the nonce N2 that B  created in the session responding to A (more precisely, 1(A)). 
The reality, however, is that K  is shared with I. Again, the key point in the success of I  in 
playing the role of A lies in the sending of nonces N2 and N !2 above without encryption in 
Messages 2a and 2b. This means that I  can utilise this vulnerability to adjust the contents 
of those messages. Notice here that the server could not have encountered N[ before, and so 
no assumption is made about its lack of memory as in [28]. In the next chapter, we formalise 
the secrecy and authenticity properties of the protocol.
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4.3.7 The Kerberos Protocol Example
The Kerberos protocol was first introduced as part of project Athena [92] to offer a com­
plete authentication solution. However, the intricacy of the implementation of the protocol 
rendered it far from being ideal in the real world. Here, we consider a simplified version of 
the Kerberos protocol that uses nonces N\, N2 instead of timestamps. The effect of using 
nonces is to prevent replay attacks that normally exploit the validity of timestamps. The 
protocol is described by the following sequence of messages [30]:
Message 1 Init —► S : Init, Resp on cs
Message 2 S  -)• Init : {N 1 ,K ,R e s p ,{N i,K ,In it }K RB,pS}K Inils on crnu
Message 3 I n i t R e s p  : [N 1} K , In it}K Re3pS, {Init, N2} k  on CReap
Message 4 Resp ->■ I n i t : {N 2} k  on c inu
The aim of the protocol is to establish a session key K  between two principals, the initiator, 
Init, and the responder, Resp, using a trusted server, S, with whom they share the long-term 
secret keys, K jnns and K R eaps ,  respectively. The follow-up messages are included as usual:
Message 5 Init ->• Resp : {M  }K on CReap
Message 6 Resp —► I n i t : {M '}K on c init
The specifications of the protocol is given in Figure 4.12, where F  and F 1 represent the 
dummy residual processes of Init and Init, respectively, which do not play any role in the 
protocol analysis.
The non-recursive definitions of Init and Resp can be instantiated for any of two honest 
agents A and B . Also, the server S  is assumed to be trusted and keeps securely a database 
of long-term secret keys shared with agents A and B  as well as the intruder /. By setting 
the knowledge of the intruder to «¿„¿t =  { A , B , I ,  ca, c b , cs, K i s } and applying the abstract 
interpretation A spi([Protocol]) {] |}p 4>Ao for a^ i (uniform analysis), we obtain the name 
subset results shown in Figure 4.13, after converting these by applying untag(<pA((l>A,x)), 
for each variable, x. The results do not reveal any anomalies. The intruder is incapable 
of obtaining any knowledge beyond the sessions that it takes part in. The distribution of 
messages, keys and nonces to variables is as expected. In the next chapter, we discuss the 






”  ( i > N X Y ) {v M X Y ) (
c s ( X ,Y ) ,c x (xX Y )-case x XY of { y x v - J / f ^ s  * n  
let (vX Y ,y x Y > w x Y ,z x Y )  — Vx y  in  
cY (zX y , { X , N X Y } UXY ).cx  ( ? ‘ x v ) .  
ca se rx y  of { i x y } , i K y  in
if  txY =  N x y  then cY{{M XY} ìlXy}.cx (insf)2'XY). 
case ms(j2'XY of { m s ( ; 2 x i / } w  in  F(m sg 2X y)
=  {»M'x y ) (
cY(x'XY).let (yx Y ,Z x y )  ~ x ' x y
case y'XY of Wx y } k ys in
let (u'x y ,  w'x Y , v'x Y )  =  o'x y  * n
if  v'XY — X  then case z'XY of { f x Y }tv'XY in
let (r'xY,t'X Y)  =  f'xY in
cx {{t'X Y)w'XY)-C-Y(fnsg  1  'x y)-c x ( { M 'x y  } « » ^ ^ ) •
ease m sgl'xY of in F '(m s g lX Y))
d =  cs{xs)-let {x,y) =  xs in
(v K -xy)^ N )cx ( { - W ,  hxy>y, { N , K-xj/t ® }  Kvs } A " * s )
d -  ( u K AS) \( In it (A ,B )  ]  In it(A, I)  \
Resp(B,A)  | Resp(I, A) \ S)  |
(i/ K b s ) K In it(B ,A )  | In it ( B J )  \
Resp(A,B)  | R e sp {l,B ) \ S) \
(iv K IS){I  | !S)
F i g u r e  4 . 1 2 :  T h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  K e r b e r o s  p r o t o c o l .
K  ^  ( A , ß ,  /, C t4 j C j j , CS j K I S 1
M U / i > M y j / i i  ,  A i j m ,  
Jï/t/l» J^H/V^/Xlj-ii/ßl» 
Z ^ / i / i ,  N n n  >  N i ,  n e i  1 }
mag2Am >-* { M ' , / n }  
rn8(fiBM h-> { M J m 1 }  
j n s i / 2 ^ 7 !  i - >  { n e i i }  
ms f i n n  ¡ - »  { n e i ] }  
ms^l/ißi •-* {M a w }  
m sglB A i >-*■ { M / m i }  
m sg liA \  t - 4  { n e i i }  
ms g l i b i  • - >  { n e i i }
UAH 1 >-» {.Kvtoi}
Ubai >-> {-if/.m i}
U-AIV >-+ {^>wi}
u bi -+ {■K’h/i }
ui'ha •->' {-K/m i }




tu Al ^  {JV/M1 }
ÌAl 1 { N a 11 }
tlìll -► {N B n }
t'ßAi {N /ìaì }
fMl *-> {neii}
fl1ah 1 >-* {JV/Hi}
*>l iB  1 >-► {nei i }
Figure 4.13: The results of analysing the Kerberos protocol.
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4.3.8 The Yahalom Protocol Example
The Yahalom protocol first appeared in [35] with the usual set up of agents as before. Two 
participants, the initiator, Init, and the responder, Resp, establish a session key, K ,  with 
the aid of a trusted server, 5 , with whom they share the long-term secret keys, K jna s  and 
K Reaps, as indicated by the following sequence of messages:
Message 1 Init —» Resp : Init, Nx on CReap
Message 2 Resp —» S : Resp, {Init, N 1 ,N 2 }K He,rS on cs
Message 3 S  -¥ I n i t : {R esp ,K ,N 1 ,N 2 }K I„its, { I n i t ,K } x Re,pS on c inu
Message 4 Init —» Resp : { In it ,K }K ReapS,{N 2 }K on cneap
Where JVj and iV2 are nonces, created by the initiator and the responder, respectively. We 
may also include the follow-up messages as usual, whereby the initiator and the responder 
exchange a pair of (secret) messages encrypted with the session key created by the server in 
Message 3:
Message 5 Resp —► Init : {M '}k  on c inu
Message 6 Init -> Resp : {M } k  on CReap
The specifications of the Yahalom protocol in the spi calculus is given in Figure 4.14. Here, 
F  and F' are the continuations of the Init and Resp processes, respectively. S  is a trusted 
server that keeps securely a database of long-term secret keys it shares with agents A and B  
as well as the intruder I .  The Protocol process represents all the possible communications 
involving the two agents, A and B, as well as the intruder, I .
Assuming that the initial knowledge of the intruder is K i n u  =  { A , B , I , c a , c b , c s , K i s }> 
where K j s  is the key shared between the intruder and the server, then by applying the 
abstract interpretation A spl([Protocol]) {] |}p f°r a i,\ (uniform analysis), we obtain a 
least fixed point value for cpA, which after conversion by untag(<pA(4>A, reveals the name 
subset results shown in Figure 4.15 for some variables, x. The result shown for k  reflects 
only the name part of the final value. More complex messages can also be composed by the 
intruder from the captured names.
These results appear to have correct distribution of session keys, messages and nonces to 
variables. Therefore, they do not reveal any anomalies. Further discussion of the secrecy and 
authenticity properties of the Yahalom protocol is included in the next chapter on security 
analysis.
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Init(X ,Y) =  (f/Nx y ){v Mx y ) (
cy(X ,N x y ).
cx{xxY)-let (vxy , zxy) =  xxy in
case yXY o f  {o x y }/f .« s in
let (uXY,VXY,WXY,rXY) =  OXY in
if wxy — Nxy then
cy(zxy , {i'xv'}r.v»')-cx(?ns(72'x y ).
cy({M x y }«xy)-
case msg'l'xY of {m sg2xy}vXY in P{m sg2xY))
ReSp(X,Y) ^  (u N'x y )^ M 'x y ) (
cy {z'xy ) ' ^  'xY'V'xY) =  z'xY *n
if x'xy — X then
cs(Y, {A >d'x Y'N'x y } kys)-
c y [u'x y ) ( s'x y >^'x y ) ~  u 'x y  in
case s'xy of {w 'x y } i<ys
let (v'xy iT'x y ) ~ w'xy  in
case t'xY ° f  {f'xY )r'XY in
if f x y  — N x v then
C^{{M'xY}r'xy)-CY {msgl'x Y ) ■
case m sgl'xy ° f {>ns(J^ xY }r'xv in F'[m sglxY))
S = cs {xs ).let {y,zs ) =  x s  in
case zs o f {u)s}/i„s in 
let (x^ sA s) — ws in
( //K Xy) Ca;({y, ftxi/t r.S, i.s} Kmsi {*» ftxy}Kvs )
Protocol =  (u ft AS)\(Init{A ,B) \ M t(A ,I) \
Rcsp(B, A) | Resp(I, A) \ S) \ 
{v fta s )  \{Init(B,A) | Init(B, I)  |
Resp(A,B) | Resp(I,B)  | 5 )  | 
W K is ) ( I  I !5)
Figure 4.14: The specification of the Yahalom protocol.
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k  {A ,B ,I,C A ,C B ,cs ,K is ,M A ii,M B n ,M 'IA1 ,M'i m ,
K Ai i  , K b n , K ia i , K i b i  , NAi i  , N b ii  , N'IAl ,N'IB1, n eti}
m s g 2 AB\ •-> {M 'ab\ \  v a b i  ^  { K a b i }  w a b i  ^  { N a b i }  
m s g 2 B A i {M 'B A 1 }  v B A \ *->■ { K b a i }  u i b a i  ^  { N B A i }  
m s g 2 A n  h-> { n e t i }  vAn ^  { K Ai i }  wAn ^ { N An }  
m s g 2 B n  { n e t i }  v B I 1 ^ { K B n }  wB n ^  {N B Il} 
m s g l A B i  ^  { M Ab i }  r'BA1 h-» { K B a \ }  f'B A\ ^  { ^ ' b a \ )  
m s g l B A i  H> {MBAi } r'I A 1 ^ { K 1Ai }  f'IA i ^  { n ' i a i }  
m s g l I A i  { n e t i }  r 'A B 1 ^  { K A B 1 }  f'AB1 (->• {N'AB1} 
m s g l i m  ^  { n e t i }  r'IB1 ^  { K i m }  f'i m  h->- {TV}g l }
Figure 4.15: The results of analysing the Yahalom protocol.
4.3.9 The Woo-Lam One-Way Authentication Protocol Example
A one-way authentication protocol was proposed in [133] using symmetric-key cryptography 
and nonces. The protocol aims at authenticating an initiator Init to a responder Resp, but 
not vice versa, using a trusted server S. This is achieved by the following modified sequence 
of messages, where TV is a nonce, and we have included a session key K  suggested by the 
initiator, Init for further communications with the responder, Resp:
Message 1 Init -» Resp : Init Oil Cfiegp
Message 2 Resp —> Init : TV on Cjn{i
Message 3 Init -> Resp : { N ,K } KlniiS on Cjiesp
Message 4 Resp —> S : R 6 S P ,  { I n i t ,  {-/V, K } K f n i t S  } R R e a p S on cs
Message 5 S Resp : { N ,K } k r „ pS On CRe8p
After which the responder Resp is assured of the presence of the initiator Init but Init has 
no guarantees as to R esp’s identity. The follow-up message indicates that Resp now trusts 
Init:
Message 6 Resp —► Init : {M } k  on
The above sequence of messages is specified in the spi calculus as in Figure 4.16, where 
F  and F' are the continuation processes of the initiator and the responder, respectively. 
Setting the initial knowledge of the intruder to «¿„¿t =  {A, B , I ,  cA, cB , cs, K is } ,  where K is
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In it(X , Y ) [v K x y ) (
cy{X).cx (x x y )-'cy { { x x y ,K x y } k  a s ) -  
cx(m8gl'xy)-ca$e msglXY °f {ms9^xy}i<Xy *n 
Fimsglxv))
Resp(X,Y) (vN'XY)(vM'XY) (
cy {z'xy )-ìÌ  z'xy  — X  then 
°x (N'x y )-
C y (x 'x y )- c s ( Y > {Af,a:;(y}Kys ) 
cy(u'x y ).case ° f  {*"xv}kV s in 
let (r'x y ,s'xy) =  ®xy- ,n 
¿/ r'XY =  A^xk then 
m i M ' x Y Ì ^ - F 1
S  =f cs(x s).let [y,zs) = x $  in
case z$ o f {ts}i<uS in 
let {x, u s) — ts  in 
case us  o f in
let ( VXy,VJXy)  =  rXy IH 
cy({vxy ) U)Xy } Kvs)
Protocol = (i' K as) \{Init.{A,B) \ Init(A ,I) |
Resp{B,A) | Resp(I, A) \ S) \ 
{i/ K b s ) \(Init(B,A) | In it(B ,I)  |
Resp(A, B) | R csp(I,B) | S) \ 
(u K l s )(I  | !S)
Figure 4.16: The specification of the Woo-Lam protocol.
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is the key shared between the intruder, I , and the server, S, and applying the abstract 
interpretation A spi([Protocol]) {] |}p <pAo for 0 :1,1 (uniform analysis), we obtain the results 
shown in Figure 4.17, where we have converted the final values of variables shown below, by 
applying untag(tpA((pA, x)) to each variable, x.
K 1  ^ {-^4-5 B 3 1 5 Ca , C j3 f Cs ^ IS  5
N'aboi N'b a o , N'ia o , N'ib o , M 'i a 0 , M'ib o , M'a b o , Mb a o , neto}
msglAB  ^  {M'a b o } s'ba  ^  { K bao}  U  {untag(<pA(cf>A, k))}
m sg lBA ^  {M 'b a 0 } s'ia  *-*■ {neto}
m sgÍAi {n eto} s'ab { K abo}  U  {untag(ipA((/>A, k))}
m sg lBi  {n eto} s'jb  1  ^ {n et0}
xab {N'AB0}  U  untag(ifA((/>A, k)) rBA ^  {N'bao}
xba  >-» {N'b a o }  U  untag(ifiA(4>A,K)) t'ia  ^
xai {n et0}  U  untag (if A((j>A, n)) rAB ^  {N'abo}
xBi  i ->  {n et0}  U  untag(ipA((j>A,K,)) r 'lB ^  {N'lBo}
Figure 4.17: The results of analysing the Woo-Lam protocol.
The results of the analysis reveal some irregularities. We find that the input parameters 
s'AB and s'BA can obtain any of the names contained in the intruder’s knowledge. The value 
of the intruder’s knowledge k also shows the additional message MABl created by B  and 
MBai created by A. Both these messages were created in communications involving A and 
B  only. Note that we do not consider the possibility of the intruder using any of the names 
of its knowledge to replace the nonce sent by the responder to the initiator in Message 2 as 
anomalous, since this message travels in the clear. Replacing would cause the responder not 
to accept the protocol.
In the next chapter, we explain an impersonation attack that causes the above anomalous 
results and discuss the resulting secrecy and authenticity implications. The intruder I  makes 
use of a session it initiates with agent B  to initiate another session with B  but masquerading 
in the second session as agent A. The attack was first reported by [7] and a solution was 
suggested to avoid it. The following sequence of messages describes the scenario in which 
the attack occurs while agent B  acting as the responder, where I(A ) means I  masquerading 
as agent A:
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Message la  1(A) —> B  : A
Message lb  I  —^ B  : I
Message 2a B  —> 1(A) : N
Message 2b B  —»■I : N'
Message 3a 1 (A) —> B  : { N ,K } k is
Message 3b I  —> B  : { N ,K } k is
Message 4a B  —»■ S : { A , { N ,K } k i s } k bs
Message 4b B  -> S : { I , { N , K } Ki s } Kbs
Message 5a S  —>■ B  : { C } k bs
Message 5b S B  : { N ,K } Kbs












Where C  is the term resulting from the attempt to decrypt the ciphertext {N , K } k i S us_ 
ing K a s , which in the semantics of the spi calculus should result in the decryption case- 
statement being blocked since the decryption key K as is different from the encryption key 
K j s ■ However, the server succeeds in decrypting the second ciphertext, { N ,K } KfS, using 
K is  after which it sends back the resulting term encrypted with K b s  to agent B . This 
leads to B  wrongly believing that A is present and active and that it has suggested key K  
for further communications. The reason behind this wrong conclusion is the absence of any 
relation between B 's request in Message 4 and the reply from the server S  in Message 5.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented abstract interpretations for processes in the 7r-calculus and 
the spi calculus that captures the property of term substitution. The meaning of a process 
in the abstract semantics is denoted as a mapping from the variables of that process to sets 
of tags denoting terms that could instantiate those variables at runtime. We demonstrated 
the safety of the abstract semantics with respect to the concrete non-standard semantics. 
The interpretation was applied to a few examples of systems specified in the 7r-calculus and 
the spi calculus. These included the file transfer protocol (FTP), the Needham-Schroeder 
(with public keys), SPLICE/AS, Otway-Rees, Kerberos, Yahalom and Woo-Lam protocols. 
The abstract interpretations used were uniform; only one copy of each new name, input 
parameter and tag in the analysed system were generated throughout the interpretation 





We define in this chapter security properties based on the results of the abstract interpreta­
tion established in the previous chapter. More precisely, we reason about term substitutions, 
and their secrecy and authenticity implications as a means of gaining information. A process 
classified at a low secrecy level could input data created by another high-level process, or 
could decrypt a ciphertext revealing the underlying sensitive plaintext if it has the appropri­
ate key. Similarly, data authenticity could be compromised if an untrusted process succeeds 
in communicating its data to a highly trusted process. We explain these properties in light 
of the examples of the FTP server and cryptographic protocols of the previous chapter.
5.2 Secrecy
In our formalization of the secrecy property, we assume the presence of predefined multilevel 
security policies that are determined by the administrators of the systems under analysis. 
To express these policies, we assume a finite lattice of secrecy levels, L  =  (S l , n, LI, T, _L), 
ranged over by /, V G S l  with ± l  being the undefined level and T l  being the most sensitive 
level. A security policy then attempts to classify processes according to their sensitivity by 
assigning to each process its appropriate level. We use the notation \P] 1 to express the fact 
that process P  is classified (running) at secrecy level, I. The approach to process classification 
is flexible but requires that every subprocess within the main specification be assigned some 
secrecy level. Usually, the bottom level, J_£, is preserved for the intruder’s specification as 
given in Section 4.2.3 (for mobile systems) and Section 4.3.3 (for cryptographic protocols).
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This is the safest assumption to make about the intruder’s secrecy property.
In the following, we discuss a variation of the secrecy property, termed process leakage. A 
process leakage occurs whenever a process classified at a low secrecy level explicitly obtains 
high-level data through one of its input parameters or variables. The meaning of explicitly 
obtains depends on the choice of language. In the 7r-calculus, a process obtains data solely 
through communications (instantiating input parameters). On the other hand, processes in 
the spi calculus obtain data both due to communications and as a result of the success of 
cryptographic operations (instantiating variables), like decryption, verification etc.
5.2.1 Mobile Systems
In order to be able to analyse the secrecy property in the 7r-calculus, we need to translate 
process classifications to name classifications. That is to say, given a process, running 
at secrecy level, I, we need to know the levels of its names, n(P). Such translation requires 
a prior knowledge of the level of the intruder running in parallel with the analysed process. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, the safest level given to such an intruder is
For this purpose, we define an environment (  : N  -4 L  that maps names to their secrecy 
levels. Initially, Co maps every name to the bottom level. Hence:
V x t N :  C o ( x ) = ± l
We also define the union of £ environments defined as follows:
V a € N  : (Ci Uc <2) (a:) =  Ci(®) u Ca '^)
To obtain secrecy levels for the bound names of process, P, a special encoding function
2  : V x (N  —» A) —> (N  —> A) is needed to construct the final value for £. This function is 
defined in Figure 5.1. The most interesting cases of the rules for (  are those of input actions, 
\x(y).P]i , and restriction, \(vy)P~\l, where the bound name, y, is assigned the level of its 
process, /. As we mentioned earlier, input parameters are treated in the process leakage 
property as the means by which processes gain data, whereas restricted names are treated 
as local data. Furthermore, the computation of Z(\P~\l) (  will terminate since the process 
on the right side of each rule is always a subprocess of the process on the left side.
For simplicity, we have chosen a uniform definition for the £ function, in the sense that 
all the copies of bound names of a process are assigned a single level, which is the level of the 
root name appearing in the specification. A more flexible classification would be to assign 
different levels to different copies, or in other words, to allow the level of a name to change 
during runtime.
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z m l) c =  c
Z(\x(y).PV ) C =  z [ P )  c b I]
Z (\x{y).py ) C =  Z (P )C
Z(\if x =  y then P  else Q ] () C = z ( P )  c Uc Z(Q) c
Z(\P +  QV c =  z ( P ) c Uc Z(Q) C
z {\p \QY) c = z ( P )  c Uc Z(Q) C
Z{\{vy)P~\l c ii to 5^ « H4 1}
z {\\p l1) c =  z ( P )  c
Figure 5.1: Rules of the iJ([P"]!) £ function for 7r-calculus processes.
The following predicate formalises the process leakage property. The predicate takes as 
input a process, P , analyzes it, and returns true whenever a high-level name, x, is leaked to 
some low-level input parameter, y (as a result of some communication).
P rop erty  1 (Process leakage in the 7r-calculus)
A name, x, is said to be leaked within a process, P , if and only if the following holds true: 
<Pa  =  ^ ([PD  Po <Pao,C =  Z(\P]1) Co, 3y 6 dom{<j>A), 3 x  £ <p a (<I>a , v ) '■ Civ) Q l  C{x )
Where po may contain the intruder, I ,  in the case it is running in parallel with P. Hence, 
process leakage occurs whenever some low-level process manages to obtain the tag of a name, 
which was originally created by some other process with a higher secrecy level.
5.2.2 Cryptographic Protocols
The secrecy property of process leakage defined in the previous section for mobile systems 
is extended here to the case of cryptographic systems specified in the spi calculus. For 
this purpose, it is necessary to redefine the environment Ç : (V + N) —> L. This is done by 
introducing the uniform function, Z (\P]1) £ : V x ((V + N )  —> L) —y ((V +N ) —> L), as shown 
in Figure 5.2, which makes use of the union of C-environments, Uf, defined in the previous 
section. Note that local variables holding the results of the decryption, signature verification 
and tuple-splitting processes obtain the levels of those processes. This is consistent with the 
manner in which input parameters are classified.
We now extend the predicate of Property 1 of the previous section to the spi calculus.
Prop erty  2 (Process leakage in the spi calculus)
A name, a, is said to be leaked within a process, P , if and only if  the following holds true: 






Z(\P\Q ] ‘) c
m p V )  c
Z(\if M = N  then P  else Q]1) C 
Z(\let ( a n , , xn) =  M in P  else Q]1) C
C
Z (P ) C[y »  I]
Z{P)  C 
2T(P) C[a 1-4 Z]
Z (P) C UC Z(Q) C 
Z ( P ) <
Z ( P ) C UC Z(Q) C
-Z(P) C[®1 1-4 ®n >-+ i] Uf
^(Q ) C[*i ^  i, ■ ■ ■ ,x„  1-4 /]
2r(P) C[* 4^ /] uc 2:(Q) C[* *“4 /]
Z(P)  C[* 1-4 l] UC Z(Q ) C[* 4^ I]
Z{P) C[x >-4 I] Uc Z(Q) Q[x l\
Z([case L  of { x } n  in P  else Q]1) C 
Z([case L of in P  else Q}1) C
Z([case L of  [[*3^ in P  else Q]1) C
Figure 5.2: Rules of the Z(\P]1) £ function for spi calculus processes.
The property captures instances where high-level names substitute low-level variables, which 
in turn, reflect the levels of their processes. Note that the property only captures the secrecy 
of names, as opposed to the secrecy of ciphertexts. This stems from our assumption that 
names are the only sensative data whose secrecy may be compromised. Ciphertexts provide 
a secure mechanism with which the secure transmission of names is achievable. For example, 
in the process a (k ) .a ( {m }k )  | a (x).a{y).case  y o f  { z } x in P , it is the secrecy of m,  rather 
than {m}fc, that is undermined by P.
5.3 Authenticity
The treatment of the process leakage property in the previous section was made possible by 
using the notion of secrecy levels that distinguished the secrecy requirements of each process 
according to a well-defined security policy. In dealing with the authenticity property, the 
main notion of interest is that of process trust level. Trust levels, a ,a 1 € Sa, are ordered 
by a web of trust such that A =  (S a, Cj,n,U,T,_L) is a finite lattice with the bottom 
element, ± a ,  being the undefined level and the top element, T a ,  being the most trusted 
level. Examples of undefined trust levels include the levels of machines connected to the 
Internet, which belong to unknown entities. A well-trusted level, on the other hand, could 
be a Certification Authority (CA) in a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). The work of [23] 
represents one example in which mechanisms for implementing trust levels, called addresses, 
are provided as  a primitive in an extension of the 7r-calculus language.
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As a result of the presence of malicious attackers, a threat of process authenticity may 
occur in situations where a process obtains data that originated at a trust level lower than 
the level of the process itself. Intuitively, such threats are directly comparable to process 
leaks. However, with the process leakage property, it is the high-level data that are compro­
mised by a secrecy breach (being obtained by a low-level process), whereas with the process 
authenticity property, it is the high-trust process that is compromised by an authenticity 
breach (obtaining the low-trust data). We emphasise here the direction of concern, which is 
different in each case.
In the following sections, we describe the process authenticity property in the 7r-calculus 
and spi calculus. We write, [P\a , to express the fact that P  is running at trust level, a. 
The requirement then is to translate process trust levels to name trust levels assuming that 
all subprocesses Q of P  have the form, [_QJa , for some level a'.
5.3.1 Mobile Systems
In the 7r-calculus, we translate process trust levels to name trust levels using the environment, 
9 : N  A, which maps names to their levels. Initially, 90 maps every name to the bottom 
element, a/ =  ± a ,  also assumed to be the level of the intruder, 7:
Vx e N : 90{x) — ± a
Additionally, we define the union of ^-environments, Ug, as follows:
(0i U9 62 ) { x )  =  9l (x) U 02 (z)
This is similar to the union of £-environments defined in the previous section on secrecy. 
The use of the least upper bound operator U is useful for adding any values of a name from 
6i and 02 that are equal to J_a ■
Defining a special encoding function, U : V x (N  —> A) —> (N  —y A), as in Figure 5.3, is 
necessary to construct 6 from the specification of [P_|a- The rules of the U(\P\a) 0 function 
are directly comparable to their secrecy counterpart given by the Z(\P~\a) £ function (in 
fact, the two functions only differ in whether they deal with secrecy or trust levels). The 
treatment of bound names is similar. These are assigned the trust levels of their process. 
In the case of restricted names, this reflects their locality, whereas in the case of input 
parameters, this reflects the fact they are used as means by which the residual process 
acquires further information (names). All the other cases do not affect the value of 9.
The following property formalises the process authenticity breach in the 7r-calculus.
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U {LOJ“) 9 =  9
U(\_x{y).P\a) 9 =  U {P )B [y ^ a]
U(\x(y).P\a) 9 =  U{P) 9
U(\if x =  y then P  else Q }a) 0 =  U {P ) 6  Ue U(Q) 9
U{\_P + Q\a) 9 II £ c U{Q) 9
U ([P\Q \a) 9 =  U{P) 9 U0 U{Q) 9
U{\{vx)P\a) e =  U(P) 9[x i y a]
u([\p\a) e =  U{P) 9
Figure 5.3: Rules of the U(\P\a) 9 function for 7r-calculus processes.
Prop erty  3 (Process authenticity breach in the 7r-calculus)
The authenticity o f a name, y, is said to be breached within a process, P , if and only if the 
following holds true:
4>a =  A n([P[) po 4>aq,9 =  U(\P\a) 90,3y  e dom(<pA),3 x  e  <PA{<t>A,y) ■ 9{y) □ 9{x)
Where po may contain the intruder, I .  When compared to the definition of the process 
leakage property (Property 1), the direction of the ordering relation clearly demonstrates 
the difference in concern. Intuitively, a process authenticity breach occurs whenever a tag, 
whose name value has a low trust level, instantiates another name with a higher trust level. 
Hence, we are concerned with highly trusted processes obtaining data not at the same level 
of trust. This could be as a result of that data originating from malicious sources.
5.3.2 Cryptographic Protocols
We extend here the process authenticity property given in the previous section to crypto­
graphic protocols. A redefinition of the U : V X (N +  V —► A) (N + V —► A) encoding 
function is necessary to construct the environment, 9 : N  + V —> A, for processes in the spi 
calculus. The rules of this encoding function are given in Figure 5.4.
From the definition of U(\P\a) 9, we can now redefine the process authenticity breach 
property for processes in the spi calculus as follows.
P rop erty  4 (Process authenticity breach in the spi calculus)
The authenticity o f a variable, y, is said to be breached within a process, P , if  and only if 
the following holds true:
(j>A =  A spi([P}s po (¡>AO,0 =  U{\P\a) 9o,3y e dom(</> )^,3a e untag(ipA{(f>A,y)) : % )  3  
9(a)
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W(|0ja) 9 = e
U(\_M(y).P\a) 6 = U{P) 9[y >-)■ a]
U(\M{N).P\a) e = U(P) e
U{\_{va)P\a) 9 = U(P) 9[a a]
U([P  | Q f )  9 U{P) 9 U9 U(Q) 0
w(L!PJa) e = U{P) 9
U{[if M =  N  then P  else Q]a) 9 = U{P) 9 U9 U(Q) 9
U{\let ( s i , . . . , xn) =  M in P  else Q\a) 9 = U(P) 9[xi >-)■ a , . . . ,  xn i-4 a] Ug
U(Q) 9[xi h4 a , . . . ,  xn t4  a]
U(\_case L  of  {a:}jv in P  else Q\a) 9 = U(P ) 9[x 1-4 a] Up U(Q) 9[x i-4 a]
U(\_case L  of  {[a:]}jv in P  else QJ°) 9 = U(P) 9[x h4 a] Ue U(Q) 9[x a]
U(\_case L of  [{as^ jv in P  else QJa) 9 = U(P) 9[x i-4 a] U» U(Q) 9[x i-> a]
Figure 5.4: Rules of the U{[_P\a) 6 function for spi calculus processes.
Notice also that only names are captured and not digital signatures. This is due to the 
assumption that digital signatures only provide the means by which names (data) are 
transmitted in an authentic manner over public channels. For example, in the process 
a([{m}]fc_) | a(x).case x o f  [{y}]fc+ in P , if P  expects a different name, m', to instantiate t, 
then it is m, rather than that breaks the authenticity requirement that P  expects
from y. Our treatment of the examples that follow enhances this view.
5.4 Examples
We revisit, in the following sections, the examples of the ftp server and the authentica­
tion protocols and discuss their secrecy and authenticity properties given the results of the 
abstract interpretation and the definitions of secrecy and authenticity presented earlier.
5.4.1 The F T P  Server Example
The ftp server example we presented in Section 4.2.4 was analysed for two cases. The 
first case has a correct specification for the client process, which communicates with the 
server without interference from the intruder, whereas the second case has a faulty client 
specification that leaks its password to the intruder process, I .  We analyse the authenticity 
and secrecy properties of both cases of the uniform and non-uniform abstract interpretations.
Secrecy. We adopt the following classification of secrecy levels:
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f t p d=  \(\start(x).(v login)(if x =  start then \(vpwd)(Server \ Client) ] 1
else [(v pwd) (Server) ] 1 | f T ] )
) | start (start). start (start). start (start). start ( I s ta r t) }±L 
Server =f (v deal) login(z).if z =  pwd then 
login(data).(
deal (data) \ \deal(w).login(w).login(u).if u =  logout then 0 
else deal(u) ) else 0
Client d=  (v request) (login(pwd).login (request).login(res).login(logout))
With _I_l C I. By applying the encoding function Z, it is possible to obtain the following 
value for the £ environment, mapping each name to its secrecy level:
C(k) =  ((x) =  ((net) =  ((login) =  ((logout) =  ((start) =  ( ( Is ta r t )  =  ± l 
( (pwd) — ((deal) =  ((request) =  I
The results of the uniform abstract interpretation (correct client specification) with a i  indi­
cate that the intruder is capable of capturing the pwd and request names, both of which have 
a higher secrecy level than k. Refining these results further, we find that the non-uniform 
abstract interpretation, with « 4 , reveals a correct distribution of names to input parameters 
in the final value for 4^ 4 . In particular, the intruder’s knowledge, k, could not obtain any 
names with higher secrecy levels and remained limited to names net, login and logout. In 
general, Vx G dom((f>A),y G <Aa(</u, z) : ((y) Q l ((x).
However, examining the results of the second non-uniform abstract interpretation (faulty 
client specification) with a 4, the analysis captures an instance of a process leakage as defined 
by Property 1. This secrecy breach occurs with the value of k, which captures the secret 
password, pwd. Since ((pwd) =  I and ( ( k) =  according to the above name classification, 
we have that ( ( k) C ((pwd). It is clear that this breach happened as a result of the client 
sending its password over the covert channel, which is a free name recognised by the intruder.
Authenticity. We adopt the following classification for trust levels:
f t p d=  [(\start (x).(u login)(if x =  start then [_ (i> pwd) (Server \ Client) J a
else [(upw d)(Server)ja \ |/J"L'4
)
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) | start (start), start (start), start (start), start (Lstart)\-LA
Server =f (v deal) \login(z).\if z =  pwd then 
login (data) .(
deal(data) \ \deal(w).login(w).login(u).if u =  logout then 0 
else deal(u) ) else O jaJ ±A
Client =f (v request) (login(pwd).login(request).login(res).login(logout))
With ± a C a. Applying the encoding function U to each of the above (sub)processes, it is 
possible to construct a 9 environment mapping names to their trust levels, as follows:
0(k) =  9(x) =  9(z) =  9(net) =  8 (login) =  9(logout) — 9(start) =  9(Lstart) =  ± a  
9(pwd) =  9(deal) =  9(request) =  a
In both analyses (with correct and faulty client specifications) with an, we find that input 
parameters captured the appropriate names. In general, Va; 6  dom(4>X),y £ VA^AiX) '■ 
9(x) Qa 9(y). Hence, no instance of the process authenticity breach occurs (Property 3). 
The case of the faulty client is interesting, since the intruder, /, failed in passing its low- 
level data to the clients, even though it clearly breaches the secrecy of their passwords as 
indicated above. This is due to the fact that the passwords are per login session, i.e. each 
time a copy of the system is spawned the passwords and the login channel are renamed. 
Hence, the intruder cannot use a password it obtains from the client in its own session with 
the FTP  server. Attempting to do that means that it will fail as a result of the conditional 
process that the server runs and that maintains a correct distribution of password-login 
session names. Hence, the authenticity property is preserved despite a failure in the secrecy 
property of the protocol.
5.4.2 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Example
As we mentioned in Section 4.3.4, the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol is suscepti­
ble to a form of impersonation attack, i.e. the man-in-the-middle attack, which was first 
discovered and fixed by Lowe [87]. From the results of the abstract interpretation given 
in Figure 4.7 (Section 4.3.4), we find that this attack is captured in the final fixed point 
value of 4>a- The fact that the intruder obtained nonces N'AB1, N 'B A 1 and messages MAB1, 
M'bai demonstrates the success of this attack. The intruder was capable of accessing and
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tampering with nonces and messages from A to B  and vice versa. The intruder also succeeds 
in passing untag(ipA(4>A, «)) to both B  and A through variables m sg2ABi and msg2BAi-
Authenticity. To discuss the authenticity property of the Needham-Schroeder protocol, 
we apply the following trust-level classifications to the protocol of Figure 4.6 (Section 4.3.4):
L ( i t K j )  ! ( L In it(A ,B)\a | [In it(A ,I)j±A \ [Resp(B,A)\a \ [Resp(I, A)\±A)\a 
L(v K g )  !(LIn it(B ,A )\a \ [ In it (B ,I ) ]±A \ [Resp(A ,B)\a \ |_R esp(I,B )\ ±A)\a
Where ± a  Q a,. From this classification, we obtain the following value for 9 by the applica­
tion of U (Protocol) 9q:
8(m sglAB )  -  Q(msglBA) =  9(msg2AB ) =  9(msg2BA) =  a  
Q(msg\Ai)  =  9(msg\B I) =  9(m sg2IA) =  9(msg2IB ) =  ± A 
9(k) =  9(net) =  ± A
9(NAB) =  9(Nb a ) =  0(N'a b ) =  9(N'b a ) =  9(MAB) =  0(MBA) =  6 (M'AB) =  9(M 'BA) =  
9(vAb)  =  0(vBA) =  0(r'AB) =  9(r'BA) =  9(h'AB) =  9(h'BA) =  8(rAB) =  0(rBA) =  a 
9(NAi) =  9(Nb i ) =  9(N'i b ) =  0(N'i a ) =  6 (Ma i ) =  9(MB I) =  9(M'IB ) =  9(M'IA) =  
9 ( v a i )  = 0(vBi)  =  0(r’IB ) =  0(r'IA) =  9(v '1A) =  9(h'IA) =  0(rAi)  =  9(rB I) =  _U
It is clear from these classifications and the result of the abstract interpretation of Figure 
4.7 (Section 4.3.4) that the process authenticity property is not preserved. For example, 
we have that any of the intruder’s fresh data can be captured by agent B  acting as the 
responder to A. Hence, net 6 untag(<pA.(<fiAimsg2AB)) and since 6 (net) C 9(msg2AB), we 
have an instance of Property 4 indicating a breach in process authenticity. The same applies 
to m sg2 BA.
Secrecy. We first classify the processes in the specification of the Needham-Schroeder 
protocol according to their secrecy requirements, as follows:
Ki’ K a ) \(\Init(A, B )1 l | [In it(A ,I)-]^  | \Resp(B,A ) } 1 | \Resp(I,A) 1 ^ ) ] *
\(i/Kg) l(\Init(B ,A ) } 1 | \ Init(B ,I)1\±L \ \Resp(A, B ) ] 1 \ \R esp(I,B ) ] ± L )']1
r (vktmv-
Where ± l  E I- Next, we obtain the value for £ by the application of Z(Protocol) Co:
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C(m sg lAB ) =  C(m sg lsA ) =  C,(msg2 AB) =  ( (m sg2 BA) =  I 
C(m sg lAi ) =  ((m sg lB I) =  C(m sg2 IA) =  ((m sg 2 IB ) =  ± L 
( ( k) =  ( ( net) =  _L L
{(Na b ) =  C(Nb a ) =  ( ( K b ) =  ((N'b a ) =  C(Ma b ) =  C(MBA) =  C(M'AB) =  ((M'BA) =  
C(vab) = ((vba) =  C(r'AB) = C(Tb a ) =  C(h'AB) = C '^b a ) =  C^a b ) = ((tba) =  I 
((Na i ) = C(Nb i ) =  C(N'IB) = C(N'IA) =  C (Ma i) =  C(Mb i ) =  C(M'IB) =  C (M ^ ) =  
C(VAI) =  C(VBI) =  C(r /_e) =  C(rIA) =  C(rBl) =  C(l’Al) =  C (^ /b )  — C(^IA) =
Considering the results of the abstract interpretation of Figure 4.7 (Section 4.3.4), it is clear 
that instances of the process leakage property occur, as the intruder is capable of capturing 
highly classified data. For example, M 'A B 1 e  untag (>^ A (4>a, k)), which is a message created 
by B  in response to A. Given that ((k )  C ((M'ab 1 ), we have an instance of Property 2.
5.4.3 The SP LIC E /A S Protocol Example
Examining the results of the abstract interpretation of Figure 4.9 (Section 4.3.5), we find 
that the attack mentioned by [42] has caused anomalous values to appear in the intruder’s 
knowledge, k . These values are messages and nonces created by initiators in sessions in­
volving A and B  only. Also, the intruder succeeds in passing its knowledge as values for 
messages received by the initiator in sessions with the honest responder.
Authenticity. To discuss the authenticity property of the SPLICE/AS protocol as spec­
ified in Figure 4.8 (Section 4.3.5), we use the following trust-level classifications:
L(v K a ) \(\_Init(A,B)]a | [Init(A ,I)\±A \ [Resp(B,A)\a \ [R esp(I,A )]±A)\a 
L(v K g )  \([In it(B ,A )]a | LIn it(B ,I)\ ±A \ [Resp(A ,B)\a \ lR esp(I,B )\ J-*)\a 
V(1, K J ) ( I )\ ±a
Where ± a Q a. From this classification, we obtain the following value for 9 by the applica­
tion of U(Protocol) $q:
d ( m s g l A B )  =  9 ( m s g l B A )  =  9 ( m s g 2 A B )  =  6 ( m s g 2 B A )  =  a  
9 ( m s g l A r )  =  9 ( m s g l B i )  =  9 ( m s g 2 I A )  =  9 ( m s g 2 I B )  —  ± a  
9 ( k )  =  9 ( n e t )  =  J- a
9(Na b ) =  9(Nb a ) =  6 (Ma b ) =  6 (MBA) =  9(M'AB) =  9(M'BA) =  9(vAB) =  9(vBA) =  
@(v 'a b )  =  9 ( v 'B a )  =  a  
9(NAi)  =  9(Nb i ) =  O(Ma i) =  9(Mb i ) =  9(M'IB ) =  9(M'IA) =  9(vAi ) =  9(vB I) =  
9 { v ' i b )  —  Q (v ' i a )  =  -^-A
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Examining the results of the abstract interpretation given in Figure 4.9 (Section 4.3.5) in 
light of the above value for 9, we find that authenticity is breached. For example, consider 
the value of the m sglABi variable, which belongs to agent A acting as the initiator of 
the protocol to agent B . Here, we find that the result net\ £ untag(ipA((l>A,fnsglABi)) 
is possible, and due to the classification 6 (net\) C 9(msglABi), we have an instance of 
Property 4, i.e. process authenticity breach. A similar breach also occurs with m sg lBAi-
Secrecy. We adopt the following classification of secrecy levels for SPLICE/AS protocol:
\(vKA) \(\Init(A, B } ] 1 | \ Init(A ,I)]±L \ \Resp(B, A) } 1 \ \Resp(I, A)~\± L ) ] 1 
\(vKB ) \(\Init(B,A)~\l | \ In it(B ,I)]±L \ \Resp(A, B ) } 1 \ \Resp(I, -B)]"Ll') ] i 
\ {vK j){I)-\ ^
Where _l_£ C I. One can now obtain the following value for £ by applying Z(Protocol) Co:
C (msglAB) =  C(msglsA) =  C(msg2AB) =  C (msg2BA) =  I 
C(msglAi ) =  C(msglBI) =  C (msg2IA) =  C(msg2IB ) =  ±  l  
C (k ) =  ((net) =  ± L
( { N a b ) =  C(N B a ) =  ( ( M Ab ) =  ( ( M B A ) =  (  (v a b ) =  ((v B A ) =  ((v 'AB) =  (W B A ) =  I 
((N a i ) =  ( ( N b i ) =  C ( M ^ j)  =  ((Mb i) =  ((vAi) =  ( (vBi) =  ((v'ID) =  C(v'IA) = U
The results of the abstract interpretation of Figure 4.9 (Section 4.3.5) demonstrate breaches 
in the process leakage property, as the intruder is capable of capturing data created by agents 
A and B  in sessions involving these two agents. For example, MAB\ £ untag(<pA(<l>AiK)), 
which is a message created by A initiating a session with B . Given that ( ( k) C ((M a b i), 
we have an instance of Property 2.
5.4.4 The Otway-Rees Protocol Example
As we mentioned in Section 4.3.6, the version of the Otway-Rees protocol specified in Fig­
ure 4.10 is vulnerable to two forms of impersonation attacks, published in [106] and [28], 
Furthermore, we find that these attacks caused anomalous results in Figure 4.11 (Section 
4.3.6). The intruder was successful in obtaining messages M abi, M ba i, M 'a b 1  and M'BAl 
from sessions involving A and B  only. Also the presence of keys K jAi and K j B\ shared 
between the intruder and agents A and B  in the values for the variables f'A B 1, f B A i ,  v a b i  
and vbai indicates the presence of extra communication sessions. Finally, we find that any
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o f  t h e  n a m e s  i n  t h e  i n t r u d e r ’ s  k n o w l e d g e ,  k , c a n  b e  p a s s e d  a s  m e s s a g e s  t o  a g e n t s  A  a n d  B  
i n  s e s s i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  t h e s e  t w o  a g e n t s  a l o n e .
Authenticity. T h e  a u t h e n t i c i t y  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  O t w a y - R e e s  p r o t o c o l  i s  d i s c u s s e d  u n d e r  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t r u s t  a d d r e s s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s :
L (u K a s ) ! ( L In it (A ,B )]a \ [_Init(A,I)\±A | [R e sp (B ,A )\a \ [R esp (I,A ) J ^ ) J a  
L (v K b s ) ! ( L In it ( B ,A ) \a \ [ In U ( B ,I ) |  \_Resp(A,B ) \ »  | [R e sp (I,B ) J ^ ) J °  
l( u K I S ) { I) \±A
W h e r e  ± a  E  a, a n d  w e  d r o p  t h e  s e r v e r  S  s i n c e  w e  a r e  n o t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  i t s  s e c u r i t y  p r o p e r t i e s .  
F r o m  t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  w e  o b t a i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v a l u e  f o r  0 b y  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  U  t o  t h e  
a b o v e  p r o c e s s e s :
d(m sglAB ) =  9 (m sg lBA) =  9(msg2AB) =  9(msg2BA) =  a 
9(m sg lAI) = 0 {m sg lBi)  =  9{m sg2iA) =  9{msg2IB ) =  -La 
9(k) =  0(net) =  _1_a
9(MAb )  =  9{M b a ) =  9{M'a b ) =  9(M b a ) =  8(vA B )  =  9(vBA) =  9{f'AB) =  9{f'BA) =  a 
6 { M A i )  =  9{Mb i) =  9{M'i b ) =  0{M'i a ) =  9 { v A i )  =  9{vB I) =  0{f'IB ) -  0(fIA ) =  ± A
W e  f i n d  b r e a c h e s  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s  a u t h e n t i c i t y  p r o p e r t y .  T a k i n g  t h e  c a s e  o f  i n i t i a t o r  A  
a s  a n  e x a m p l e ,  w e  h a v e  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  a t t a c k  t h a t ,  net\ 6  untag{ipA (cj)A ,m sg2ABi)),  i s  
a  p o s s i b l e  i n s t a n t i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  msg2AB\  v a r i a b l e  o w n e d  b y  A.  H e n c e ,  w e  h a v e  t h a t
9(net\)  C  9(msg2ABi)-  T h e  a u t h e n t i c i t y  b r e a c h  o c c u r s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a d d r e s s  c l a s ­
s i f i c a t i o n  a b o v e ,  w h i c h  s t a t e s  t h a t  6{net\) =  _La a n d  9{rnsg2ABi)  =  cl. I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
t h e  s e c o n d  a t t a c k ,  a n d  t a k i n g  t h e  e x a m p l e  c a s e  o f  B  a s  t h e  r e s p o n d e r ,  w e  h a v e  t h a t ,  
net\ e  untag(ipA{(l>A-,m S9^-AB\)), i s  a  p o s s i b l e  i n s t a n t i a t i o n .  T h e  p r o c e s s  a u t h e n t i c i t y  p r o p ­
e r t y  i s  b r e a c h e d  a g a i n  a s  9(net\)  C  9(m sglABi),  w h e r e  9{net\) =  ± a  a n d  9(m sglABi)  =  a .
Secrecy. C o n s i d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c r e c y  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  O t w a y - R e e s  p r o t o c o l :
\{v K As ) • ' ( \In it(A , B)~\l \ \'In it(A ,I)]±L \ \R e sp {B ,A ) ] '  | \R esp (I,A )]-LL)~\l
\(u K b s ) \( \In it(B ,A ) ] 1 | [ In it(B ,I)']±L \ \Resp(A, B } } 1 \ \Resp(I,B)~\± L )}1
\(v K j s ){I)]-La
W h e r e  i j ,  C  I ,  a n d  w e  a r e  n o t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  s e c u r i t y  l e v e l  o f  t h e  s e r v e r  S.  I t  i s  n o w
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possible to construct (  by applying Z  to the above classified processes. This will result in 
the following value for £:
C(m sglA B) =  C(msg\BA) =  C(m sg2AB) =  ((m sg 2 BA) =  I 
( (m sg lAi)  =  C(m sg lBi ) -  ((m sg 2 IA) =  ((m sg 2 IB ) -  ± L 
C(k) =  C (net) =  -U
C(Ma s ) =  C(Mb a ) =  C(-M'a b ) =  <(m b a ) =  C(v ab) =  C(vBa ) =  C tfab) =  CUb a ) -  * 
((M a i) =  C(MBi ) =  C ( M ' S )  =  ((M'i a ) =  C(v a i) -  C(v b i) =  C (f 'I B )  =  C(fiA) =  - L l
The attacks mentioned in Section 4.3.6 introduce breaches in the secrecy of messages created 
by agents A  and B  in the Otway-Rees protocol. Again we refer to the results of the abstract 
interpretation of Figure 4.11 (Section 4.3.6) where we find that for the case of the first attack, 
messages created by A  and B  as initiators end up in F s knowledge, as {M a b i , MBAi}  C  
untag (ip A(<i>Ai « ) ) ■  From the second attack, we have that messages created by A  and B  
as responders are captured by I ,  as {M'AB1, M'BA1}  C  < /> ^ ( k ) .  Taking messages Ma b i  and 
M'AB1 as examples, we have that £ ( k )  C  ((M a b i )  and £ ( K) E  C(M'a b i) s i n c e  from the 
above classification, we have ((k )  = _ ! _ / ,  and ((M a b i) =  C(MAB1) =  a. Hence, instances of 
process leakage property as stated in Property 2 occur in the above results.
5.4.5 The Kerberos Protocol Example
The results of the abstract interpretation of the version of the Kerberos protocol given in 
Section 4.3.7 reveal correct distributions of keys and nonces created by the server S  for the 
different sessions. For example, we find that all the keys K ix  and K x i  for X  e { A ,B }  are 
assigned to input parameters u and w' only belonging to sessions where A  or B  communicate 
with I .  The intruder naturally obtains these keys in its knowledge. Similarly, nonces N jx  
and N x i  are only bound to variables t, t' and k  in sessions involving I .
Authenticity. To analyse the authenticity property of the Kerberos protocol, we assume 
the following classification of trust levels for the specification of the Kerberos protocol as 
given in Figure 4.12 (Section 4.3.7):
L (v K a s ) \( lIn it ( A ,B ) ] a | [ In it ( A ,I ) |  [R e sp (B ,A )\a \ [R esp(I,A ) J ^ ) J a
1(v K b s ) ]([In it(B, A ) \a | L I n i t ( B , I ) } ^  \ [R e sp (A ,B )\a \ lR e s p { I,B ) \± * ) \a
l( u K IS ) ( I ) ] ^
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Where ± A C a, and we drop the server 5  since we are not interested in its security properties. 
From this classification, we obtain the following value for 9 by the application of U to the 
above processes:
9 {m sg lAB) =  9 (m sg lBA) =  9(msg2AB) =  9(msg2BA) =  a  
0(msglAi) =  9 {m sg lBi)  =  9(msg2IA) =  9(msg2 I B )  =  ± A 
8 (k) =  O(net) =  ± A
9{N Ab ) =  9{Nb a ) =  9{M AB) =  9(M b a ) =  9 {M 'a b )  =  9(M'BA) =  0(uAB) =  0(uBA) =  
9(w'ab ) =  9{w'ba ) =  9(tAB) =  9(tB A )  =  9(t'AB) =  9(t'BA) =  a
9(Na i ) =  B{NBi ) =  8{MAi ) =  9(MBj ) =  9(M 'I B )  =  9(M 'IA )  =  9(uAI) -  0(uB I) =  
9 {w'ib ) =  9 (w'ia ) = 9{tAI) =  9{tB I) =  6{t'IB ) =  9[t'IA) =  J _ ,4
From the results of the abstract interpretation of Figure 4.13 (Section 4.3.7) and taking as an 
example input variables m sg2 AB and rnsglAB, we have, M a s i € untag(ipA{(l>A/m sg^Ain)) 
and M'Am e  untag{<pA{(pA,m s9‘2‘ABi)) are possible values. Referring to the above classi­
fication of variables and messages, we have that 9(MABi) =  9 (m sg lAB\) and 9(MAB1) =  
9(msg2A m ) since 9(MA m ) =  9(M 'AB1) =  a  and 9{m sglABi) =  9(msg2AB\) =  a. The
same statement is true about the rest of the variables in the domain of (j)A (except for u
and w', which capture the keys created by the server). These results demonstrate that no 
breaches of the process authenticity property as defined in Property 4 have occurred.
Secrecy. We adopt the following secrecy classification for processes in the specification of 
the Kerberos protocol 4.12 (Section 4.3.7):
[(Iv K a s )  \(\Init(A,B)V | \Init(A,I)']J-,‘ \ \Resp(B,A ) } 1 \ \Resp{I,A ) ] ± L ) ] 1
\{vKBs) \(\Init(B, A ) ] 1 | \Init(B, I ) ] ±L \ \Resp(A,B) } 1 \ {R esp (I ,B )~\-L L )'}1
\(uKIS) ( I ) ] ^
Where 1  i  C [, and we are not interested in the security level of the server S. To evaluate 
( , we apply Z  to the above classified processes. This will result in the following value:
C(m sglA B) =  C(m sg lsA ) -  ({m sg2AB ) =  C{msg2BA) =  I 
( (m sg lAi) =  ( {m sg lB I) =  C(m sg2IA) =  C{msg2 IB ) =  _Ll  
C(/c) =  ({net) =  ± L
({N a b ) =  ((N BA) =  ( ( Ma b ) =  ( { MBA) =  ({.M'AB) =  ((M'b a ) =  ((u AB) =  ( (uBA) =
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( (WAB) — C(wB>l) — C(£AB) — ((¿Ba) — ((I'ab) — C(^Ba ) — ^
C ( ^ / )  =  C ( ^ B /)  =  C ( M a /)  =  C (M B / ) =  C (M }b ) =  C ( m ;a ) =  C (ttiu ) =  C M  =
( ( w'ib ) =  C{wIa ) =  ((J'Ai) =  ((tB l) =  ((t'ls) ~  ((t'lA) —
The secrecy property of messages exchanged between A and B  in the presence of I  is also 
preserved as a result of the inability of the intruder I  to undermine any of the session keys cre­
ated for communications between A and B. More accurately, we find from the abstract inter­
pretation of the protocol (Figure 4.13, Section 4.3.7) that K a b i ,  K b  ax  ^ untag(ipA(<l>AiK)) 
for all the instances of the session keys created for communications A and B .  As a result, the 
interpretation reveals that M ab i, MBAi, M'AB1, M 'B A 1  ^ untag(ipA(<t>A, «))• For the remain­
ing keys and messages captured by untag^tpA^A, &)), we have that (¡(MAn )  =  (i(M bii) =  
(i(M 'iai) =  (i(M'IB1) =  Therefore, the secrecy of messages created in sessions between 
A and B  is preserved according to the process leakage definition in Property 2.
5.4.6 The Yahalom Protocol Example
The uniform abstract interpretation of the Yahalom protocol in Section 4.3.8 demonstrated 
correct distributions of session keys and messages among the participants in the protocol 
including the intruder I . This is despite the possibility of some replay attacks that were 
reported by Paulson in [105] and that are based on compromised old session keys. Since 
we do not emphasize the behaviour of agents A and B  after they exchange the follow-up 
messages (i.e. the continuation processes F(m sg2) and F'[m sg  1)), the results of our abstract 
interpretation are not as sensitive as the results of [105].
Authenticity. We adopt the following trust-level classifications for processes in the Ya­
halom protocol specification given in Figure 4.14 (Section 4.3.8), except for the server:
L(v K AS) l([In it(A ,B)\a | \_Init{AJ)\^ \ [Resp(B,A)\a \ [R esp(I,A )\ ^ )\ a 
L(v K b s ) !(LIn it(B ,A )\a | lInÜ (B,I)\^* | [Resp(A,B)\a | lR esp (I,B )\ ^ )\ a 
l ( v K IS)( I )\ ^
Where -LA Ç a. The following 0 is obtained by the application of U to the above processes:
9{msg\AB) =  0(msg l BA) =  9{msg2AB) =  9{msg2BA) =  a 
9 (m sg lAi)  =  9 {m sg lBi)  =  9{msg2IA) =  9(msg2IB ) =  ± A 
9(k) =  0(net) - ± a
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6{NAB) = 9(Nb a ) =  9(N^B) = 9(N'BA) = 9(MAB) = 9(MBA) = 9(M'AB) = 9(M'BA) = 
0(vab) =  9{vBA) = 9(r'AB) = 0(rBA) = 9(wAb) = 9(wba) = 9{fAB) = 9(f'BA) = a 
9{NAi) = 6{NBj) = 9(N'ib ) = 9(N'i a ) =  9(MAI) = 9(MB I) = 9(M'IB ) = 9(M'IA) = 
9(vAi) = 9 ( vb i ) = 9(r'IB) = 9(r'IA ) =  9(wAi) = 9{wBI) = 9(f'IB ) =  0 ( / j A) =  ±A
Prom the results of the abstract interpretation of Figure 4.15 (Section 4.3.8) and the above 
classifications, no breaches of the process authenticity property (Property 4) are detected.
Secrecy. We adopt the following secrecy classification for the Yahalom protocol:
\{vKAS) \(\Init(A,B)V | \Init(A ,I)-}^  \ \Resp(B,A ) ] 1 \ [Resp(I, J4)]-Lt)] i 
\ { v K b s ) \(\Init(B, Af\l | \Init(B,I)~\±L \ \\Resp(A,B) ] 1 \ f< _ Z ",_ B )“]-1 ^ )1' 
\(vKIS ) ( I ) ^
Where J-l E I- We now construct £ by applying Z  to the above processes:
( (m s g lAB) =  ( ( m s g l B A )  =  C ( msg2AB ) =  ((msg2BA) =  I 
( (m sg lA i )  =  ( (m s g lB I) =  C ( msg2 I A )  =  C ( msg2 I B )  =  ± L 
C(k ) =  ((net) =  ± L
((Nab) = ((Nba) = ((N'ab) = ( (N'ba) = ((MAB) = ((MBA) = ( (M'ab) = ((M'BA) =
( ( v a b ) =  C (VB A ) =  C(r A B ) =  ( ( h ' b a ) =  C (W A B ) =  C(W B A ) =  C (I ' a b ) =  ( ( f B A ) =  ^
((N AI) =  ((.Nb i ) =  ((N'i b ) =  ((N'i a ) =  ((M AI) =  ((M B I) =  ((M'IB ) =  ((M ’IA) =  
( (VAI) =  ( ( VBI) =  ( (r'IB ) =  ( ( r 'jA) =  ( ( w a i) =  ( (WBl) =  ( ( f lB ) =  (U ’ia ) =  -Li
Again similar to the authenticity property, we find that the results of the abstract inter­
pretation of Figure 4.15 (Section 4.3.8) have revealed no instances of the process leakage 
property (Property 2) in the light of the above secrecy-level classifications.
5.4.7 The Woo-Lam Protocol Example
We review here the authenticity and secrecy properties of the Woo-Lam protocol, as specified 
by the version of Figure 4.16 in Section 4.3.9. The results of the abstract interpretation of 
Figure 4.17 (Section 4.3.9) revealed some anomalous values for the k, s'a b  and s'BA variables. 
These values are caused by the attack discovered by [7] and reviewed in Section 4.3.9.
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Authenticity. Consider the following classifications of trust levels for the specification of 
the Woo-Lam protocol:
L{u K a s ) l([Init(A ,B)\a | [Init(A, I ) ] ±A \ \\Resp(B,A)J a | [Resp{I,A)\±A)\a 
L(u K b s ) \([Init(B, A)\a | \_Init(B,I)\±A \ \\Resp(A,B)\a \ [_Resp(I,B)\^)\a 
L(i' K IS)( I )\ ^
Where ± A Q cl, and we drop the server S  since we are not interested in its security properties. 
From this classification, we obtain the following value for 9 by the application of U  to the 
above processes:
9(m sglAB) =  9(m sglBA )  =  9(msg2AB) =  9(msg2BA) =  a 
9{m sglAi )  =  9(m sglBi)  =  9(msg21A) =  9(msg2 i B )  =  -LA 
0(k ) =  9(net) =  ± A 
9{N'a b ) =  9(N'b a ) =  9(M'a b ) =  9{M'b a ) =  9{s'a b ) =  9(s 'BA) =  0{xAB) =  9{xBA) =  
9 { r 'A B ) =  9 [ r ' B A )  =  a  
9{N'i a ) =  9(N'rB) =  9(M'ib ) =  9(M'i a ) =  9{s'ib ) =  9(s 'ia ) =  9{xA I) =  9(xB I ) =  9(r'I B ) =  
°(r 'lA) =  -Li*
Analysing the results of the abstract interpretation along with the above classifications 
reveals the success of the attack of [7] in undermining the process authenticity property 
as defined by Property 4. This is clear from the values of the s'AB and s'BA variables. 
For example, we have that net± £ untag(ipA((f>A,s'AB1)) and neti 6 untag(<pA((f>A, s'BA1)) 
are possible instantiations of these variables. From the above value for 9, we have that 
9(n eti) C 9(s 'AB1) and 9(net\) C 9(s'AB1), since 9{net\) =  JLa  and 9(s'AB1) =  9(sAB1) =  a.
Secrecy. For analysing the secrecy property for the Woo-Lam protocol, we adopt the 
following secrecy level classifications for the involved processes, except S:
\(vKa s ) \{\Init(A,B)~\l | \Init(A ,I)]±L \ \Resp(B,A } ] 1 \ \Resp(I,A )']± L ) ] 1 
\(vKBs) \{\Init(B,A)~\l | \Init(B,I)'}J-L \ \Resp(A,B)y \ \Resp(I,B}]-LL)~\l
Where _!_/,□/. Computing (  results in the following value:
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( ( msglAB) =  C(msglsA) =  ((msg2AB) =  C(msg2BA) =  I 
({msglAi) =  C i w s s is / )  =  ((msg2IA) =  ((msg2I B ) =  _1_L 
C(/t) =  ((net)  =  J_i
((N'a b ) =  ( ( N B a ) — ( ( M a b ) =  ( ( M b a ) =  ((s'AB) =  ((s'BA) =  ( ( x a b ) =  ( ( x b a ) =
C(rAB) =  C ( ) =  ^
C W J  =  ((N'i b ) =  ( (M'i b ) — ( ( M j A) =  ( (s'IB ) =  C(s'IA) =  ( ( x a i )  =  ( ( x Bi )  - ((r'I B ) =  
C(ru ) =  -Ll
The secrecy property of the Woo-Lam protocol is also breached according to Property 2. 
This is clear from examining the final value of the intruder’s knowledge, k. We find that 
M'AB1, M'b a i € untag(tpA((f)A, k)), both of which were created by agents A and B  in com­
munications involving these two agents alone. Process leakage occurs since ( ( k) Ç ((M'AB1) 
where ( (k )  =  ± l  and ( ( M'AB1) =  I. The same argument applies to M BA1 captured by 
untag(ipA(cpA,K)).
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have formally defined the notions of secrecy and authenticity of infor­
mation in processes specified in the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus. The secrecy property is 
centred on the idea of a low-level process obtaining high-level data, whereas the authentic­
ity property is based on the reverse idea of a high-level process capturing data created by 
low-level processes. These definitions were then combined with the results of the abstract 
interpretation of the system examples given earlier in Chapter 4, for detecting instances of 
secrecy and authenticity breaches in those systems. In the FTP example, we demonstrated 
that using per-session passwords (once-off passwords) protects authenticity, even though the 
passwords were leaked after their usage. For the case of authentication protocols, the secu­
rity analysis detected the man-in-the-middle-attack in the Needham-Schroeder public-key 
protocol. It also detected well-known impersonation attacks in the SPLICE/AS, Otway-Rees 





In this chapter, we review briefly two implementations of the abstract interpretation and the 
process leakage analysis as presented in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. Two initial proto­
types were developed: Picasso, a static analyser for processes in the 7r-calculus, and Spicasso, 
its cryptographic sibling for the language of the spi calculus. The programming language 
used is Objective Caml (OCaml) version 3.02, a functional programming environment.
6.2 Picasso: A Pi-Calculus Analyser for Secrecy and 
Security Objectives
The Picasso program is a direct implementation of the abstract semantics of the 7r-calculus 
discussed in Section 4.2.2 and its current version incorporates the secrecy property of process 
leakage (Property 1, Section 5.2.1). The program receives as its main input the specification 
of the process under analysis (along with other parameters related to context information and 
uniformity of the analysis), and returns information about any term (name) substitutions 
that may take place in that process. The process leakage function also permits the detection 
of any instances of the process leakage threat in the analysed process. These are captured 
as lists signifying the leaked names.
The design of the Picasso program is fully modular. The main modules are described in 
the following paragraphs, along with the main type and functions in each module.
118
Module Process. This module introduces a 7r-calculus process type as shown in Figure
6.1, and some functions on processes (e.g. for performing substitutions and labelling bound 
names and tags).
type name =  string
and process =  NULL
INPUT of name * name * process
OUTPUT of name * name * process
| MATCH of name * name * process
MISMATCH of name * name * process
REST of name * process
| SUM of process * process
COM of process * process
| REP of process
Figure 6.1: The name and process data types in Picasso.
For example, the process:
x(y).y(z).0  | (v data) (v Info) x (datan ). data (Infot2).0
instantiates the following type:
Process,COM(Process. INPUT("x", "y"»P rocess. INPUT("y", "z" .Process.NULL)), 
Process.R EST("D ata", P rocess.R E ST ("In fo", P ro cess. OUTPUT("x", " t l "  ,
Process.OUTPUT("Data","t2".Process.NULL)) ) ))
While it keeps a mapping from tags to their name values. Hence, Data can be retrieved 
from t l  and Info can be retrieved from t2 .
Module Phi. The main type in this module is the type denoting <pA environments: 
phi = (Process.name * Process.name l i s t )  l i s t
This type represents a list of pairs. The first element of each pair belongs to the set of 
variables of the analysed process (input parameters in the case of the 7r-calculus) and the 
second element is a list of names denoting possible tags instantiating that variable. For 
example, the following value for <f>A:
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<f>A =
is represented as the type instantiation:
- : (Process.name * Process.name list) list =
[("xl", ["tl"]); ("x2", ["tl";"t2"]); ("x3", ["tl";"t2";"t3"])]
M o d u l e  Rho. This module introduces the p multiset and other related functions over p. 
The p multiset is represented as a list of processes composed with the analysed process:
type rho = Process.process list
Where Process .process is the process data type defined in module Process.
M o d u l e  Picasso. This is the main abstract interpretation module for the 7r-calculus. The 
abstract semantic relation A!' ([-P]) p (j>A is defined by the following function signature:
val picasso : Process.process -> Process.process list -> int ->
Process.name list -> (Process.name * Process.name list) list
where the function takes as arguments a process type instantiation of the analysed process, 
P , a list of processes running in parallel with the analysed process, p0, a number representing 
the abstraction constraint, n, and a list of names representing the initial knowledge of the 
intruder, The outcome reflects a set of names, that can substitute an
input parameter, x. The mapping also contains a variable, intruder, in its domain, which 
signifies the intruder’s knowledge, k .
For example, consider the following system,
system d=  \x(y) \ \{v data)x(datai )
Applying Picasso.picasso system [ ] 1 [ " x " ] , we obtain the following result:
- : (Process.name * Process.name list) list =
[("intruder", ["DATA1"; " x " ] ) ;  ("yl", ["DATA1"; " x " ] ) ]
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Where the intruder process manages to  capture Datal, by communicating over x with the 
replicated output process, \(u data)x(datai). On the other hand, variable yl captures both 
Datal, due to the communication with the replicated output, \(v data)x(datat), and x, due 
to  the communication with the intruder, who can output any of the names in its knowledge 
over any other name in that knowledge.
Module S e c u rity  .Levels. The module provides a data type for security policies that are 
used in classifying processes. This type is shown in Figure 6.2.
procJLevel =  L0 of int
1 LI of int * proc_level
| L2 of int * proc_level * proc_level
Figure 6.2: The p ro cJL ev el data type in Picasso.
Security levels are modelled as binary trees. Leaves are the security levels of processes that 
have no subprocesses (e.g. null), nodes with single child being the levels of processes with 
a single subprocess (e.g. guards, restrictions and replications) and finally, nodes with two 
children being the levels of processes with two subprocesses (e.g. parallel compositions and 
summations).
For example, in the following system, we assume that P  has security level 2 and Q,Q' 
have security level 1 (0  is assumed to have no level, which is denoted as - 1 ) :
P d=  Q | Q'
Q == x(y).y(z).0 
Q' d=  x (r) .0
Then, the corresponding security policy will be written as:
S e c u rity _ L e v e ls . L 2 ( 2 ,
S e cu rity _ L e v e ls  . LI ( 1 , S e c u rity  JLevels . L0 ( - 1 )  ) ,
S e c u rity _ L e v e ls .L I  ( 1 ,  S e cn rity JL e v e ls  ,L0 ( - 1 ) )
Module P i. This module represents an implementation of the process leakage analysis 
that is based on the results obtained from applying the P ic a s s o .p ic a s s o  function. The 
module consists of the following function:
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v a l  procJLeakage : P r o c e s s .p r o c e s s  ->  P ro c e s s .p ro c e s s  l i s t  ->
i n t  ->  S e c u r ity _ L e v e ls .p ro c J .e v e l  ->  in t  ->  P ro cess.n am e l i s t  ->
P ro cess.n am e l i s t
The procJLeakage function takes the same arguments as the P ic a s s o .p ic a s s o  function in 
addition to a  security policy and an integer representing the security level of the intruder. 
The function then returns a list of names that have been leaked to lower level processes.
As an example, applying proc^Leakage to  system (6.1), mentioned earlier, with po =  
x (e ).0 , k =  1, k =  {a ;} and the security level of the network is 0, is shown as follows:
P i .p r o c  JLeakage 
Process.C 0M (
P r o c e s s . IN PU T("x", " y " » P r o c e s s . IN PUT("y", " z " , Process.N U LL)) ,
P ro ce ss .R E S T ("D a ta " .P ro ce s s .R E S T ("In fo " , P r o c e s s . OUTPUT("x", "D a ta " ,
P r o c e s s . OUTPUT( "D a ta " , " I n f o " .P r o c e s s . NULL)) ) ) ) )
[ P r o c e s s . IN PU T("x". "e" .P ro cess .N U L L )] 1 
S e c u rity _ L e v e ls . L 2 ( 1 ,
S ecu rity _ L e v e ls  .L I  ( 1 ,  S ecu rity _L ev els  .L I  (1 ,S e cu rity _ L e v e ls  . LO ( - 1 )  ) ) ,
S e c u r i ty X e v e ls  . L I ( 1 , S e c u r i ty X e v e ls  . L I ( 1 , S e c u rity JL e v e ls . L I (1 ,  
S e cu rity _ L e v e ls  . L I ( 1 , S e c u r i t y i e v e l s  . L 0 ( - 1 ) ) ) ) ) )
0 [ " x " ] ; ;
W ith the security policy made simple by specifying the same security level, 1, for all the 
subprocesses of the system (except for the intruder process, which is running at level 0). 
The following result is obtained:
-  : P ro cess.n am e l i s t  = ["D a ta " ; " I n f o " ;  " x " ; ]
Which shows that the above names have been leaked to the intruder.
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6.3 Spicasso: A Spi-Calculus Analyser for Secrecy and 
Security Objectives
The Spicasso program is a direct extension of Picasso to cover processes specified in the spi 
calculus. The program represents an implementation of the abstract semantics of the spi 
calculus given in Section 4.3.2. The main input to the program is the specification of the 
process under analysis, along with context and uniformity information. The main modules 
of the program are stated in the following paragraphs.
M o d u l e  Term. This module defines the structure of terms in the spi calculus. The main 
data type in this module is term, and its definition is shown in Figure 6.3, where we have, 
for simplicity, considered 2-element tuples (pairs) only.
term =  NAME of string
| VAR of string
| PUB_KEY of term
| PRV-KEY of term
| PAIR of term * term
| SECCIPHER of term * term
| PUBCIPHER of term * term
| SIGNATURE of term * term
Figure 6.3: The term data type in Spicasso.
SECCIPHER is the secret-key ciphertext constructor, PUBCIPHER is the public-key ciphertext 
constructor and SIGCIPHER is the digital signature constructor. The first element of each 
constructor represents the plaintext and the second represents the encryption/signature key. 
Names are represented by NAME, variables by VAR, private keys by PRV_KEY and public keys 
by PUB KEY. Secret session keys are instantiated as names, constructed by NAME.
For example, the complex term [{(a;, (n, {?n}fc'))}]fc- is represented as follows:
Term.SIGNATURE(Term.PAIR(Term.VAR("x "),
Term.PAIR(Term.NAME ( "n") ,Term.SECCIPHER(Term.NAME("m"), Term.NAME("k’")))), 
Term.PRV.KEY(Term.NAME("k")))
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M odule Process. The module denotes what a process is in the spi calculus. This is 
defined in Figure 6.4. The module also provides operations for substitutions of terms and 
the renaming of bound names, variables and tags.
and process =  NULL
INPUT of term * term * process 
j OUTPUT of term * term * process
COND of term * term * process * process 
REST of term * process 
COM of process * process 
REP of process
SPLIT of term * term * term * process * process 
SECDECRYPT of term * term * term * process * process
| PUBDECRYPT of term * term * term * process * process
SIGVERIFY of term * term * term * process * process
Figure 6.4: The process data type in Spicasso.
Although the use of type term is generic in the definition of the process type, we still 
assume the appropriate usage of names as channels and secret session keys. Other keys 
must also have the appropriate type. In the case of SPLIT, the first term is the pair to 
be split. The subsequent terms are the variables instantiated by the two elements of the 
pair. These variables are bound to the first process. Similarly, for the case of the secret-key 
decryption construct, SECDECRYPT, the first term represents the ciphertext to be decrypted, 
using the second term (a name). The result, if successful, is bound to the third term in the 
first process. The same applies to public-key decryption, PUBDECRYPT, and digital signature 
verification, SIGVERIFY.
The process module also includes the environments, tag_to_term and term_to_tag, map­
ping tags to terms and vice versa. For example, the term [{(a;i3, (nt2, {w*1}^ )*3)42}]^ 1-  yields 
the tags (note that t becomes tt and t becomes t):
Term.NAME(ttl), Term.NAME(tt2), Term.NAME(tt3),Term.NAME(tt4),
Term.NAME(tl), Term.NAME(t2) and Term.NAME(t3)
each of which has a value in the tag_to_term environment corresponding to a different 




T erm.PAIR(Term.NAME("n "),Term.SECCIPHER(Term.NAME("m"), Term.NAME("k’")))), 
T erm. PRVJiEY (Term. NAME ( " k" ) ) )
Whereas applying term_to_tag (Term. VAR ( " x " ) )  results in Term.NAME("t3"). For example, 
the following system:
(uk) (^ ({(M *1,A r*2)*2}|1) | a(x).case x of {yi4}k in let (u,w ) = y in a(ui3))







Using the tag_to_term function, it is possible to retrieve the value of each of the tags, 
ttl, t3 and t4 included in the above type instantiation. Similarly, using the term_to_tag 
function, it is possible to  convert any term  to  its tag.
M o d u l e  Phi. This module is the same as in the Picasso tool, holding mappings from 
variables to  sets of tags. The main type here is phi = (term * term list) list, where 
the generic term will only be used for the particular case of NAME. For example, consider the 
following (j>j\ environment revisited from the previous section:
4>A =
X H4 { t l }
y { t i , t 2}
Z 1-4 { i l , Ì2, ¿3 }
Which instantiates the following type:
- : (Process.term * Process.term list) list =
[(Process.NAME "x", [Process.NAME "tl"]);
(Process.NAME " y " , [Process.NAME "tl"; Process.NAME "t2"]); 
(Process.NAME " z " , [Process.NAME "tl"; Process.NAME "t2"; 
Process.NAME "t3"])]
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M o d u l e  Kho. This module is the same as in the Picasso tool described in the previous 
section. The main type is:
rho = Process.process list
Which holds a list of processes that are running in parallel with the current analysed process.
M o d u l e  Spicasso. This is the main abstract interpretation module in Spicasso. The 
module contains the following function:
val spicasso : Process.process -> Process.process list -> int ->
Process.name list -> (Process.term * Process.term) list ->
(Process.term * Process.term list) list
which represents the abstract semantic relation A spl ([PJ p 4>a - The function takes as inputs 
the specification of the process to be analysed P , a list of initial processes running in parallel 
p, a number representing the abstraction constraint n, a list of names representing the initial 
knowledge of the intruder and finally, a list of pairs representing the mappings from terms 
to their tags. The outcome is the list representing ¡paÍ^A, x ) f°r each variable, x, in the 
domain of <f>A■ The variable, intruder, is preserved for the final knowledge of the intruder 
process, k, which is modelled by the capabilities of the Dolev-Yao attacker.
Taking the system:
(uk) (a({(M *1 ,iV*2)¿2}£L) | a(x).case x o f {y*A}k in let (u ,w ) =  y in a(u*3))
















(Term.PAIR(Term.NAME("M"), Term. NAMEO'N") ) , Term.NAME("tt2"));
(Term.NAME("N"), Term.NAME("t2"));
(Term.SECCIPHER(Term.PAIR(Term.NAME("M") ,Term.NAME("N")),Term.NAME ( " k " ) ) , 
Term.NAME("tt2"));
(Term.VAR ( " y " ) , Term.NAME("t4")) ;
(Term.VAR("u"), Term.NAME("t3"))]
will result in the following outcome, which represents the name subset only:
- : (Process.term * Process.term list) list =
[(Process.NAME "u", [Process.NAME "M"]);
(Process.NAME "w" , [Process.NAME "N"])];
(Process.NAME "x", [Process.NAME "a"; Process.NAME "net"])];
(Process.NAME "intruder", [Process.NAME "a"; Process.NAME "net";
Process.NAME "M"])];
Clearly u and w will obtain the values of the pair (M,N). However, note that x obtains as 
values the names a and net from the intruder by communicating over name a, which is a  
channel shared with the intruder. The intruder itself manages to obtain the first element M 
of the pair (M,N) using channel a.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented two initial prototype implementations for the abstract 
interpretations for the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus languages. The implementation of both  
prototypes captures the term  substitution property, and in the current version of the Picasso 
prototype, a special function for the detection of process secrecy leaks is implemented. Both  
prototypes were w ritten in the Objective Caml language (OCam l), a functional language.
Future developments of the tools include the addition of other functions for the detection 
of security breaches, like the process authenticity breach, the building of a language parser, 
the improvement of tool performance and the building of a graphical user interface.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
The modern advances in the design and implementation of distributed computing systems 
and the advent of mobile technologies has increased the demands for information security and 
the protection of computing resources beyond any stage in the past. The task of preventing 
unauthorized malicious intruders and erroneous programs from compromising the secrecy, 
authenticity and other desirable security properties is growing into a complex and delicate 
task as a result of the dynamic nature of network topologies, which modern distributed 
systems are characterised by. This dynamic nature facilitated a plethora of novel methods 
by which attacks from such intruders could be mounted. Therefore, it is of great concern to 
ensure that more secure and robust systems are designed that coincide with the important 
role information technology plays in modern life activities and business transactions.
One significant approach to the analysis of program security is static analysis, which is 
used to determine properties about programs and their runtime behaviour prior to their ex­
ecution. This is necessary to determine whether programs exhibit certain security flaws, like 
information leakage and lack of authenticity. It is also necessary when designing newer sys­
tems and languages that avoid such pitfalls. Therefore, static analysers constitute standard 
tools often used as part of language compilers. Their applications reach beyond the areas 
of code safety and security into other areas like program optimisation and transformation.
Due to the importance of program static analysis, it was chosen as the main subject of 
this thesis, where a denotational abstract interpretation-based framework was introduced for 
the analysis of mobile systems and cryptographic protocols specified within the models of the 
7r-calculus and its cryptographic extension, the spi calculus. In this concluding chapter, we 
review the major contributions of this framework and discuss prospects for future extensions 
and modifications that can benefit the framework.
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First, we summarise the work presented in the main chapters of this thesis.
Chapter 3: Nominal Calculi
A domain-theoretic model for processes in the 7r-calculus was given in this chapter based 
on Stark’s predomain equations [121], where the semantic domain of processes and a de- 
notational function from the language syntax to elements of the domain were fully speci­
fied. The resulting denotational semantics is precise, compositional, and includes a labelling 
mechanism for renaming new instances of bound names introduced as a result of repli­
cated processes. Such a mechanism facilitates tracing copies of names to their origin in 
the specification. Furthermore, the denotational model was extended to be able to model 
cryptographic capabilities of processes in the spi calculus. This extension allowed complex 
data structures, like ciphertexts, digital signatures and tuples to be captured in the result­
ing semantics. The soundness and adequacy of both models were shown with respect to 
transitions in the structural operational semantics.
Chapter 4: Abstract Interpretation
In this chapter, abstract interpretations for the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus were built 
based on extensions of the denotational semantics presented in Chapter 3. The abstract 
semantic domain was constructed in order to capture the security-sensitive property of term 
substitutions. Such substitutions occur as a result of communications in the 7r-calculus, and 
communications and cryptographic operations in the spi calculus. The meaning of a process 
was then given as a mapping from its set of variables (input parameters, local variables), to 
sets of tags, representing the captured terms. The number of tags and variables constituting 
this meaning was kept finite by placing an integer limit in order to ensure the termination of 
the analysis. The resulting interpretation is non-uniform in that it can distinguish between 
multiple copies (up to the integer limit) of the bound variables, names and tags created 
as a result of replicated behaviour. The interpretation was then applied to a number of 
examples including the File Transfer Protocol and the Needham-Schroeder, SPLICE/AS, 
Otway-Rees, Kerberos, Yahalom and Woo-Lam authentication protocols.
Chapter 5: Security Analysis
The results of the abstract interpretation were used to build security analyses for the de­
tection of breaches in the secrecy and authenticity properties of mobile systems and crypto­
graphic protocols. Breaches in data secrecy were formalised by the process leakage property,
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whereas breaches in data authenticity were formalised by the process authenticity breach 
property. In the former, the secrecy of data is compromised whenever a low-secrecy process 
obtains a name that was created by a high-secrecy process. On the other hand, authenticity 
is compromised when a low-trust process manages to send a name to a high-trust process. 
The definitions of these properties were used in explaining the results of the abstract inter­
pretations of the examples given in Chapter 4.
Chapter 6: Automatic Tools
The framework, defined in Chapters 4 and 5, was implemented using the functional language 
of Objective Caml for the cases of the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus and two prototypes 
are available, PiCASSO and SpiCASSO. The resulting implementations are closely related 
to the denotational definition of the abstract interpretation adopted in the framework.
7.1 Research Contributions
The work presented in this thesis contributes directly to the following areas,
7.1.1 Denotational Semantics
The work presented in this thesis has resulted in the definition of a sound and adequate de­
notational semantics for the languages of the 7r-calculus and the spi calculus. The 7r-calculus 
semantics was based on the predomain equations presented by Stark in [121], whereas the spi 
calculus semantics was built on an extension of these equations that included a predomain 
of complex terms, and it permitted the presence of complex terms as messages of output 
actions. These modifications allowed for the modelling of the cryptographic capabilities of 
processes in the spi calculus. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first domain-theoretic 
model for the spi calculus.
7.1.2 The Static Analysis of Nominal Calculi
We have presented an abstract interpretation-based static analysis for reasoning about the 
term-substitution property in mobile and cryptographic systems that are potentially infi­
nite. The analysis is non-uniform in that it can distinguish between the different instances 
of bound names (local data) and variables belonging to the different copies of replicated pro­
cesses. It also caters for the presence of intruder processes (e.g. the network) that exhibit 
potentially harmful behaviour, by allowing the specification of the most general attacker to
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be included in the analysis of any system. Finally, the major novelty about the framework 
presented in this thesis is that it adopts a denotational rather than an operational approach 
for the analysis of mobile and cryptographic programs. This approach has the following 
advantages:
- The resulting theory is often simple and close to its implementation in functional 
programming. The use of the operational approach in constructing static analyses for 
mobile systems has often resulted in complex analyses that are difficult to implement 
(e.g. [126]).
- Certain mathematical concepts that are computationally significant, like domains and 
least fixed points, are directly available for the theory and implementation of the static 
analysis.
- Finally, a denotational model allows for program properties (in our case, the term 
substitution property) to be defined compositionally. In other words, the property 
of a program can be defined from the properties of its subprograms. Such features 
provide an interesting research foundation for exploration in the future.
7.1.3 Program  Security
The state environment, <f>A, resulting from the abstract interpretation defined within our 
framework offers a common ground for the definition of security properties based on the 
fundamental property of term substitution. Thus far, we have provided definitions for the 
process leakage and authenticity properties. We plan to extend the framework to define other 
security properties, like communication security, freshness, anonymity and non-interference- 
based security. Such unifying frameworks exist in the literature, the most notable one being 
the framework introduced by the team led by Focardi and Gorrieri [57] based on the non­
interference property.
The secrecy and authenticity definitions have been used in analysing a number of proto­
cols. These include a simple version of a File Transfer Protocol and the Needham-Schroeder, 
SPLICE/AS, Otway-Rees, Kerberos, Yahalom and Woo-Lam authentication protocols. Re­
sults confirmed the presence of a number of well-known impersonation attacks on the 




There are several directions towards which the framework presented in this thesis can be 
extended. We summarise a few ideas in the following sections.
7.2.1 Communication Secrecy
Another security property that can be formalised using an extension of the current framework 
is the communication secrecy property. Communication secrecy refers to the secrecy of 
communicated data with reference to the secrecy levels of the channels over which the data 
are communicated. Informally, a communication secrecy breach occurs whenever a high-level 
name is sent over a low-level channel. The conceptual difference between a communication 
secrecy breach and a process leakage, as defined in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, is that the 
former is a name-channel relationship, whereas the latter is a name-process relationship.
For example, consider the system, \(v y)x(yt).P~\l \ \x(z).Q~\l , specified in the 7r-
calculus, where a; is a free name and the level of the network is _l_£ C I- Then, we obtain, 
Civ) =  Ciz ) =  I■> and, C(x) — J-l , according to the definition of the Z (P )  function in Section
5.2.1. Analysing the system reveals that t £ 4>a {z)-> but according to the above classification 
of secrecy levels, this does not constitute any process leakage. However, it is clear that y 
is sent over a channel, x, with low secrecy guarantees (since a; is a public channel and its 
secrecy level is that of the intruder, i.e. J-x,)-
To be able to capture breaches in the communication secrecy, the channel over which a 
term travels must be associated in the abstract interpretation with that name. For example, 
it is possible to include in the meaning of a process, an environment, £ 4  : Tag p(Af), 
mapping every message, as represented by its tag, to a set of possible channels over which 
the message is sent. Such association could be used then to compare the level of the message 
to the levels of its possible channels. The presence of a channel with a lower security level 
indicates an insecure communication.
7.2.2 Message Independence
As we discussed in Section 1.5 of the introductory chapter, other notions of security, like 
non-interference-based and equivalence-based security, attempt to capture breaches that 
occur through means subtler than the explicit message passing or message processing, like 
changing the input/output behaviour of processes. We believe that it is possible to extend 
the static analysis framework presented here to cover one such security property, known as 
message independence.
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The definition of message independence in the spi calculus is closely related to the notion 
of testing equivalence, as suggested by Abadi and Gordon in [5]. According to this 
equivalence, two processes are identified by the surrounding context if and only if they 
exhibit the same sequence of barbs in the presence of a testing process composed in parallel 
with each of the two processes. Based on this, a process is message independent with respect 
to a particular variable if and only if instantiations of that variable by different names form 
a class of equivalent processes.
The idea of barbs is fundamental in the study of implicit information flow in nominal 
calculi and finds its roots in synchronisation-based calculi, in particular in the work of 
Milner in CCS [94]. The importance of this idea arises from the fact that barbs stand for 
observable channels that are ready for communications, and therefore, may be utilized to 
implicitly send information from the analysed system to its context. This flow of information 
utilises messages, names of channels and the sequence in which channels interact with their 
context.
In the theory of the static analysis framework presented in this thesis, it is possible 
to detect a weak form of the message independence property. Intuitively, assuming that, 
j^spi^p | p ^  ancj | /]) p =  (j)AQ, are the results of analysing processes
P  and Q in parallel with the intruder, I ,  then P  is abstract testing equivalent to Q, written 
as P  Q, if and only if <Pa p (k ) =  In other words, the intruder is incapable of
distinguishing (using its knowledge, K), between running in parallel with P  and running in 
parallel with Q.
It is possible to demonstrate that the notion of testing equivalence [5] implies abstract 
testing equivalence, i.e. ~  =>■ This result is mainly due to the fact that the abstract 
interpretation used in this framework does not maintain any temporal features of the set of 
names substituting a variable. Such temporal features could be used to transmit information. 
Hence, note for example, that the two processes c(a).c(b) and c(b).c(a) are distinguished by 
~, but are identified by
Now, assume that an open process, P (x), is a process that can be instantiated by sub­
stituting a variable, x, for any name, m, which yields the instance P[m /x], P {x), is then 
said to be abstract message-independent with respect to the intruder, I ,  if and only if 
Vm,n € Af  : P[m/x\ P[n/x], This implies that choosing any two names in Af  to ob­
tain instances of P (x ) should always result in the same abstract knowledge of the intruder 
composed with each of those instances. Hence, the intruder cannot find any difference when 
abstractly interpreted in parallel with P[m /x] from P[n/x],
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7.2.3 Language Extensions
Finally, we mention the important research direction in which we could consider other for­
malisms for mobility, or extensions of current formalisms, that incorporate concepts related 
to the security of mobile systems. We give an overview below of two such extensions.
PK I-based Extension
Currently, work is under way1 in utilising the framework to build an abstract interpretation 
that captures the term substitution property in an extended version of the spi calculus with 
primitives for modelling systems with a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) state. The spi- 
pki language allows for certain PKI requirements in security protocols to be expressed, for 
example, the validity of the binding between a public key and its owner, which is maintained 
through valid digital certificates that link the key to its owner and are signed by a Trusted 
Third Party (TTP). Such requirements cannot be expressed in the spi calculus.
The extension allows for the authenticity of a particular PKI user to be defined as the 
capturing of a digital signature that has signed fresh data with a private key, of which the 
public part could be verified to be validly bound (in the current PKI state) to that user. 
Capturing digital signatures relies on the term substitution property of our framework.
Location-based Extension
Another possibility of using language extensions would be to include location-based lan­
guages, like the mobile ambients calculus and the seal calculus. The main issue involved 
is the construction of an appropriate denotational semantics that models the concept of 
locations in a correct manner. Term substitutions could then be selected as the abstract 
semantic domain and used in formalising security properties of the analysed systems. For 
example, in the mobile ambients calculus, one such property could be the capturing of the 
evolution of system topology during which certain ambients may be present within parent 
ambients. This property depends on the manner in which communications take place: by 
the movement of ambients into and out of other ambients. Hence, it could be possible to 
have a non-standard meaning of a process denoting an environment that maps each ambient 
name to a set of ambient names that may exist at runtime within the location of that am­
bient during runtime. The breach of secrecy then, could be expressed by having an ambient 
with a lower security level entering inside the boundaries of a higher-level parent ambient 
or vice versa.
'P roject IMPROVE - Enterprise Ireland, with David Gray, Geoff Hamilton and David Sinclair.
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So, far, there have been a few attempts to extend location-based languages with crypto­
graphic primitives, which add another dimension to the problem of the denotational mod­
elling and abstract interpretation of these languages. The mobile ambients calculus has 
been extended with primitives for shared-key cryptography in [34], The seal calculus has 
also been extended in [22], however, with a more generic model that deals with public-key 
as well as shared-key cryptography. Moreover, a primitive is suggested for expressing code 
mobility as passive data. The language allows for the modelling of many features in tech­
nologies, like Java and .NET, including for example the modelling of secure downloading 
and running of Java applets within locations called sandboxes. The results show that it is 
possible to model an example, like the certified email protocol suggested by [4], which relies 
heavily on the concepts of cryptography and code mobility. Future research plans include 
extending the current static analysis framework to the crypto-loc language.
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A .l Safety of the operation in the 7r-calculus 
(Lemma 1)
V ie  { i . . . n } , n e  N.0* £ D ± ,<f>\ e  d {_ ■.
(0 =  U«, 4>i) a  (0' =  # )  A
t=l...n i=l...n
(3y € A f : ve(<t>i,l/) € </>i(a:) => 3t € $ ( ° * ( * ) )  : va/«e_o/({i}) =  {«*(»)})
=» (3y € N  : <P£(<t>,y) e  <t>{x) => 3t £ <t>'{ak{x)) : value-of {{t}) = {a>k{y)})
The proof proceeds by mathematical induction on sets of environments.
T h e base case: n = 0
(<£= U(i, <Pi =  <h) a  (<f>‘ = U(i <t>'i =  M  
i=t.,.0 ¡=1 ...0
=> {By e jV  : ip£{4>o,y) e  0o(®) => 3t e  $ o (a*(*)) : value.of ({t}) =  { a k{y)})
Since, Vx e  M  : <Ao(a:) =  0o(a*(a:)) =  0.
T he induction step . First, assume the hypothesis is true for a  union of n environments:
(<f> -  Up 0i) A (<p' =  U0 4>i) A
(3y e A f :  (peXfcyy) € </>,( a:) =$> 3i e  #(<**(*)) : « a /a c-o /({i}) =  {a * (y )})
=> (3y e  jV : <fi£(<t>,y) € 4>{x) => 3t e  0 '(at(a :)) : va/ue-o/({t}) =  {etjt(j/)}}
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Proving the induction step demands that the above statement is true for a union of n + 1 
environments. Assuming that, <j> =  IJ^ and </>' =  U<<. as above, we have that:
i= l...n  i= l...n
</».-=  $  0«+1
i= l...n + l
U$ Q'i =  V ^0 ^Jl+l
f= l. ..n+1
From the definition of U<j in Section 4.2.1, we have:
[<f> U«, fpn+i )(x)  =  <t>(x) U 0 II+i (a;)
(<*>' U0 <f>'n+i){x) =  <t>'{x) U (/>'„+, (x)
We obtain Vy 6 <J>(x), y' € <A„+i (a:) => 1J, v' S (<t>{x) U <£„+i (a:))
arid, Vi e <p'(ak(x)),t' € '^n+1 (afc(a:)) => i ,i ' e {<f>'{ak(x)) U cf>'n+i{a k{x)))
By the inductive hypothesis, we have that:
(3j/ e Af : vd<t>,y) € <l>(x) =>■ 3t e  (t>'{ak {x)) : value-of{{t}) =  { a k[y)})
and with the assumption that the new added environments are also safe:
(3y' ZAi :<P£(<pn+i,y') € (t>„+\{x) => 3t' € </>'„+, (afc(i)) : ua/ue_o/({i'}) = {a fc(y')})
Then by the properties of set union, it is possible to arrive at the following result:
y£{(f>{x) U 0„+i(x))
=» 31 e  {<t>'{ak(x)) U <j>'n+i(a * (x ))): valuc-of{{t}) =  { a k{y)}
□
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A .2 Safety of the abstract semantics of the 7r-calculus 
(Theorem 5)
VP,P,<t>£,<t>A •
(¿ " ([ P ] )  R<t>£=(p, <t>'£ ) )  A  ( ^ ( [ P ] )  p  <j>A =  4>'a ) A
(By e M : (fi£{(l>£,y) €  (¡>£(x) => 3 t £ (t>A(ak(x)) : value.of ({t}) =  { a k(y)})
=> (By e  N  : ^ (^ £ ,2 / ) G <f>'£ (x) => 3 i e ^ ( a fc(a)) : =  {ae*(l/_)»
Til« proof proceeds by structural induction on P  (in all that follows, snd(a:i ,£•_>) — x->).
T he base case: 0
p $A = & a
f'dOD p 4>e =  W ,*£)
Here we have from the antecedent:
^ f l P j )  pu 4>a =  4>'a
P0<i>£ =  (p,<&)
Since <p'£ — <t>£ and 4>'A — 4>a , this satisfies the safety requirement as follows:
(3y e A f :  fs(<(>£,y) 6  </>f(x) => Bt € <t>A((*k{x)) ■ value.of ({t})  =  {a * (j/)})
=> {By CAT : tp£{<p'£ ,y) e  4>'£(x) => Bt € </>'A(ak{x ) ) : value.of {{t}) =  { a k(y)})
T h e induction step .
Case 1: x(y).P  
^ (¡l(y ).P D  p <!>a =  <Pa 
£ * d®(y) P]) p<t>£ =  (j >,4>£)
From the antecedent, we have that:
^*([P]) PO <f>A =  <P'A
i"([PD po <Pe =  {p ,4>£)
Since <p'£ — <j>£ and <j)'A - tf>A, this satisfies the safety requirement as follows:
(By € Af : <p£(4>£ ,y) G <l>£(x) => Bt e  M d k (x ) )  : value.of ( { ( } )  =  {ctt(y )})
by (A*2) 
by (£*2)
by (A* 1) 
by (£*1)
152
[3y  G Af : ip£{4>'£ ,y )  G <t>'£ {x) => 3i G (¡>'A {a k{x))  : uake_o/({i}) =  ( a fc(j/)})
Case 2: x(y).P
A^([x(yt).P]) p<t>A =  U0 Va by ( ^ 3 )
x'(z).P'eP
where, (j>'A =  V7<[{\P\}p l±lp pfP'/ar'^.P']]) (¡>A[ak (z) 4>A(ak {z)) U { a fc(f)}]
=  U ^ ^ d P ]) ({l-P&p ^PP[P'/x'{z).Pl]\{\P\}p) (j>A[ak{z) 4>A{otk {z)) U {a fc(i)}]
Pep'
if, VA{<t>A,x)nipA(<l>A,x') /  { }
^li<!/)-P]) i  ^  =  (p, U0 u 0 f c )  by (^ 3 )
s' (¿).P'G/3
where, <f>'£ =  snd^i-Q PD p l±lp p[P'/x'(z).P']} <f>£ [z ^  We{<!>e,y)}})
=  snd(p', snd{£*{P]) ( { jP ^  Wp p[P'/x'(z).P']\{\P$p) (¡>£ [z ^  Ws{<l>£,y)}]))
Pep'
if, ip£ ((j>£ ,x) =  (p£ (<t>£,x')
From the antecedent, we have that:
(3y G Af : (p£ ((j>£ ,y ) G 4>£ {x) => 3t & <t>A(a k(x)) : value-of {{t}) = { a k (y)})
Setting (j>'£ =  (¡)£ [z {<pe(</>£,V)}] and <p'A =  <j>A[ak {z) ^  (¡>A{ak (z)) U { a fc(i)}], we have 
that 3y 6 Af : ip£ ((j)'£ ,y) G 4>'e (z) => 3i G <p'A(a k (z)) : value.of ({t}) =  { a k (y)} (by the 
properties of set union)
=> (3 y £ A f:< p £ (<p'£ ,y)£<j>'£ (x) => 3t G <t>'A(a k (x)) : value.of {{t})  =  { a k(y)})
By the induction hypothesis for P : (¿^([P]) p" cj>'e =p",<j>£) A (^ ([P ]) p" (j)'A =  (f>A) A 
(3t/ & Af : tp£ (<j>'£ ,y) G <f>'£ (x) => 3i G <j>'A(a k{x)) : value.of {{t}) =  { a k{y)})
=>■ (3y e  Af : <p£ ((p£ ,y) G 4>£ (x ) => 3t G <j}'X{ak {x)) : value.of {{t}) =  { a k {y)})
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 1), we arrive at the following result:
P>(( U0 ^ s n d ie - ip - ] )  m P ^P P [P 'lx '{z ) .P '}\ m P) <!>£)) <t>e)=PA A
x(z).QeP Pep'
( u0 ( m P ^ p p [p '/x , (z).p'}\m p)< i> ,A) u* <t>A =  <t>' a
x{z).QeP PeP'
{3y G Af : V£(<j>'e ,y ) G <j>'£ (x) => 3t G 4>'A(a k(x)) : value.of ({t})  =  ( a fc( y ) } )
=> (3?/ G Af : ip£ ((f>,y) G 0(ar) => 3t G </>'(afc(a;)) : mZue_o/({i}) =  { a fc(j/)})
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
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C a se  3 : i f  x  =  y then P  else Q
A n([if x =  y then P  else Q]j p (¡>a — <
uP p\) <t>A,
if <PA{4>A,x)n<pA {<j>A,y ) i  { }
Up P i <t>A, otherwise
where, ^ ([{ jP D p  l±lp p\) <f>A =  (J^, -^ ([P ]) Pp 4>A
Pep'P
and, H * m P UP p j 4>a  =  U 0 A "(Q ]) Pq <t>A (by .AM)
Q EP'cQ
£ *  ([if x =  y then P  else Q]) p <pe =
<t>e, if we(<t>£,x) = <P£(<l>£,y) 
T ^ ^ Q D p U p  p]) <j>£, otherwise 
where, ^([flP^ l±lp pj <p£ =  p , |J0 s n d { £ n ([P]) p '{, f c )
p z p 'p
and, p]) <(>£ =  q, U<* snd(£*([Q1) p”Q <f>£) (by £*4)
Qtp'd
Where, p'P =  {jP|}p l±)p p, p'Q =  {]Q[}p p, Pp =  p'p\QP\}p and p% =  Pg\{]<2[}p.
By the induction hypothesis for P  (Q):
(£*([P]) p" 4>£ = P ', <t>'£) A (^ ( [P J  p" <j>A =  <t>'A) a
(3y G J\f : (p£ {<t>£,y) G <j>£{x) 3t G ^ ( a fc(*)) : va /«e_o /({ i} ) =  {ak(y)})
=* (3y £Af : <pe((t>'£,y) G <f>'£(x) => 3t G (¡>'A{ak{x)) : value.of {{t}) =  {afc(y)})
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 1), we arrive at the following result:
M U tf, snd ^ flP ]) p" <j>£)) =P,<t> A ( U* “^ ([.P]) p" 4u) =  </>' A 
pgp' P e p '
[3y £ M : (p£ (cj>£ ,y) £ <j>£ [x) => 3t £ <j>A{a k (x)) : value.of ({t}) =  { a k {y)})
=>■ (3y £ JS : <p£{<t>,y) £ <j>{x) =>• 3 i  G 0 '( a fc(®)) : value-of ({t}) = {ak(y)})
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
Case 4: P  + Q
A ” <[P + Q5 p 4>a  =  T in m } p  Up pD 4>a  u0 k * w q \}p ph <t>A  =
( U0 A*<[P} Pp  <Pa ) U0 ( U0 A-dQJ p£ ¿a ) (by A *5)
PSPp Q6p'q
«^([P +  QD p =  p, (s n d ^ If lP llp  I±JP pj 4>e) U0 tt)p pj f o  )) =
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P,(( U* 5nd(£-([PD tt'P 4>e )) U* ( U* sn d{£"lQ } p% <f>£)))
Pep',, Qcpq
Where, p'P =  {|P|}p i±)p p, p'Q =  {|Q|}„ Wp p, p",, =  p'/A{|P|}p and p£ =  Pq\{|Q|}„.
By the induction hypothesis for P:
(£*([PD P" <f>£ =  p‘,<i>'£) a  M 'iP D  p" 4>a =  <t>'A) A 
(3y e  N : ip£ {(j>£,y) £ 4>s{x) =>■ 3t e  4>A(a k(x)) : value-of { { t})  =  { a k {y)})
=> (3y G N  : <p£ {<l>'£ ,y) 6 $ ;(« )  3f € <j>'A{a k {x)) : value.of ( { t})  =  {a k (y)})
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 1), we arrive at the following result:
P, ( U * snd{£*([P]) p" </>£))= p,4>  a  (U 4 A ” <[P]) pf'4>a) =  (f>' A 
pep' p^p'
(3y G M  : <p£ {</>£,y) G <p£ {x) => 3t € 4>A{cek{x)) : value-of{{t}) =  { a k [y)})
=> (3y 6 jV : <P£{</>,y) G <p{x) => 3i G 4>'{ak (x)) : value.of {{ t})  =  {afc(j/)})
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
Case 5: P \ Q  
A * iP  | QU p 4>A =  ^ (1 {)P (}, m P W, P} <Pa =  U* A*([P]) p" 0^
Pep'
f ’ ffP IQ5 p <t>£ =  ft'(H|P|}p Wp AQDp Wp d) *  =  p, ( U* W (f-([P ])  p" «/>£))
Pep'
Where, p' =  {|P|}„ {]Q|}P p and p" =  p'\{]P|}p-
By the induction hypothesis for P:
(f'([P]) p" <f>£ =  p \ & ) A M *(P ]) p" 0^ =  <^) A
(3j/ G TV : tp£ {<f>£,y) € </>f(a:) => 3i G <f>A{a h{x)) : valu e.o }{{t}) -  { a k(y)})
=> (3y :(p£ {(t>'£ ,y) e<l>'e {x) => 3i € 0 *  (<**(*)) : t;a/«e.o/({i}) =  {a*(j/)})
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 1), we arrive at the following result:
p .(U *  ¿*(IPI> p" 4>£)=p ,4> a  ( U * ^ iP D  p" M  =  4>' A
/’ep' Pep'
(3j/ € N  : tfi£{</>£>y) € <}>£(x) =» 3 i e  0^(a*(a:)) : uai«e.o/({i}) =  {a fc(2/)})
(by ,4*6) 
(by £ '6 )
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=> (3y G N  : <pe{<t>,y) G 0  =>■ 3< G 0 '( a fc(x)) : value-of ( { i } )  =  { a k{y)})
Whieh satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
Case 6: {u x)P
A*H(uz)P\) p < t > A =  Wp PD <t>A =  U *  A'dP]) p" <I>A
Pep'
£ ” { {vx)P ) P  </>£ =  p,md(K"<[{|P|}„ Wp p]> 0£) =  p\ Utf, snd(£”HPD p" <f>£ )
Pep'
Where, p' =  {|P|}p Wp p and p" =  p'\{]P|}p
By the induction hypothesis for P:
(£-([P]) p" 0* -  p',0^) A M *dP5 p" 0.4 =  d/A) A
(:ty G A/": <pe(<i>£,y) G 0 t-(x ) =>• 3 i G < M a * (x ) )  : va/«e.o/({i}) =  { a fc(j/)}) 
(32/ G A/- : <pe{(t>'c ,y)  G 0^ (x) => 3 i G 0 ^ ( a * (x ) )  : i>a/ue-o/({i}) =  { a * ( 2/)})
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 1), we arrive at the following result:
p ',(\ Jt>S7id(£-([P]) p" </>£))= <f> A (\J^A^<[P]) P" 4>a )  =  4>' A 
Pep' Pep'
[By €  jV  : <pe{<t>£,y) €  0 £ (x )  => 3t G 0 ^ ( a fc(x)) : va/?ie.o/({i}) =  { a fc(?/)})
=>■ (3j/ G A/- : <P£(<f>,y) €  0 (x )  => 3 i G 0 '( a fc(x)) : va/ue-o/({i}) =  { a fc(2/)})
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
C ase 7 : !P
p <t>A =  1)
where,
■P^(n) = let 0i =  ¿Tfl [ ]  ren(P, i) ]) p <j>A in 
i=l
n+1
let </>■) =  •A'fl n  ren(P,i)  ^ p 4>a in 
t= 1
if <l>\ =  <h then 0i else T A{n + 1)
and, Vx € bn(P),yl G n (P ) : ren(P,i) =  (P[x*/®])[ y /|/eJ
^ ( [ ! P D P 0 £ = ^ ( - 1 )
where,
(by A *7) 
(by £ *7 )
(by .4*8)
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P " ( n) =  let ui =  El P [bn i(P )/ bn(P)\ ]) p <l>£ in
1=1
n+1
let v-i =  £ 7r([ n P [bn i{P )/bn (P )} )  p tj>£ in 
¡=1
i f  i»i =  t>2 then t>i else T £ (n + 1)
and, bnj(P) =  {a:,- | x € bn(P )} (by £ v8)
The proof proceeds by mathematical induction, where we demonstrate that .F J ( - l )  is safe 
with respect to J-g (—1) (base case) and that if T\(n) is safe with respect to T J (n) then 
F \ (n  + 1) is safe with respect to (n +  1) (inductive step).
The base case: n  =  —1
=  let <(>x =  ± Di in 
let f a  =  0 ]) p 4>a in
if  0, = <f>2 then 0i else 0)
^ ?(~ 1 ) =  Let v i =  (_Lp,-x ,-Lo) in 
let V2 =  £"([ 0 I) p <l>e in 
if  V\ — «2 then V\ else (0)
From the above two calculations, we have that L Dt — (¡>aq is a safe abstraction of _L/) =  <j>£o 
since Vx € dcrm(<f>£o) : (x) =  <Pao{%) =  {}• Also, since we have proved the case for P  =  0
(The second computation of J-*)  earlier, then we have that:
(£*([PD Pd>£= p', 4>'£) A (^ ([P J) p<t>A= <I>'A) A
(3y G Af : <P£{<l>£,v) € 4>e{x) =$■ 3i € <f>A{ak(x)) : v alu e.o f ( {* })  -  {Qfc(j/)})
=> (3j/ €  Af : <pe(<t>£,v) € 0k(®) =>■ 3i € 0 ^ (a fc(a:)) : t/a/ue-0/ ({i}) =  {ajt(j/)})
T/ie induction step:
We start by assuming the inductive hypothesis:
( ^ ( n ) = p ' , & )  A ( ^ ( n )  =  0^) A
(3y £ Af : <p£ (<t>£,y) £ <l>£(x) => 3f € 0 ^ (a fc(a:)) : va/ue-o/({i}) =  {<**&)})
=> (3y e A/": <P£(<f>'e ,y) € 0^(a:) => 3 1 6  </)'A(a k (x)) : value.of ({ t})  =  { a k {y)})
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Now, we prove that the same safety relation holds for +  1) with respect to T £ (n + 1), 
as follows:
7 1 + 1
T \{n  +  1) =  let (j>i =  A*<[ H ren(P ,i) ]) p in
i=1
n+ 2
let 02 =  An<[ n  ren(P ,i) ]) p <f> a  in
i= 1
if  0 i =  02 then 0 i else T\(n  + 2 )
n+1
T^[n  + 1) =  let v\ =  £*([ P [bn i{P )/bn(P)\ ]) p <f>s in
i=l
7 1 +  2
let v2 =  Sn<[ P [bn i(P )/bn {P )] ]) p (f>s in
i= 1
if  Vi =  u2 then Vi else !F£ (n + 2)
From the induction hypothesis, we know that:
n+1 n+1
(£*([ I ]  P [bn i(P )/bn(P )] ]) p 0£ =p',<f>'£) A ( ^ ( f  Q ren(P ,i) ], p <j>A =  <t>'A) A 
¿=1 ¿=1
(3y G TV : <ps(<l>£,y) G 0 s (x )  ^  3 i G <j>A{ah(x)) : wa/we_o/({i}) =  {afcO /)})
^  (3y 6 TV : <Pf(0é,2/) G 0'£ (a:) =>■ 3i G 4>'A{a k (x)) : value.of ({t}) =  { a k (y)})
n+2 n+2
The remaining case involves ^ ( [ 1 1  ren(P ,i) ]) p (¡>a  and £*§_ P[6n,(P)/6n(P)] ]) p <j>£.
i=1 i=1
We can rewrite these as:
n+2 n+1
I I  ren(P, i) ]) p <f>A =  Av ([ Yi ren(P, i) \ ren(P, n +  2) ]) p <f>A 
i=l i= 1
n+2 n+1
£ * {  U P [b n i(P )/b n (P )\ } p $ £ = £ ” <[ f i  P [bm (P )/bn (P )] \ P[bnn+2 (P )/bn(P )] ]) p f c
¿=1 2=1
From the induction hypothesis, we have that:
n+ i n-H
(£*([ f i  P[bni{P)/bn{P)\  ]) p <t>£ =  p',(j>'£) A (A.7^  È  ren{P ,i) }  p 0 a  =  <j>'A) A 
i= 1 i= l
(3y  G jV : ip£{(j)£,y) G 4>£(x) ^  3t G (j)A{0Lk{x)) : u a /u e_ o /( { i } )  =  { « * ( 2 / ) } )
(3y € N  : (pEiÿ^y) e  (¡>'£ (x) => 3 i G 0 ^ ( a fc(x)) : ua/ue_o/({f}) =  { a fe(î/)})
And from the antecedent:
(£*([ P[i»n„+2(P)/6n(P)] ]) p 0£ =p',<p'£) A ( ^ ( [  ren(P,n +  2) ]) p <j>A =  4>'a) a 
(By G A/" : tp£{<l>£,y) G 0 £ (x ) 3 i G (¡>A{ak{x)) : va/u e_o/({i}) =  (afc(2/)})
=> (3?/ G AA : <pe{<t>'£,y) G 0^(æ) => 3 i G <j>'A(ak(x)) : value.of ({t}) = { a k (y)})
We have already proven the case for the parallel composition of two processes,
A *([ P  | Q ]) p (j>A and £ n ([ P  \ Q }) p <p£ (case 5). Hence, we can conclude that:
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(P£(n +1) aj / ,  fa ) A [F\(n  + 1) -  <t>'A) A
(3y e  Ai : <P€Ì<l>£,y) € foi®) => 3i e (j>A(ak(x)) : voi«e-0/({i}) = {or/tCì/)})
^  (3y e N  •■ip£(<t>'£ ,y) £<t>'c(x) => 3t e  <p'A(ak(x)) : value.of {{t}) -  { ak(y)})
From both thè base case and thè induction step, we can conclude that:
(£-d \P J p d>£ =  pf^ 'e) A (A*<[ !P ])p^  = #*) A
(3y e Af ; V£{<t>E,y) e  <M») => 3f e  0^ (a*(® )) : vaiue-o/({t}) =  {a * (j /) })
^  (32/ g A/" : <Pi:( ,^y) e ^(x) = > 3  t e  <p'A{ak{x)) : valuc.of {{t}) =  {ajt(j/)})
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A .3 Safety of the operation in the spi calculus 
(Lemma 2)
Vi G { 1 . . .  n }, n G N, <f>i G D±, 0- G D\_ :
(</> =  U* <t>i) A (<f>' =  Utf, <t>'i) A
i= l...n  i = l . . . n
(3M  G Term : ipe(<f>i,M) G </>i(a:) => 3i G 4>'i{aktk' (a:)) : value.of ({t}) =  {M '} A 
untag(M') =  (Va; G bnv(M) : M [ak,k' ix ) /x ] ) )
=> (3M  G Term : 1ps((j),M) G 0(a;) =>• 3i G 4>'(ak,k' (x)) : value-of ({t})  =  {M 1} A
untag(M') =  (Va; G bnv(M) : M[aik,k'(x)/x]))
The proof proceeds by mathematical induction on sets of environments.
The base case: n = 0
(<t> = U0 ^  = <M a  (</>' = U0 #  - </>o) 
i=1...0 i=1...0
=> 3 M  G Term : <pf(0o,M ) G </>o(x) => 3i G (j>'0(ak,k' {x)) : value.of ( { i} )  =  {M 1}  A
untag(M') — (Va; G bnv(M) : M[a.k,k'{x)/x])
Since, Va; G Af : 0o(a;) =  0o{a k {x)) =  0.
The induction step. First, assume the hypothesis is true for a union of n environments: 
(4> =  1)4, <t>i) A (0' =  U0 <Ai) Aj—]_.. Ji
(3M  G Term : <pe(<l>i,M) G 0j(ar) => 3 i G 4>\{oik,k’ {x)) : wa/we_o/({i}) =  {M '}  A 
untag(M') =  (Va: G bnv(M) : M [ak,k'{x)/x]))
=> (3M  G Term : <ps((p,M) G </>(a;) =£• 3i G </>'(a M ' {x)) : waZue_o/({i}) =  {M '}  A
untag(M') =  (Va; G bnv(M) : M [ak,k'{x)/x]))
Proving the induction step demands that the above statement is true for a union of n + 1
environments. Assuming that, <j> =  |J0 <Ai and <j>' =  U0 <Ai, as above, we can show that:
i = l . . . n  i= l...n
U 0  $ i  =  0  0 n + l
i = 1 . . . 7 l + l
Ui/> = <^t> ftn+l
1 = 1 .  . .7 1 + 1
From the definition of in Section 4.2.1, we have:
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(<t> LI* <t>„+1 )(x) =  4>{x) U <j>n+ 1 (x)
(<j> U<i> 0 rl+ i)(x ) =  </> (a.1) U <fin+\ (a:)
We obtain Vt/ € <t>{x),y' G </>„+ i(x) => y, y' G (<£(x) U <A„+i (a:))
and, Vi G <f>'{ak(x)),t' € </>'„+1 (a* (x)) =*■ i ,t ' €  (</>'(afc(x)) U <f>'n+l (a k(x)))
By the inductive hypothesis, we have that:
(3M €  Term : tpc(<f>,M) € 4>{x) => 3£ 6  <f>'((**,*'(*)) : value.of {{t})  =  {M '}  A 
untag(M') =  (Vx G bnv(M) : Af[afc,jfc<(x)/x]))
and with the assumption that the new added environments are also safe:
(3 M 6  Term : <pe (<pn+l,M ) €  0„+ i(x) = » 3  i G <#,+, (a*,*<(*)) : va/w e.o/({i}) =  {M '}  A 
untag(M') =  (Vx € bnv(M) : M [ak:k>(x )/x ]))
Then by the properties of set union, it is possible to arrive at the following result:
(3M G Tci'm :<pe{(<l>{x) U </>„+,(x )) ,M ) G (</>(x) U </>n+i(x))
=> 3i G U 0 /„+ i (a fc,)t-(x ))) : t>a/ue.o/({i}) =  {A /'}  A
untag[M') — (Vx G bnv(M) : M [afc,fc'(x)/x]))
1C1
A .4 Safety of the abstract semantics for the spi calculus 
(Theorem 8)
VP, P,<t>£,<l>A •
(£spi([P]l p<t>£ =  (p ,^ ))  A p <j>A =  <j>'A) A
(3M  e Term : <p£ (<t>£ ,M ) e (¡>£ (x) =>- 3i G cf>A(a k:k'(x)) : value-of ( { i})  =  {M '} A 
untag(M') =  (Wy e bnv(M) : M [afc,fc- (y)/y]))
=>• (3M  6 Term : (p£ (<p'£ ,M ) 6 «/»¿(a:) =>• 3i e 4JA(a klk'(a;)) : wa/tie_o/({i}) =  {M '} A
untag(M') =  (Vy € bnv(M) : M [akik>(y)/y]))
The proof is by structural induction on P  (in what follows, we have that fs t (x i ,x 2) — X\ 
and sn d {x i,x 2) =  x 2).
The base case: 0
p° <t>A =  <t>'A 
£ SP%P]) p0 <p£ =  {p,(f)'£)
Since <j>'E =  (¡>£ and (j)'A =  <j>A, this satisfies the safety requirement as follows:
(3M  G Term : <p£ (4>£ ,M ) e  4>e(x) => 3i e  <pA(a kik'(x)) : value-of ({t}) =  {M 1}  A 
untag(M') =  (Wy € bnv(M) : M [ak,k>(y)/y]))
=>■ (3 M  6 Term : <£>£ (0'e , M ) 6 <Af(a:) => 3i e  (¡>'A(a kyki (x)) : va/iie_o/({i}) =  {M '}  A
untag (M 1) =  (Wy G bnv(M) : M [aklk>(y)/y]))
The induction step.
Case 1: x(y).P
A spi <[M(x).PD p<t>A =  <i>A by (.4^ 2)
¿ 8pi|M(a;).P| =  ( { jm ^ f ^ M ^ A a ^ ') ! } ,^ )
where, (p',<j>'£) -  Tlspi([{\P\}P]) (j>£ and, <p£ (<t>E,M ) 6 N  by (£ spi2)
^LSJpi ([OD p  4>a  =  <f>A  
£ spi<m P cj>£ =  (0 , <t>£ )
by (Xairil)  
by (£spil)
Here we have from the antecedent:
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From the antecedent, we have that:
^ t f P D  po </u =  0 U
Po <fi£ =  M e )
Since (j)'£ =  <f>£ and (¡>'A — <j>A, this satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement as 
follows:
(3M  G Term : ip£ ((f>£,M) G <t>e(x) =>• 3t G 4>A{otk,k' {x)) : ua/w e_o/({i}) =  { M '}  A 
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [ak,k'(y)/y]))
=>- (3M  G Term : ip£(4>'£ ,M ) G =>■ 3i G (j)'A(a kiki (x)) : value.of ({t})  =  {M '} A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [aktk'(y)/y]))
C ase 2 : M (N ).P
A *m L *).P ]> P 4 > A  =  ( U 0 </>'A) ^  <pA
M'(z).p'ep
if, untag{ipA(4>A, M )) n  untag(ipA{<t>A, M '))r\N  { }
where, ^  =  T ^ tff lP I} , W„ p[P'/M'(*).P']I) 0"
and, (*) <f>A{otk,k' (*)) U {«&,*;' (i)}] by (.¿***3)
P ^ ( [ M ( £ ) . P D  p <j>£ =
( |+) {]ia«(p')|} W {]o«i(vJ£(0£,M),v>£(0£,£),p")|}, Utf, 4>'s U0 </>e)
M'{z).p'ep M'(z).P’£p
if, <As(0£, M) =  <p£(cj>£,M') G JV
where, (p ',01e ) =  ^ spi([flP|}p l±lp p[P'/M'(z).P']]) h>
and, (p",</>f) =  fcspi([{]P|}P]) <t>£ by (£3p*3)
We only consider the safety of the first environment (the safety of the second envi­
ronment follows from the base case). Extending (¡>'A and (p1, <j>'£) in the above rules yields:
4>'a =  U 0 A9pim  p[P'\M'(z).P'] <t>\ 
pep'
(p ',^ )  =  ( l i lp '" ,U 0 O
p ep pep
where, (p"',0g') =  f * ( [ P ] )  p[P'\M '(z).P'] 0£[z ^  { ^ ( f c .L ) } ]
From the antecedent, we have that:
(3M  G Term : ip£(<j>£,M) G <j>e(x) => 3t e  (¡>a (a*,*.« (x)) : value.of ({t})  =  {M '} A 
untag(M1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [ak,k'{y)/y]))
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From the above values of (¡’s' and (¡>'\ we have that:
(3 M  G Term : ip£(<j>£ ,L )  6 4>e{z ) =>■ 3i G <f>A(a ktk<{z)) : value.of ({ i} )  =  {L '}  A
untag (L1) =  (Vy G ¿mu(L) : ¿ [a fcifc-(y)/2/]))
=> (3M  G Term : ipe((f>'s ,M ) G «/»¿(a:) => 3f G <t>\{oik,k'(x)) : value.of ({ i})  =  {M '}  A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [akik'(y )/y ])) (From the antecedent)
By the induction hypothesis for P:
p[P'\M'(z).P'] <t>£ [z { ^ ( 0 £>£ )}] =  ( p ' " ,< 0  A
( ^ t f P J  p[P'\M'(,z).P'] =  0%) A
(3M  G Term : <p£ («fe [;z >-4 {<pe(</>£,Ii)}],L ) G (j>£ [z {(p£ (<j>£ ,L )}](z )  =>
31 G 4>'\{aklk'(z)) : value.of {{t}) =  { L 1} A untag (L1) =  (Vy G 6nv(T) : L [a kik>(y)/y]))
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 2), we arrive at the following result (where p ' " , <j>£
and (j>A are given in the above induction hypothesis result for P ):
( |+) flto«( |+) p"')\} , U* U 4,^£)=P,<t> A ( |J* U 0 <Pa) = 4>' A
m '(z) . p ' e p P e p  M ' ( z ) . P ' e p P e p  M ' { z ) .P ' e p  P e p '
(3L  G Term : ip£{<j>£ ,L )  G ^'¿'{z) = ^ 3 i  G (p'A (a k,k' (z)) : value-of {{t})  =  { £ '}  A
untag (L 1) =  (Vy G 6nw(T) : £ [a fc|fc<(y)/y]))
=>• (3L G Term : <pf(0, T) G <f>{z) =>■ 3i G 4>'(aktki (z)) : value.of ({f}) =  { £ '}  A
untag(L') -  (Vy G 6m>(L) : £ [a M /(y)/y]))
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
Case 3: (v a )P
A ^ ^ P }  p 4>A =  n spim P Pi 4>a  =  U0 p 4>a
P(zPf
£ spi{[{va)P]) p (j>£ =  (new(Aa.p'),<p'e ) 
where, (p',4>'£) =  f t spi([{]P|}> pD </>£ =  ( 1+1 P", U ^ f )
PGp Pgp
and, (p", <^) =  £ spi([P]) p (p£
By the induction hypothesis for P:
(£spi([Pfl pcf>£ =  (p,J>'£)) A ( ^ ( [ P ] )  pcj>A =  <t>'A) A
(3M  G Term : <p£(</>£, M) G 0e(x) => 3 i G <j>A{ak,k'(x)) '■ value.of ({ i} )  =  {M '}  A 
untag(M1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [akik<{y)/y]))
=>• (3M  G Term : f£(<f>'£ ,M ) G <^(2:) =>• 3i G <j>'A{a ktk'(x)) : vo/«e_o/({i}) =  {M '}  A




By the safety of the relation (Lemma 2), we arrive at the following result:
(new(Xa. l+j /si(£sp,([PD p <t>£)) , ([Z3]) p <f>£)) =  (p ,0 ) A
Pep p£p
( U ^p-'IIPD  p 4>a =  <!>') A 
Pep'
(3M  € Term  : <fi£{4>f, M) G 4>£ {x) =>■ 3t € 4>A{otk,k' (*)) : value-of {{ t})  =  { M ' } A 
untag(M') =  (Vj/ G bnv{M) : M[a*j*'(y)/l/]))
=> (3M  G Term : <pe(<f>, M) € 0 (x) =>■ 3t € <l>'(aiklk' {%)) ■ value-of ({t}) =  {M 1} A
untag{M') — (\/y G bnv(M) : M[ak,k'(y)/y]))
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
Case 4: P \ Q
A * & P  I <35 p 4>a =  f t spifl{|P|}„ Wp {|Ql}„ Wp p) r/M =  U , -4spi([P]) p" 0„
Pep'
£*pi<[P IQ5 p 0£ =  ft*pi([{]P|}p Wp AQDp Wp p D -  ( W p\ U* & )
Pep'
where, (j/,<f>'£ ) =  ¿ ^ ‘ ( [ P ] )  p" <t>£ 
and, p" =  p'\{]P|}p and p' =  {]P|}„ l±ip ttlp p
By the induction hypothesis for P :
(frfflPD  P" 4>£ =  ( ] / ,& ) )  A (^ spi(PD P" 0 *  =  <i>'A) A 
(3iW G Term : <P£(0£, Af) G 0f(a:) => 3f G <t>A{&k,k'{%)) ■ value .o f  ({t}) =  {M 1} A 
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M[cik,k-{y)/y]))
=> (3M G Term : (p£{</>'£ ,M ) G 0£-(a:) =>• 3i G 0^ (<**,*'(a;)) : t)«/ue.o/({i}) =  {M 1} A
untag(M') -  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [akik'{y)/y]))
By the safety of the U<> relation (Lemma 2), we arrive at the following result:
( 1+1 p" 0 £), U* « ¿ ( f ^ t P )  P" 0 f)) =  (P, 0) A ( U0 AspiiPD p" 0 * )  =  0' A
Pep1 pgp- p6p-
(3M G Term : <pf(0f > M) G 0ir(a:) => 3i G 0^(ajt,fc'(a:)) : va/«e.o/({i}) =  {M '} A 
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv{M) : M [ak,k-(y)/y}))
=> (3M  G Terw : <p£(0, M) G 0(x) => 3i G 0 '(a jtij!' (a:)) : wa/we_o/({i}) =  { A<f7} A
■untag(M') = (Vy G bnv(M) : M[ock,k’{y)/y]))





where, (n) =  let 0 \ =  .A^’d [ [  ren (P ,i) ]) p <Pa  in
II
let 02 =  A sp,<{ n  ren(P ,i) J) p 0 a in
1=1
i f  0 | =  02 then 0 i else T spi{n + 1)
and, Va: G bnv(P ),t G tags.of(P ) : ren(P ,i) =  (P[a:;/a;] )[£,/£] (by ,4®pi6)
where, ^¿p'(n) =  let v t =  £ S7"(J [ ]  P[bnv ¡(P) /  bnv(P)] ]) p 0t- in
n
let V2 =  £ ap'd I I  P[bnvi(P)/ bnv(P)} ]) p f c  in
i= i
if v\ — v-i then Vi else .P 'p,(?i + 1) (by £ spi6)
The proof proceeds by mathematical induction, where we demonstrate that jT^p,(—1) is safe
with respect to !F£P‘(—1) (base case) and that if .TA '(n) is safe with respect to F g ” (n) then 
(n + 1) is safe with respect to T s£pi(n +  1) (inductive step).
The base case: n =  — 1
^ p,' ( - l )  =  let 0 , =  ± D, in 
let 02 =  ylap,d 0  ]) p (¡>a in 
i f  0, =  0.2 then 0i else T A l(0 )
jT*p'( —l) = let vi =  (.L/jj^.X/j) in 
let v-i =  £*pi d O ]) p tj>c in 
i f  v\ =  v-i then v\ else J r|p,(0 )
From the above two calculations, we have that L nt — 4>ao is a safe abstraction of _L/; =  0 £O
since Va; G dom(</>£o) : 4>£o{%) =  0.40 (x) =  {} . Also, since we proved the case for P  =  0
(The second computation of !Fsp‘) earlier, then we have that:
(£*pidOD p f a  =  ip A 'e)) A (A»pim  P <Pa =  <t>'A) a  
(3M G Term : <Pf(0£, M) G 4>e{x) => 3t G 0.4 (« * ,* '(a;)) : value.of {{t})  =  {M '} A
untag(M') =  (\/y G bnv{M) : M [ak,k'(v)/y]))
=► (3M  G Tei-m : y>£(0£,M) G 0f(a;) => 3£ G 0^(a*,fc'(a:)) : valu e.o f({t}) =  { M ‘ } A
untag(M') =  (Vj/ G bnv{M) : M [ak,k'(y)/y]))
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The induction step:
We start by assuming the inductive hypothesis:
( ^ r ( n ) = p ' , ^ )  A ( F f ( n )  = <t>'A) A
(3 M  G Term : ipe{<ps,M) G 0 £ (x) => 3i G 0 ,4  (<*&,*'f a ) ) : value.of ( { i } )  =  { M ' }  A 
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv{M) : M [ak,k'(y)/y ]))
=> (3M  G T ern  : ifi£[<p'£,M ) G cj>'£ (x) => 3 i G (t>'A{ak,k' [x)) : wz/we_o/({f}) =  { M '}  A
untag(M1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [afe>fe-(y)/y]))
Now, we prove that the same safety relation holds for (n +1) with respect to (n +1):
n+1
+  1) — n  ren (P ,i) D P <t>A in
i = 1
n+2
/ei 0 2 =  «4spi ([ n  ren (P, i) ]) p <f>A in 
i=l
if 0 i  =  02 then 4>i else T A l (n +  2)
n + 1
^ • ( n  +  1) =  let v! =  £■*([ n  P[6nt;<(P)/6nt;(P)] ]) p (¡>£ in
i =  1
n+2
fef  w2 =  £ sp*([ n  P [ 6 r i j ( P ) / 6 n ( P ) ]  ]) p 0 £  m
i= l
i/ ui =  u2 then V\ else F £pi(n +  2)
From the induction hypothesis, we know that:
n + l . n+1
(£sp*d i l  P[bnvi(P)/bnv(P)\  ]) p (f>£ =  p',cf>'£) A (Aapi{  H ren{P ,i) }  p <j>a =  Va) a 
¿=1 1=1 
(3 M  G Term : < P £ { 4 > £ , M )  G 0 f  (x )  => 3i G <i>A{(xk,k> f a ) )  : uaiue_o/({i}) =  { M ' }  A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv{M) : M [akik'(y)/y]))
=>■ (3M  G Term : y>£(0£,M ) G (f>'£ (x) => 3 i  G 4>'A{akyk'{x)) '■ value.of ({t}) = {M'} A
untag(M1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [a fc,fc/(y )/y ]))
The remaining case involves:
n+2 _ n+2
A spi([ n  ren{P ,i) ]) p (j>a and £ sp*([ f l  P[bnv¿(P)/bnv(P)] ]) p <j>£ . 
i= 1 1=1
We can rewrite these as:
n+2 n+1
-4sp*([ f l  ren(P ,i) ]) p (f>a  =  A spi§_ n  ren{P ,i) \ ren{P ,n  +  2)]) p <t>a
i = 1 ¿=1
n+2
£ spi([ f l  P [ 6 n ^ ( P ) / 6 w ( P ) ]  D p 0 C =
1=1
n+1
£ sp*([ n  P [ 6 n u i ( P ) / 6 n v ( P ) ]  | P [ 6 n u n + 2 ( P ) / 6 n t ; ( P ) ]  ]) p 0 £
¿=1
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From the induction hypothesis, we have that:
n + 1 . n+1
(£spi([ n  P[bnV i{P)/bnv{P )] ]) p <j>£ =  p',</>'£) A (A 8pi{  n  ren(P ,i) }  p <l>a =<!>'a )  A 
1=1 i= 1 
(3 M  G Term : ip£(cf>£,M) G (t>e{x) =£• 3 i G cj>A(otk<k'{a;)) : i>aiwe.o/({i}) =  { M '}  A
untag(M1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : iW[cvfc,fc' (2/)/y]))
=> (3M  G Term : tp£ (cf>'£,M ) G (/»¿(a:) => 3 i G x)) : uaiwe_o/({f}) =  { M '}  A
untag(M1) — (Vy G bnv(M) : M [ak,k'{y)/y ]))
And from the antecedent:
(£spi([ p[6nt;n+2(p)/6nu(p)] ]) p =p',(j)'£) A (.4S3” ([ ren(P ,n  +  2) ]) p <t>A =  <I>a) a  
(3M  G Term : (p£ ((j)£,M) G <j>E(x) => 3i G <t>A{&k,k'(x)) : value.of ( { i } )  =  { M '}  A 
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [akik'{y)/y ]))
=>■ (3M  G Term : ip£ ((p'£ ,M ) G 0'e (a:) =>- 3 i  G <j>'A(ak>k’ (x)) : u a /«e_o /({i}) =  { M '}  A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [ak^ {y )/y ]))
We have already proven the case for the parallel composition of two processes,
P  \ Q }) p 4>a and ESV1<[ P  \ Q ]) p (f)£ (case 5). Hence, we can conclude that: 
{ T f { n  +  \)^p',4>'£) A ( ^ 7 ( n  +  l ) = ^ ) A
(3 M G Term : tp£ ((f>£,M) G (/>£(x) =>• 3i G (j>A{otk,k'{x)) : v aiu e_o /({i}) =  {M '} A 
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [afc,fc'(y)/y]))
=> (3M € Term : <p£((j)'£,M ) £ (p'£ (x) => 3 i G <f>'A(aktk' (x)) : value.of ({t}) =  {M 1} A
untag (M1) =  (Vy G bnv{M) : M [afc,fc<(y)/y]))
From both the base case and the induction step, we can conclude that:
(£■*([ IP 5 p <fi£ =  p\ <P'£) A (A^([ !P  D P <t>A =  <&) A
(3M  G Term : tp£ (4>£,M )  G </>f(a:) => 3 i G ^ (a fc .fc '(a;)) : uaZwe_0/ ( { i } )  =  { M '}  A 
untag(M1) =  (Vy G bnv{M) : M [ak,k'{y)/y]))
=> (3M  G Term : <p£ (</)'£ ,M ) G 0f(a;) 3i G cj)’A{a kikl(x)) : valu e.o f({t}) =  {M '} A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [ak}k'(y)/y]))
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Case 6: if M  =  N  then P  else Q 
A spi([if M  =  L  then P  else Q]) p <f>A =
( 7esj,i([{|P|}p l±lp p]j <pA, if, untag{tpA{^ >A, M )) n untag(tpA(<j>A, L)) ^  { }
I  7£spi([{]<2|}P Wp p\) <t>A, Otherwise
where, 7£spi([{]P|}p l±lp p])s <j>A =  |J0 A spi([P])s p"P <j>A
Pep’p
and, n spim \ ip  p])s <f>A =  U0 ^ piiQ])s P& <PA (by A spi7)
P&p’q
£ sp,([«i/ M  =  L  then P  else Q]j p <t>£ =
I  n spim p n)p p]) 4>s , if ^ ( 0 £,M ) =  ^ ( 0 £ , i )
| 7£spi([{]Q|}p l±)p p} 4>e, otherwise
where, 7espi([{]P|}p l±Jp p])s (¡>£ =  ( J0 £ spii-P])s Pp  <t>£
Pep'r
and, n spi{S\Q\iP Wp p js <t>£ =  |J0 £ spim s Pq  <f>£ (by £ spi7)
PZPq
Where, p'P =  {]P|}p l±Jp p, p'Q =  {]Q|}P l±lp p, p"p  =  Pp\{]P|}p and p£ =  Pq\{]Q[}>
Hence, from the inductive hypothesis for P  (the same applies to Q):
(£spi([P]) &  <l>£ =  <j>'£) A (A°piiPl) p"p 4>a  =  <f>’A) a
(3M  e  Term : ip£ (<j)£ ,M )  e 4>e{x) = ^ 3 i e  4>A{a ktk:{x)) '■ valu e.o f({t}) =  {M 1}  A 
untag (M 1) =  (Vy e bnv(M) : M [ak:k' (y)/y]))
=>- (3 M  6 Term : <pf(0£ ,M ) 6 </>£ (a;) => 3f e <j>'A{a ktk' (x)) : value-of ({t}) =  {M 1}  A
untag(M1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [aktk,{y)/y]))
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 2), we arrive at the following result:
( U 0 5-*( [PDp" 0 £) =  0 A ( U ^ W P p  0 , 0 = 0 '  A 
Pep' Pep1
(3M  e Term : ip£ (<f)£ ,M )  € (j>e{x) =>- 3i £ <f>A{a kiki{x)) : wa/«e_o/({i}) =  {M '}  A 
untag(M 1) =  (Vy e bnv(M) : M [akik'(y)/y]))
(3M  6 Term : <pf(</>,M) 6 0(x) =3- 3i € ft  (a kik‘ (x)) : value^of ({£}) =  {M '}  A 
untag(M 1) =  (Vy 6 bnv(M) :
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
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Case 7: let ( x i , . . xn) =  (M i, . . . , Mn) in P  else Q 
A spi<[let (x\,. . .  ,x n) =  M in P  else Q]> p 4>a =
U0 n ° pim P Wp Pi d>'A,
if 3 { M i\ .. . ,M tr? )£ < p A{<t>A,M)
J bv i>/4s^ 8l
where, cj>'A =  <t>A[ak,k' fai) i-* <t>A(ak,k'(x i ) )U { a k,k' (¿1)},  • • •.
&k,k' (^n) ^  $A-{.Oik,kl C^n)) U (^n)}]
, 7£spt([{]Q|}p l±Jp p]) (¡>a , otherwise
S spi<[let ( x i , . . . ,  x n) =  M in P  else Q]) p <f>£ =
' ^ O i ’DpWpp]) <t>'£ , i f ¥>£#£,M ) tn)
< where, ^  { i t { i „}]  by (£spt8)
[ W'IIQQDp &p P§ <t>£, otherwise
We extend the following constructs:
n * piUP\}p Wp p], =  u *  P" <p\
Pep’
T L ^ m P Wp Pi =  ( li) fs t(£ spi<[PD p" <t>'A) , |L snd(£°pi([PD p" <j/A))
p ^p' Pep'
where, p" =  p'\{]-P|}p and p' =  {jP[}p l±)p p (the same expansion applies to Q)
From the induction hypothesis, and ViV G Term, we have that:
(37V G Term, : ipe((j)£,N) G (f>s{x) => 3t G <j>A(ot-k,k'(x)) • value.of ({t}) =  {N '} A 
untag(N') — (Vy G bnv(N) : N [ak,k' (y)/y]))
And from the above values of (j)'£ and <fJA, we can arrive at:
(3Mj G Term : v e i f c ,  M j) G 4>e(x) => 3i G 4>A(otk,k' (x)) : value.of ({t})  =  {M j} A 
untag(M'j ) =  (Vy € bnv(Mj) : M,'[afc,fc/ (y)/y]))
=>- (3AT G Term : <p£ {<j>'£,N )  G 0g(x) => 3i G <f>'A{a k,k' (x)) : value.of ({t})  =  {N 1}  A 
untag (N 1) =  (Vy G fem;(iV) : iV[afc,fc- (y)/y]))
Hence, from the inductive hypothesis for P, we have that:
( ^ ( P i  P" <t>'£ =  [ p " , m  a  ( A ^ i P j  p" ^ = <^) a
(3M  G Term : ip£ (<p'£ ,M )  G </>f(x) =4> 3i G (¡>'A(a k^ (x ))  : value.of ({ i})  =  {M '} A 
untag (M 1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [akth'(y)/y ]))
=>• (3M  G Term : tp£ (cj)£ ,M )  G 0£ (x) =)• 3 i G <f>A(a ktk' (x)) : value.of ( { i} )  = {M '} A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [akiv  (y)/y]))
170
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 2), we arrive at the following result:
(( li) fs t(£ spi<[P]) p" ftA) , U0 snd(£spi([P}, p" ftA))) =  (p,<j>) A 
p&p' Pep1
( u 0 ¿ apim  p" <t>'A) =  <t>' a
Pep'
(3M  e Term : tp£(ft£ ,M )  6 <f>'£ (x) => 3t G ftA(a kik' (x)) ■ value^of ({t}) =  {M 1} A 
untag (M 1) =  (Wy e  bnv(M) : M [afelfci(y)/j/]))
=> (3 M  € Term : <p£ ((f>,M) e 0(x) =3- 3i e f t  (oik,k' (x)) : vaZwe_o/({f}) =  {M '} A
untag(M') =  (Vj/ € bnv(M) : M [ak,k'(y)/y]))
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
Case 8: case {M }n  of {a;}jv in P  else Q
case {M }tv o/ {x}jv in P  else Q]j p 4> A =
U *  pD <&> if, n  e  v a (<I>a , n )
where, =  4>a [<**,*<(a:) *-+ (¡u(ak,k'{x)) U { a kik> (tag)}}
otherwise
by (.Aspi9)
£ spi<[case {M }jv of {a;}iv in P  else Q}j p 4>s =
K ^ U P b p  ttip p]) ft£ , if <Pf(0£, {M }jv) =  sec(t,k) and <P£ (<j>e, N) =  k 
where, ft£ =  <f>e [x t-+ {i}] by (£spi9)
 ^ 'JZ8p i([{\Q\}p p]) 4>e, otherwise
Where, p' =  flP|}p l±lp p and p" =  p'\-QP|}p.
We extend the following constructs:
n ° pim P Up pd <p'a =  u 0 A spi m  p" ¿a
Pep'
■Jlspim p p } f t £ =  ( 1+) /Si(£ spi([P]) p" # *) , snd(£spi([P]) p" < 0
-P6p' p£p'
From the induction hypothesis and V7V 6 Term:
(37V € Term : <pe((j>E,N) 6 <fc(a:) => 3 i G <t>A(otk,k'{x)) : value.of ({ i})  =  {TV'} A 
untag(N') =  (Vj/ € bnv(N) : N [a k,k>(y)/y]))
Setting ft£ =  0 £[a: {*}] and (f>A(a k,k' (x)) U { a k^  (tag)}], then:
(3T e Term : ip£(ft£ ,T )  6 ft£ (x) =>• 3iap 6 ftA(a k,k‘ (x)) : ua/ue_o/({iap}) =  {T '}  A 
untag(T') =  (Vy € bnv(T) : T[ak,k'(y)/y ])) Where <p£ ((f>£,T) =  i  in rule (£sp,9)
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=> (3M  £ Term : <p£ {$'£ ,M ) £ q.b'£ (x ) =>• 3t £  <t>'A{a ktki fa)) : ua/ue_o /( { i } )  =  {-AT} A
untag(M1) =  (Wy £ bnv(M) : M [ak,k'{y)/y]))
Hence, from the inductive hypothesis for P , we have:
(£.*<(ip]) p// ^  =  A ( ^ p j )  ^  =  0« ) A
(3M  G Term : ip£ (cp£,M ) G 0e(a;) => 3 t  G (¡>A(a kik>(x)) : value.of ({t}) =  {M 1} A 
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : (y)/y]))
=£- (3Af G Term : ip£ (cj>'£,M ) G 0 £ (x) => 3i G 4>'A{ak,k'{%)) ■ value^of ( {£ })  =  { M '}  A 
untag(M1) =  (Vy £ bnv(M) : M [akik:(y)/y]))
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 2), we arrive at the following result:
( li) fst(£°pi<[P]) p" <t>'A) , U0 snd(£^l[P]) p" 4>'a )) =  M )  A 
P e p '  p e p 1
( [ J .A ^ i P ] )  p" cP'A) =  <Pl A
P e p '
(3M G Term : ¡p£ {ft£ ,M ) £ <f>'£ {x) = > 3 1 £ (p'A{a k^ {x ))  : value-of ({£}) =  {A i'} A 
untag(M') =  (\/y £ bnv(M) : M [ah,k'{y)/y]))
=> (3M  G Term : <p£ ((/),M) £ (f>{x) =4- 3t £ (¡>'{aktk'{x)) : value^of ({t})  =  {M 1} A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv{M) : M [ak,k'{y)/y}))
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
Case 9: case {[M]}^ o f  {[a;]}jv in P  else Q 
A spi<[case {[MJ}-;v o f  {¡a;]}w in P  else QJ p <j>A —
£ spt([case {[M]}jv o f {¡x]}jv in P  else Q]) p ft£ =
7lspi([{]P(}p Wp pj) <f>'£ , if <pf(0£, {[MJjv) =  pub{t, k+ ) and we{<P£,N ) =  k~
U 0 7 ^ p i([{|P|}p <\>’Ai if, n £<p a {<I>a , n )
{[Mi°s]}n + eVA(<t>A,{lM]iN)
where, 4>'A =  <pA[ak:k'{x) (j>A{a k,k'(x )) U { a fc|fc' (tag)}] by (^ 4spi9)
. n spim \ }p  Wp P i  <t>A, otherwise
where, 4>'£ — <t>£ •-> {£}]
Wp p]) </>£, otherwise
(£ **9 )
by
Where, p' =  {jP|}p l±lp p and p" =  p'\{]P|}p.
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We extend the following constructs:
 ^pd Pa = u0 A^m P"
P e p '
n « * m „  WP P i <j>'£ =  ( li) W W  p" <t>'A) , U 0 sn d (£spi([P]) P" #A))
P e p '  p e p 1
From the induction hypothesis and VZV 6 Term:
(3N  G Term : <p£ ((p£,N )  G <fe(x) =3- 3i G 4>A(a ktk: (x)) : value^of ({t})  =  {TV'} A 
untag (N 1) =  (Vy G bnv(N) : N [ak,k'(y)/y]))
Setting =  0£ [x i-> {i}] and <f>'A =  </u[afcifc' (x) H- cpA(a kih> (x)) U { a fe,fc' (tag)}], then:
(3T  G Term : ip£ (4>'e ,T )  G <^(x) => 3 tag G <j>'A(ak,k'(x)) : value.of ({tag }) =  {T 1} A 
untag(T1) =  (Vy G bnv(T) : T [a k,k' (y)/y])) Where ip£ (cj>£ ,T )  =  t in rule (£spi9)
=>• (3M  G Term : ip£ (<t>'e ,M ) G (/»¿(x) => 3 i G <p'A(a ktk' (x)) : value-of ({t})  =  { M '}  A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [aktk,(y)/y]))
Hence, from the inductive hypothesis for P, we have:
(£ spi([P5 p" 4>'e =  # 0  a  ( ^ d P j  p" ^  =  <^) a
(3M  G Term : (ps(<f>e,M) G <fc:(x) => 3f G <j>A(ak#  (x)) : w a/?te-o/({i}) =  {M 1} A 
untag(M 1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [ah,k'(y)/y]))
=> (3M  G Term : <p£ (<j>'£ ,M ) G 0£ (x) =>■ 3i G (j>'A(a kiki (x)) : value.of ({£}) =  {M '}  A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [ak>k'(y)/y]))
By the safety of the relation (Lemma 2), we arrive at the following result:
( li) M £ spiiP]) p" 0U) . u 0 snd(f^([PD p" 4>'a )) =  M )  A
P e /  p e p '
( u t A apim  p" <t>'A) =  4>' a
P e p '
(3M  G Term : ip£ ((j>'e ,M )  G </>'e (x) => 3i G 4>'A(a k,k' (x)) '■ value-of ({ t})  = {M 1} A 
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [ah>k'(y)/y]))
=>- (3 M  G Term : ips(<f>,M) G 0(x) =>- 3i G 4>'(a k,k' (x)) : uafee_o/({i}) =  { M '}  A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [akik'(y)/y]))
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
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Case: 10 case [{M}]at o f [{xjjjv in P  else Q 
A spi<[case o f [{x}]at in P  else Q} p $  a  =
U0 ^ Bpi< m ^ p p D  Pa > if-,n+GipA(4>A,N)
{{M^s}}n-E VA(<t>A,KMHN)
i by (A*& 9)
where, (j)A =  </u[afc,fe' (a) </uOm' (a?)) U { a kik> (tag)}] 17 v }
T^ apti{\Q\}p Wp pi <I>A, otherwise
£ sp,([fjttae [{M}]iV o f  [{«}]w in P  else Q]} p f a  =
T^flflPftp  Wp p]) <f>'£ , if <p£(0f, [{Aijjjv) =  sig(t, k~) and tp£ {(j>£,N) -  fc+
■ where, <j>£ — <j>e[x i-t {£}] by (£spz9)
7Z3pt d{]Q |}P Wp pj) <p£, otherwise
Where, p' =  {]P|}p Wp p and p" =  p'\{]P|}p.
We extend the following constructs:
K°pim P Up Pi Pa = U 0 Aapim  p" Pa
P e p '
}p  Wp p i  ^  =  (  l i l  M £ s p i tfP]) p "  < ^ )  , U 0  s n d ( f 9p i ([P I) p "  <t>'A ) )
P e P‘ p6p'
From the induction hypothesis and ViV 6 Term:
(3iV G Term : ip£ {(j>£,N) G f c ix )  =>- 3t G (a;)) : uaiue_o/({i}) =  {iV '} A
untag(N1) =  (Vy G bnv{N) : N [akik'(y )/y ]))
Setting <t>'£ =(f>£ [xt-*- {£}] and =  (/u[aM' (») <f>A{akih< (x)) U { a fcjfc/ (tag)}], then:
(3T G Term : ipe(<p'£ ,T )  G <f>'£ (x) => 3tag G <j>'A(a kik’ (x)) : na/«e_o/({ta5 }) =  {T '}  A 
untag(T') =  (Vy G bnv(T) : T [a k,k'{y)/y ])) Where <p£ (0£ ,T ) =  t in rule (£8i”9)
=>■ (3M  G Term : <p£(<f>'e ,M ) G =>- 3i G 4>'A(ak,k’ (x )) : value.of ({t}) = {M 1} A
untag(M1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [ak>k>{y)/y]))
Hence, from the inductive hypothesis for P , we have:
( ¿ Spi([pD pu fts = 4>"£) A ( ^ C P D  p" ^  =  <j>\) A
(3M  G Term : <fi£(<p£,M) G 0£(a:) =» 3 i  G <t>A(ak,k'(x)) : value.of ( {£ })  =  { M '}  A 
untag (M 1) =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [afc,fc<(y)/y]))
=> (3M  G Term : Lp£((j>'£,M ) G (x) => 3f G (¡>'A(ak,k> (x)) : value.of ( {£ })  =  { M '}  A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : M [akik>{y)/y]))
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By the safety of the relation (Lemma 2), we arrive at the following result:
( w  f s t i S ^ l P D p "  <t>'A) . U *  s n d { £ ^ m  p "  4>a ) )  =  M )  A
P£p' Pep'
(D ^ A ^ < [P U "  ^ )  =  <t>‘ A
Pep'
[BM  G Term : M) G => 3 i G $ A(«*,,*< (it)} : tiai«e_c/({i}) =  {M 1} A
imteff(-M') =  (Vy G 6m i(M ) : M [a * )fc,(y)/j/J)5
=> (3 M  G Term : i p c ( t p , M )  G <j>(x) => Bi G 0 '( t t t , t '(x ) )  : ?;a/iie-o/({i}) — { M '}  A
untag(M') =  (Vy G bnv(M) : A/[afc,i.-(2/)/i/]))
Which satisfies the induction step and the safety requirement.
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